The Necessary Being’s Knowledge In Mulla Sadra’s View

 

Ahmad Beheshti

  

 The problem of the Necessary’s knowledge is one of the most intricate and difficult problems of philosophy and theology, and there are only a few theological and philosophical problems that have been disputed as much as this problem.

The questions which might arise in this regard include the following:

Does God have knowledge?

If yes, does He have the knowledge of both His Essence and other than Him, or His knowledge is only restricted to His Essence and He lacks the knowledge of effects?

The idea of denying God’s knowledge of His Essence and other than His Essence is based on the principle that knowledge is either a correlation (idafah) between the knower and the known, or a form (Sêrah) corresponding to the known. As far as God’s knowledge is concerned, none of them is sensible, for an object cannot generally be related to itself, and the form, too, necessitates the plurality of the Necessary.

Those who believe in this idea are unaware of the fact that God’s knowledge of His Essence is knowledge by presence and none of the forgoing constraints can be applied to it.

The idea of denying God’s knowledge of His Essence is held by those who believe in a pre-eternal and lifeless principle. If one denies the life of the Necessary Being, one should necessarily deny His other high attributes including God’s knowledge as well, since life is the highest among the attributes of the Necessary Being (imam al a’imma).[1]

Those who deny God’s knowledge of effects (creatures) intend to deny God’s knowledge prior to creation (qabl al-íjad); for no effects existed in the pre-eternal plane and; therefore, the pre-eternal knowledge of them is impossible. However, as propounded in the Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Sadrian schools, the pre-eternal knowledge does not necessitate pre-eternal effects.

There is no place for argumentation in the Necessary Being’s knowledge of His Essence since every immaterial being, due to its perfection of essence, is present because of the external entity of its Essence. In this regard, Sabziwarí says:

“And He, the Exalted, knows His Essence, since the very existence of the world of essence is derived from His existence.”[2]

In Sabziwarí’s view, God knows His Essence since the existents of the world are its effects by essence, and according to the principle: “One who bestows perfection cannot be devoid of it,” the Necessary Being’s knowledge is by presence, as is the knowledge of effects of their essence.

Mulla Sadra says:

“God’s knowledge, which is the same as His pre-eternal divine will and solicitude, is the very unveiling of His Essence so that blessings are emanated from it to His Essence and by His Essence.”[3]

All three major Islamic philosophical schools[4] are unanimous concerning God’s presential knowledge of His Essence. Their difference lies in whether the knowledge by presence includes the knowledge of the cause of effect and the knowledge of the effect of the cause, or whether it is limited to the knowledge of the essence. The Peripatetic philosophers do not accept the knowledge of effects of the cause and the presential knowledge of the cause of effects, and believe that the Necessary Being’s presential knowledge is only limited to His Essence and the concomitants of His Essence, which include the intelligible and imprinted forms, and His knowledge of other than Him is acquired knowledge; however, the Illuminationist sage (hakím-i Ishraqí) has expanded the domain of knowledge by presence and basically rejects God’s acquired knowledge of other than Himself.

Concerning God’s presential knowledge of other than Him, two questions may arise: 1- Does He have the differentiated knowledge with creation (ma‘ al-íjad)?  2- Does He have the differentiated knowledge prior to creation (qabl al-íjad)?

The Sadrian answers to both these questions are positive, while the Illuminationists’ responses are positive to the first and negative to the second, for they consider the knowledge prior to creation as being undifferentiated. However, the Sadrian school is not in full agreement with the Illuminationist school concerning the with creating knowledge.

Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Theosophy represents the developed form of the Illuminationist and Peripatetic ideas concerning God’s knowledge. Nevertheless, Mulla Sadra has taken other ideas into account as well. In fact, he has taken all negative and positive aspects of his predecessors’ theories into consideration and, accordingly, developed a new doctrine that views God as the knower of His Essence and other than His Essence. This doctrine agrees with the knowledge of other than Him, both prior to creation and with creation. As we shall see, both of the above-mentioned types of knowledge are differentiated (tafsílí) and all the three types are knowledge by presence rather than acquired knowledge.

Undoubtedly, the explanation given by Mulla Sadra concerning God’s knowledge is based on the theories of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist schools, since Mulla Sadra, by excluding their weak points and adopting their strength, has succeeded in conquering a high summit among the philosophical summits.

In fact, the good tree (shajarat al-tayyibah) of Sadrian doctrine concerning God’s knowledge has emerged and grown in the context of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist schools and other theological and mystical approaches, and in order to thoroughly grasp the depth of this doctrine one should be well-versed in its historical and geographical background.

  

1. The Peripatetic Theory

According to the Peripatetic school, God’s knowledge of His Essence and intelligible forms posterior to His Essence is knowledge by presence. Since both His Essence and intelligible forms, which are concomitants for and posterior to His Essence are known by presence. How it is possible for some of His creatures such as man to have presential knowledge of their essence and intelligible forms, whereas God, Who bestows existence and ontological perfections, be lacking in them?

Ibn Sína, himself, is among those who prove man’s non-material soul as follows:

“let us assume that all man’s senses are paralyzed and he is unable to have contact with the external world through the senses of touch, smell, taste, sight, and hearing; even in this case he knows his essence, and perceives his own “self” directly and without the mediation of his senses, acquired knowledge, and intelligible forms.”[5]

 If man, who is one of the God’s creatures, can be aware of his Essence, so can God at the highest level.

This very man knows the existents of the external world through intelligible forms and; therefore, his knowledge of them is a kind of acquired rather than presential knowledge. He not only has the knowledge of the existents other than himself, but also the knowledge of having this knowledge; though the former is acquired and the latter is presential, for acquired knowledge requires continuity and succession.

Since man is not lacking in the knowledge of knowledge, and this knowledge is presential rather than acquired, God, who bestows perfection, is not lacking in the knowledge of knowledge and His knowledge is primarily presential.

According to the Peripatetic school, God’s knowledge of other than Him is of the acquired and imprinted type; however, this knowledge must be explained in a way to be free from all the imperfections and defects of the acquired knowledge of possible beings. It should be a kind of knowledge which befits the dignity of the Necessary rather than possible beings.

Active and Passive acquired knowledge

Sometimes the acquired knowledge is a cause for an external object and sometimes for its effect. We call the former active and the latter passive. For instance, when we gain the knowledge of the sunrise after witnessing the emergence of the sun in the horizon, our knowledge is of the passive and acquired kind, but when we design the form of a building in our mind and then create it in the outside, our acquired knowledge will be of the active kind.

Undoubtedly, the Peripatetics philosophers in general and their pioneers such as al-Farabí and Ibn Sína in particular hold that God’s acquired knowledge is active rather than passive; for the order of the objective world, which is the most desirable order, follows His intelligible order, and His intelligible order, which is a followed order, in turn, follows the magnificent order of His Almighty’s Essence, which is free from any kind of imperfection, deficiency, composition, and possibility.

Perfect and Imperfect Active Acquired Knowledge

Now that the first steps have been taken to purify the Truth from any kind of effect and passivity and it has been revealed that He is thoroughly free from passive acquired knowledge, it is the right time to deal with another division by which another incomparability (tanzíh) will be accomplished. If these successive purifications do not take place and we do not employ similarity (tashbíh) and incomparability (tanzíh) simultaneously, then we might go astray in our perceptions.

The active acquired knowledge can be divided into the prefect and imperfect types. If the active acquired knowledge is a perfect cause for the known and the essence of knowledge, the cause of realization will be known and the knower will not need the other in the realization of his own knowledge. In this case, the active acquired knowledge is considered perfect; otherwise, it will be imperfect.

One who is walking on a narrow and high wall might fall down immediately after he thinks about falling. Then his fall is a phenomenon which is realized once the knowledge of the fall is acquired and no other factor has been involved in it.

However, an architect who has designed the plan of a building in his mind and has acquired an active knowledge of the building needs construction materials, tools, and workers in order to materialize his knowledge in the outside.

The active knowledge of the man walking on the wall is perfect, and that of the architect is imperfect.

The Almighty God’s acquired knowledge of creation is of the perfect active rather than the imperfect type. According to the Peripatetics, the very God’s very knowledge of the highest order of creation has caused its realization, and He is needless of others for the realization of His knowledge.

The Divisions of the Perfect Active Acquired Knowledge

The perfect active acquired knowledge is either mental or intellectual. According to the Peripatetic philosophers, the mental intelligible forms are derived through abstraction. What the senses do is to perceive the particulars. The particular forms which are perceived through the senses are maintained and saved in the faculty of imagination. The soul can separate the particulars from accidents and derive the universal forms from them.

Nevertheless, the intellectual intelligible forms do not need to follow these stages since the perfect immaterial beings, including the Necessary Being and intellects, are free from the faculty of sense perception and estimation (wahm) and; therefore, they need no abstraction or separation.

Then the Necessary Being’s perfect and active acquired knowledge does not belong to the category of psychic (nafsaní) knowledge and the particular and universal perceptions of the souls; rather, it belongs to the category of intellectual knowledge.

God’s Knowledge of Particulars

According to the Peripatetic point of view, God’s knowledge is not by presence to be the same as the very known and to indicate the presence of the known before the knower; neither is it a kind of sensible acquired knowledge so that the form of particular to be known to Him by essence and the external object to be known by accident; rather, it is a kind of universal acquired knowledge. Therefore, one is justified to ask whether God has the knowledge of particulars or not.

For example, when the universal form of man is created in our mind, we have no knowledge of particulars. We only have the knowledge of some commonality among men which is the very humanity, and are unaware of the deeds, thoughts, moralities, and changes of individuals and particulars. Therefore, in a sense, it can be said that we have no knowledge of particulars and what we know is the very universal form of man and, in other words, it can be said that we do have the knowledge of particulars, not because of their particularity, but because of the knowledge of what a particular has in common with other particular individuals.

Evidently, if we say that God’s knowledge of the particulars of the world is of this kind, in fact, His knowledge has been denied, for in this way, He will have no knowledge of particular events and will be unaware of particular changes in this world. His only knowledge of particulars will be the knowledge of what they have in common (ma bih al-ishtirak) and the knowledge of universals.

If this interpretation of Ibn Sína’s theory of knowledge is correct, then Ghazzalí is justified in accusing him of heresy and considering him as a denier of God’s knowledge of particulars.

Ibn Sína himself took this point into consideration and tried to explain God’s knowledge of particulars in a way to be in agreement with his own principles.

He declared that as the generous Quranic verse says[6]: “Not an atom’s weight, or less than that, or greater escapeth Him in the heavens or earth.”

God is aware of particulars, and no particular phenomenon, even if it is as small as an atom, is hidden from him; but we should discover how such a thing is possible.

Of course, the theory of intelligible forms and imprinted acquired knowledge had cast such a veil on Ibn Sína’s life and heart that he did not even pay attention to the literal meaning of the verse indicating that: nothing is hidden from His Essence and knowledge, and this is the best evidence for there not being any intermediaries such as imprinted forms between the knower and the known in God’s knowledge. Quite the contrary, the knowledge must be either the same as the knower or the same as the known.

In other words, the knowledge prior to creation must be the same as God’s Essence and the knowledge with creation must be the same as the known. Of course, it is still too soon for Ibn Sína to realize that His Essence encompasses everything and that nothing is far, absent, and hidden from Him, as the lucid expression of the Revelation suggests.

In Ibn Sína’s eyes, God’s knowledge is an active and not passive one and is placed in the chain of vertical causes of beings; moreover, it is at the top of the hierarchy, right after His holy Essence; therefore, he has the knowledge of the causes of all phenomena.

Since the chain of causes and concomitants finally leads to an individual and particular phenomenon, and it is impossible for them to lead to a universal one, God’s knowledge, too, leads to a particular and individual phenomenon.

The reason is that, though the Almighty God has knowledge of universal forms, each of these universal forms is a unique species in the outside. That is, they are subject to the classification of accidents in the first place and to individual accidents in the second. They are so much subject to accidents till their species becomes unique.

For example, although our knowledge of immaterial intellects is obtained through universal forms and archetypes, the intellects are unique in kind because of their immateriality; therefore, the knowledge of universals is the same as the knowledge of particulars.

God’s has the knowledge of either perfect immaterial or perfect material beings; in the former case, God’s intelligible form has no referent other than the individual and there is no need for specific and determined accidents. This is because the intellects or perfect immaterial beings have no multiplicity in the outside and their species is unique by essence. In the latter case, though knowledge is not limited to individuals and all phenomena are universally known to God, a particular phenomenon such as eclipse, whose universal form is known to God, will become unique in kind because of its multiplicity of features and accidents and; therefore, the universal form has no referent except for the individual and hence, “Not an atom’s weight, or less that that or greater escapeth him, in the heavens or earth.”

That is why the occurrence of a particular phenomenon will have no effect on the Divine Essence.

To better clarify his theory, Ibn Sína refers to an astronomer’s knowledge of eclipse. An astronomer’s knowledge of eclipse is not a particular and passive kind of knowledge like that of others. Rather, he knows the particular phenomenon of eclipse through the knowledge of a series of vertical secondary causes. Naturally, the astronomer’s knowledge of the secondary vertical causes has a universal and not particular form. He has perceived through intellectual demonstrations rather than sense perception that one particular phenomenon is followed by another. He has discovered that the universal phenomenon of A is followed by the universal phenomenon of B till it reaches the universal phenomenon of C called eclipse, but the universal eclipse and not the particular one. However, this archetypal universal eclipse has been so much subject to classification and individual accidents that it has no referent other than a particular eclipse in a certain month, week, night, or at a certain hour, minute, and second in the external world. That is why when there is an eclipse, laymen gain passive and particular knowledge but the astronomer suffices to his own active, rational, and universal knowledge. Yet, he can still perceive the eclipse through the sense of sight and passive particular knowledge.[7]

2. The Illuminationist Theory

Shaykh al-Ishraq considers the basis of the knowledge of the Necessary the very presence of objects rather than their imprinted forms. For him, the Necessary Being’s knowledge of others is the same as Essence and at the level of Essence, and the same as act and at the level of act. However, God’s knowledge by essence is of the undifferentiated type. That is, God does have the knowledge of Essence and His Essence is the cause of objects, and the knowledge of the cause requires the knowledge of effect; hence, He has knowledge of other than Him but this knowledge is not a differentiated one, since neither the intelligible forms of objects nor the very objects themselves are present at the level of His Essence. He knows that His unparalleled Essence is the cause of other than Him, since knowledge of His Essence is the same as the knowledge of the causality of Essence which is a necessary accident for His Essence. Nevertheless, for Mulla Sadra, “the perfect knowledge of the cause leads to the perfect knowledge of effect.[8]

An important point which has attracted the attention of Shaykh al-Ishraq is that for Ibn Sína the Divine Essence has presential knowledge of His intelligible forms, but His knowledge of other than His Essence is gained through these very intelligible forms and is of the acquired type. So, the intelligible forms are intermediaries between the knower and the known, that is, the Divine Essence and other than His Essence.

Regardless of Shaykh al-Ishraq’s objections to the Peripatetics’ theory of imprinted knowledge and the criticisms which are rightly targeted at his objections, one might ask why we should consider the intelligible forms as intermediaries between the Divine Essence and other than His Essence, or why not consider the objective forms, rather than intelligible forms, as being present in the Divine Essence. Shaykh al-Ishraq must be praised for removing the obstacle of intelligible forms and casting away the intelligible intermediary between God and the world, and also maintaining the objective forms as being directly known for God.

Therefore, we had better acknowledge that these are the objective forms, rather than the intelligible forms, that are present before the Divine Essence.

Despite its significance, Ibn Sína’s theory of imprinted knowledge has been severely criticized by Abu’l-Barakat Baghdadí, Shaykh al-Ishraq, Khwajah Nasír al-Dín Tusí, Hakím Khifrí, and finally, by Mulla Sadra.

Ibn Sína has certainly played an influential role in the development of Shaykh al-Ishraq’s theory, which considers God’s knowledge with creation as knowledge by presence. This theory was later accepted by Mulla Sadra to some extent.

Though Ibn Sína could not solve the problem of God’s knowledge of other than Him, whether prior to creation or with creation, his success in solving the problem of presential knowledge of Divine Essence and presential knowledge of imprinted forms after knowing the Essence cannot be ignored.

He could solve the problem of God’s knowledge to some extent. He accepted the presential knowledge of the Essence and of the imprinted forms after knowing the Essence. Following his objections to Ibn Sína’s theory of acquired knowledge, Shaykh al-Ishraq replaced the presential knowledge of imprinted forms by the presential knowledge of objective forms, and thus solved the problem of God’s with creation knowledge of others. Hence, so far, in the history of the Creator’s knowledge, both the problems of presential knowledge of the Essence and with creation presential knowledge of other than Him have been solved. However, there is still a long and uneven way to go before the problem of presential knowledge prior to creation is solved, and the defects of Shaykh al-Ishraq’s theory of with creation presential knowledge are removed. More research is also needed to clarify the point that although Shaykh al-Ishraq was right in posing the problem of with creation presential knowledge, he could not appropriately perceive the weak points of the Peripatetic theory; rather, he himself had some arguments which are not devoid of contradictions and fallacy.

            All the criticisms of Abu’l-Barakat and Shaykh al-Ishraq are accurately classified and presented in Khwajah Nasír Tusí’s Kalam, and it can even be said that after him, Åakím Khifrí did not say anything new, and was not as successful as al-Tusí in the classification of criticisms. However, in Mulla Sadra’s sharp mind, none of the criticisms targeted at Ibn Sína are justified and no one has ever been able to completely grasp the weaknesses and strengths of the theories of this infamous philosopher of the Islamic world, who, after Farabí, held a high place in the Peripatetic school of philosophy.

Al-Tusí, who had made a pledge to be a defender and commentator, and not a critique of Ibn Sína, in his Shara al-isharat, only in the seventh book (Namat), in which God’s knowledge is discussed, violated his commitment and could not help criticizing him. He believed that Ibn Sína’s theory suffered from the following problems:

1. TheUnion of the Intellect and the Receptacle

Since the Necessary Being is both the agent of intelligible forms and their receptacle, this requires the union of the agent and the receptacle, because it is impossible for the agent of these forms to be anything other than God. Other than God is either necessary or contingent. The existence of another necessary is not possible and the influence of possible things on the Necessary Being is also impossible. Therefore, he must be both the agent and the receptacle of forms. The union of the agent and the receptacle is absurd since it requires the collection of possession (wijdan) and lacking (fiqdan) in the Single Essence. The Single Essence possesses perfection for being the agent and lacks the same perfection for being the receptacle, and this is impossible.

2. Objections in Terms of Attributes

The attributes of God are either real or relative (idafí). The real attributes are either positive or negative. Definitely, the intelligible forms are not among the real positive attributes since they are the same as essence, nor are they among the negative and relative (idafí) attributes. Then, there must be other attributes for God which do not belong to the three above- mentioned categories.

3. Essence as a Locus

To prove this idea, the Essence of the almighty God, which is the cause of imprinted forms, must be their locus, too. Thus, the cause is a locus for possible and multiple effects and, to put it more clearly, the Essence of the Necessary is the locus for many things which are both possible and multiple. Therefore, one might ask, “how can the Necessary be a locus for multiciple  possible?”

4. The Connection of the First Effect to the Essence of the Creator

Since the Necessary Being is at the top of the vertical order of causes and effects, to justify the idea of imprinted forms, which are vertically caused by His Holy Essence, it is necessary for the first effect to be connected to his Holy Essence.

5. The Impossibility of Immediate Influence

The pre-requisite for the argument of imprinted forms is that the Necessary Being does not exercise immediate influence on the world of being unless through these imprinted forms, and in this way, He brings the existents to existence from non-existence. However, if this thick veil of intelligible forms is removed, the Essence of the Necessary can exercise immediate influence on the world of possible, and bring the possible quiddities to existence from non-existence.

The conclusion is that, the power of the Necessary is unlimited and infinite. And His unlimited power, for which the immediate and mediated influence have to be the same, must not be restricted to mediated influence.[9]

Mulla Sadra’s Criticism

Though Mulla Sadra does not agree with the Peripatetic theory concerning the Necessary Being’s knowledge and pinpoints its defects in his masterpiece, Asfar, and in his other books such as al-Mabda’ wa’l ma‘ad, al-Shawahid al-rubêbiyyah, and Sharh al-hidayat athíriyah, he considers these criticisms unfounded and provides some decisive replies for them.

The Answer to the First Criticism

He says that here the renewing passivity and attribution to concomitants are confused. The renewing passivity is always accompanied by the potentiality and possibility for being a receptacle; and that is why an object cannot be both an agent and a receptacle. Since, the agent enjoys actuality and receptivity and is associated with potentiality, preparedness, and possibility. And for the same reason, it is not possible that act and potency come together in a single object. The union of the agent and the receptacle leads to the union of the act and potency, which is not permissible.

Nevertheless, to be qualified by concomitants is in contradiction to renewing passivity. There is no problem with simples to be qualified by their own concomitants, and the agent (ma -‘anhu) to be the same as the receptacle (ma-fíh).

For example, the number 4, which is among quantitative accidents, is simple in the external world, is not composed of form and matter, has concomitants, and is even, and that is why the agent and the receptacle have come together.

Basically, receptivity is employed in two senses: Renewing passivity and being qualified by concomitants. In the former case, its union with the agent is impossible, and in the latter, it is allowed.

Nevertheless, we should not be misled by the joint meaning between “receptivity” in the sense of renewing passivity and receptivity in the sense of qualification to generalize the same rule to both of them.

The Answer to the Second Criticism

The second criticism is based on the fact that the Necessary Being is qualified by attributes which are neither negative nor relative, nor even real. 

The answer to this criticism is that the imprinted intelligible forms of the Necessary Being are out of the categories of qualification, passivity, and perfection (entelechy). The Necessary Being is neither qualified, nor influenced, nor perfected by these forms.

The intelligible forms are neither the attributes of the Essence so that the Necessary Being may be qualified by them, nor do they exercise influence on the Essence so that the Necessary Being may be influenced by them, nor are they considered as perfections for the Essence so that His Presence may be perfected by them.

The Essence is perfect, and even beyond perfect, at its own level, and His attributes are the same as the Essence, and that is why the Holy Essence is denied the attributes other than His Essence.[10] Passivity is among the characteristics of imperfect beings. Entelechy is for those who lack perfection and gain it through secondary perfections. However, God, who has no attributes other than His Essence, is influenced by nothing, lacks no perfection, and is far from qualification, passivity, and entelechy.

Therefore, the Necessary Being’s intelligible forms are external to His Essence, but are among the concomitants of His Essence. Sometimes, it is claimed that the nature of qualification is like that of qualifying the concomitanced by the concomitant, like qualifying the number four by evenness, which is necessary for it and is not similar to those attributes which occur as accidents to the qualified. Even in this case, the separation of the qualified from such qualification is not impossible.

The Answer to the Third Criticism

According to the third criticism, the Necessary Being is a locus for multiple possible effects; and it is impossible for the cause to be a locus for effect, especially if the cause is the Necessary Being by Essence.

In reply it should be said that the Necessary Being is not a locus for multiple possible effects; rather, the intelligible forms, like the objective forms, enjoy vertical order in the same line.

The intelligible forms of the Necessary Being, such as the objective forms, are causes and effects in relation to each other. Neither the objective nor the intelligible forms have a locus. Then, just as the Essence of the Necessary Being is not a locus for objective forms, it is not a locus for intelligible forms, either.

After the perfect and beyond perfect Essence of the Necessary Being, there are two orders: one is the intelligible order and the other is the objective order. The objective order, which is described as the highest order in philosophers’ opinion, is compatible with the intelligible order, and the intelligible order is the perfect cause for the objective order. It is known by presence by the Creator and enjoys perfect presence. If it is not known by the with presential knowledge, another intelligible order may be needed, and this leads to a vicious circle, and both of these cases are impossible. But the objective order is known by acquired knowledge, and the Essence of the Necessary Being knows it through acquired and imprinted knowledge.

The Answer to the Fourth and Fifth Criticisms

In response to these two criticisms, it should be said that the disagreement between the Peripatetic and other schools is whether the first effect can be other than the Essence of the Necessary Being. Does the Essence of the Necessary Being exercise any influence on other than Himself through His own intelligible forms or without their mediation?

According to the Peripatetics, the first effect of the Essence is something which is the intelligible form of the first intellect, and like the first intellect, which is at the top of the order of objective forms, its intelligible form is also at the top of intelligible forms, and is not separate from the Essence. Then, the first effect is not separate from the Essence. However, this is not the case for the non-Peripatetic philosopher. Thus the difference between the two schools cannot be considered as a defect for either of them.

Besides, according to the Peripatetics, the Essence of the Necessary Being creates the objective order by the intelligible order, and as mentioned before, the objective order follows the intelligible one and originates from it in the same way that the intelligible order follows the Essence and originates from it. The non-Peripatetic philosopher may not accept this idea and consider the objective order as an immediate effect of and a subordinate to the Essence. At this point, we can say that it is scientifically unacceptable if one considers the differences between the two schools as weaknesses for either of them[11].

3. Mulla Sadra’s Doctrine

According to Ibn Sína, the structure of intelligible forms and the intelligible order of the Necessary Being is a criterion not only for the pre-creation knowledge and the with creation knowledge, but also for the post- creation knowledge. Therefore, the pre-creation knowledge is of a differentiated nature like the with creation knowledge.

Shaykh al-Ishraq, by eliminating the intelligible forms and the intelligible order of the Necessary, considers the presence of objective forms as the criterion for the with creation knowledge. But, for the pre-creation knowledge, he only maintains the criterion of the knowledge of the cause which requires the knowledge of effect, and this is nothing but the Necessary Essence’s undifferentiated knowledge of other than Himself.

Mulla Sadra has made a new attempt to disprove the Peripatetic doctrine and, in line with Shaykh al-Ishraq, define the with creation knowledge as the presence of the objective forms, and establish a strong criterion for the pre-creation differentiated knowledge.

A. The With Creation Knowledge

Mulla Sadra declares that:

“God’s knowledge of the existence of things is same as the existence of things through proof from the Divine throne (‘arshiyyah).”[12]

 To prove this point, he argues:

“Concomitants are of three kinds: concomitants of quiddity, concomitants of mental existence, and concomitants of objective existence.”[13]

In fact, it should be said that concomitants are of two kinds: the concomitants of quiddity and those of existence. The concomitants of existence are also of two kinds: objective and mental.

If something belongs to the concomitants of quiddity, it will never be separated from it. That is, whether quiddity is realized in an external or mental container, it will have its own concomitants. A good example here is evenness, which is among the concomitants of the number four and inseparable from it, whether this number has mental or external existence.

However, if something is among the concomitants of the object’s external existence, it is not among those of its mental existence, and if it is among the concomitants of its mental existence, it is not among those of its external existence. For example, temperature is one of the concomitants of the external existence of fire and is separate from its mental existence; and rational secondary intelligibles such as universality, particularity, genus, differentia, essence, being, and accident, which are among the concomitants of the mental existence of objects and are externally separate from them.

In the Transcendent Theosophy, quiddity is a mentally-posited quality and its concomitants are also mentally-posited. In fact, they cannot go beyond quiddity in their qualities.

With respect to quiddity, Sabziwarí says:

“What I have chosen to believe is that

“The concomitants of quiddity are mentally-posited.”

Finally, it should be said that quiddity, which is a mentally-posited thing by essence, will be realized and qualified as an existent by accident and through existence, and that is why it is qualified as a mental existent due to mental existence, and as an external existent due to its external existence. Nevertheless, quiddity is a mentally-posited and false entity by itself.

In this sense, the concomitants of quiddity, like the very quiddity itself, are mentally-posited by essence, so they are deprived of being realized essentially. If quiddity does not become existent due to the existence which is bestowed to it by the source of effusion, its concomitants will not come to existence, either.

The world of other than “Allah” can’t be considered a concomitant of the quiddity of “Allah”, since He does not have quiddity because of His being pure existence. And even if this world is among the concomitants of the Necessary Being’s quiddity, it must be made (maj‘ul) due to the quiddity of concomitance; while being made is not consistent with the necessity unless one believes in the principiality of quiddity and considers the nature of the Necessary needless of making (ja‘l). In this case, the concomitants of such quiddity are non-made (la-maj‘ul) because His quiddity is non-made, since the concomitants of everything follow it in terms of being made or non-made. If that thing is made, its concomitants are also made because of its being made, and if it is non-made, its concomitants are non-made because of its being non-made.

One might say that the world of other than God may be among His concomitants and; therefore, it will be among the concomitants of either mental or external existence. However, the Necessary Being is devoid of the concomitants of mental existence, since He does not become existent in any mind. In comparison to the Existence of the Truth, man’s mind is like a small chip of wood on the boundless sea. How can the chip reach the bottom of the sea?

Thus, the truth is that everything other than God is among the concomitants of His external existence. This concomitance is neither an essential nor a mental one, but an objective one. Objective concomitance and objective concomitancy require an objective concomitant.

Therefore, we should not consider mental existence, imprinted universal forms, and intermediaries between the existence of the Truth and objective forms as the concomitants of the existence of the Truth. Rather, they are specific external existents and are both the knowledge and the known, since objective concomitance and the objectivity of concomitant entail the individuation and not the universality of the concomitant. Hence, the concomitants of the existence of the Truth, instead of unveiling objective and external existents and acting as intermediaries, are the same as the outside, the unveiling, and the unveiled.

In the Peripatetic perspective, what is essentially both the knowledge and the known is the universal intelligible form; however, the external world consists of particular and individuated forms which are known by accident and mediation.

Ibn Sína had to go through a lot of difficulties to make a compromise between the universal intelligible forms and individuated objective forms, and materialize the essence of the generous verse saying: “Not an atom’s weight, or less than that or greater, scapeth him,” in his own philosophical point of view. Of course, it was not easy to understand Ibn Sína’s explanations, and if one did not devote enough time to deliberation or was unable to perceive his point, he would accuse Ibn Sína of blasphemy and consider him as a denier of God’s knowledge of particulars. This was the same mistake that Ghazzali made.

However, in this approach, there are universal subjective forms to open a window to the external world and introduce the external world both as His indirect known and object of power. Here, the external world is essentially both the known and the object of power. In other words, it is both knowledge and power. Of course, knowledge and power are used here as the attributes of act and not those of essence.

With this explanation, not only does he solve the problem of knowledge, but also he puts an end to the old debate between theologians and philosophers on power, and admits that both the philosophical and theological definitions are correct. Nevertheless, the theological definition of power considers it as a quality of act, and its philosophical definition treats it as a quality of essence.

The problem of bada’ (revocation of a decree), which according to Sadra: “is the religion of our Imams (a) and no one holds it except the chosen,”[14] is also solvable in this way, and those who equate Shi’ites’ belief in bada’ with the denial of God’s knowledge, are in the dark and are oppressing those who believe in it. It is true that the meaning of bada’ is “appearance after concealment,” but “appearance after concealment” in the Essence of God, and as a quality of Essence, requires denying God’s knowledge and believing in his ignorance; however, “appearance after concealment” in act, and as a quality of act requires neither denying God’s knowledge nor believing in His ignorance. In some places in the Holy Quran, also, no application or meaning can be found for knowledge other than the quality of act.[15]

Accordingly, nothing, whether material or non-material, is out of God’s realm of knowledge, and nothing is out of the realm of His activity, either. In Sadra’s view, God’s knowledge reveals His activity, and the direction of activity and creation is the same as having the knowledge of things in His unique Essence. And that is why the existence of objects is the same as His knowledge of them, and there is no difference or separation between the knowledge of objects and their existence[16].

Another controversial issue which has been differently approached by theologians and philosophers is whether God’s knowledge is a followed (matbu‘) or follower (tabi‘). Is it cause or effect? And if God’s knowledge is the cause of knowledge, then, what is the role of man’s free will? If all phenomena of the world, including man’s actions are subordinates to God’s knowledge, how could we consider man a free creature? The debate between Ash‘arite Khayyam and al-Tusí is directly related to this issue. Khayyam says:

“I drink wine and those who know this approve of my drinking  easily,

“The Truth knew about my drinking from the very first day,

“Then, if I do not drink, God’s knowledge will turn to ignorance.

He finds himself in a dilemma. Either he has to deny God’s knowledge and approve of man’s free will or acknowledge God’s knowledge and deprive man from his free will. Of course, since he considers God’s knowledge as being followed and undeniable, he denies man’s free will.

But, al-Ìêsí has emphasized that knowledge is the follower[17]. In response to Khayyam, he says:    

“Taking the pre-eternal knowledge as a reason for disobedience stems from ignorance in the eyes of the learned.”

Ibn ‘Arabí has also referred to the same idea in the following glorious verse:

“And we did not wrong them, but they were wont to the wrong themselves.”

According to Ibn ‘Arabí, the meaning of this verse is:

“What We have done to some of Our servants is the same as Our knowledge, and Our knowledge is in complete conformity and subordinate to what they are.”[18]           

Evidently, Ibn Sína’s opinion is in opposition to those of al-Ìêsí and Ibn ‘Arabí. He considers God’s knowledge as the followed but never considers it as being subject to determination since man’s free will is also among the qualities which are subordinate to God’s knowledge. The cause bestows existence to effect rather than annihilating it.

In Mulla Sadra’s opinion, both the doctrines are correct. Since God’s knowledge is both the followed (matbu‘) and the follower (tabi‘); the root and the branch; and the cause and effect.

As inferred from his words, and put in its clearest form, God’s essential and pre-creation knowledge is the followed (matbu‘) and His with creation knowledge of act is the follower (tabi‘). At the level of actualized knowledge, the existence of things is the very knowledge of them, and the knowledge of things is the same as their existence.

At the level of essential knowledge, the existence of the essence (as we will see later) is the same as essential knowledge, and the essential knowledge is the same as the existence of the essence. Therefore, as the existence of the essence is a perfect cause for the existence of objects, and the existence of objects is an effect for the existence of the essence, the essential knowledge is also a perfect cause for the knowledge of the existence of objects, and this knowledge is an effect for the essential knowledge. In fact, it should be said that the essential knowledge is a perfect cause for the actual knowledge, and the actual knowledge is an effect of the essential knowledge.

Here, we can see that there is only a conceptual and not referential distinction between the essential knowledge and the existence of essence. Likewise, there is no referential distinction between the actual knowledge and the existence of things; rather, there is only a conceptual difference. In many cases, referential union is linked to conceptual distinction, and it is not necessary for conceptual distinction to be always linked to the referential one. Zayd is not only known to God, he is also the object of His power and His creature. Obviously, the concepts of the “known”, the “object of power”, and the “creature” are distinguished from each other; however, the referent of all of them is the same, that is, Zayd, who is the place of all multiple conceptions and their single referent.

Mulla Sadra has solved the problem of the followed knowledge (matbê‘) and the follower knowledge (tabi‘) in a way which is not ultimately different from what we have said so far. He argues: One to whom God has bestowed the expansion of heart (shara-i Sadr) and in whose heart has cast the light of faith, sees with the eyes of his heart that God possesses a kind of knowledge which follows the known, and that knowledge consists of the forms of the realities of divine names. He also sees that He has the followed knowledge prior to the creation of the known; that is, the forms of objective existents. Therefore, he is using both eyes for seeing things. With one of them, he sees that the essence of God is the mirror of the forms of contingents, and with the other, he sees that objective existents are the mirrors of His face because of their ontological realities, and that He observes the forms of His names in them.

In Mulla Sadra’s argument, the realities of the names of the followed knowledge and their forms are considered the follower knowledge. The realities of divine names are both the known and the knowledge. Of course, the realities of divine names are followed by the forms.

There is no contradiction between what Mulla Sadra says and the argument that the followed knowledge is the same as the very forms of objective realities; and the followed knowledge is the same as the essential knowledge.

B. Pre-creation Knowledge

Ibn Sína’s intelligible forms are of the pre-creation and with creation types of knowledge. However, his main problem is that he considers the Necessary’s knowledge of other than Him as imprinted knowledge. For Ibn Sína, the pre-creation and with creation types of knowledge are differentiated, actual, and perfect.

Shaykh al-Ishraq has solved the problem of with creation presential knowledge; however, he has not been as successful in criticizing Ibn Sína’s theory and explaining the theory of with creation presential knowledge. He believed that not only the immaterial but also the material existents are known to the Necessary Being by knowledge by presence; while the material existents are dim and dark by essence and are not worthy of presence and knowledge by presence, and these are only their intellectual and luminous ideas which are deserve presence.

Mulla Sadra was successful both in criticizing Ibn Sína’ theory and those of other Peripatetic pioneers; and in explaining the theory of knowledge by presence at the level of act and the presence of material and immaterial objects in the Necessary Being’s knowledge.

Shaykh al-Ishraq, who shattered the Sinan epistemological system and eliminated his imprinted intelligible forms, acting as the criterion for both the differentiated knowledge prior to creation and the differentiated knowledge posterior to creation, could not establish his Ishraqi epistemological system so strongly that the Necessary Being’s knowledge, both prior to creation and posterior to creation, may be differentiated. The post- creation knowledge, despite all its adornments, was differentiated knowledge, but the pre-creation knowledge was undifferentiated, and this can be called nothing but a scientific error concerning the Necessary Being’s knowledge.

Mulla Sadra placed the post-creation knowledge on a firm stand and removed the adornments added by the Ishraqi school. Then, he made an effort to conquer the high summit of the pre-creation differentiated knowledge. This was not only a demonstrative effort, but also a mystical and Quranic one as well.

The key to the solution of the problem was in the Holy Quran itself which by the expression “Not … escapeth” (10:69) had attributed the pre-creation knowledge to the Essence, and with the expression “an atom’s weight, or less than that… in the heavens or the earth” had conceived of the pre-creation knowledge as being differentiated, and had not considered even a negligible particle as being hidden from God’s knowledge.

He subordinates understanding the intricate problem of the pre-creation differentiated knowledge to following the divine teachings, and declares that neither the Peripatetics and their pioneers, like al-Farabí and Ibn Sína, nor Suhrawardi, the founder of Ishraqi theosophy, nor Mu’tazalites, who held that the immutability of non-existents provided the basis for the pre-creation knowledge, nor Plato, who believed in the Ideas, nor Porphyry, who accepted the union of the intellect and the intelligible, were successful in providing a solution to the problem. Although most of them had been successful in solving the post-creation differentiated knowledge to some extent, the problem of the pre-creation differentiated knowledge, which is the same as Essence, still waits a solution.[19]

He says:

“I do not think an explicit expression of what I have perceived following a special method and through divine teachings is wise, since they are too complicated to be understood by most people.”[20]

Then he adds:

“Therefore, I will explain them implicitly, so that anyone who is created to understand and to be guided to grasp them.”[21]

Evidently, the solution of the problem of the pre-creation differentiated knowledge, after eliminating the imprinted intelligible forms of the Peripatetics, depends on the fact that the Essence of the Necessary to be such in which the forms of all possibilities may be seen, and since the Essence is the Knower of the Essence by presential knowledge, His Essence should be a mirror for the forms of the possibilities, and when He contemplates His Essence, He should contemplate all the possibilities in His Essence.

However, it is emphasized that the contemplation of the forms of possibilities in His eternal Essence means neither indwelling nor union. Since, indwelling requires two things: the dwell and the locus, and union also suggests the difference between two things which are united in their existence. In this case, His Essence will be the locus of all forms of possibilities in the form of indwelling or union, and this is not consistent with the perfect and absolute simplicity of the Necessary’s Holy Essence[22].

His Essence, is a mirror in which all the forms of existents are observed by the Essence; however, no possibilities have ever indwelled in His Essence, nor have they united with Him, and those who believe in indwelling and union are deeply in error.

Mulla Sadra has clearly explained and proved the rule “the Truth in its simplicity contains all things.” According to this rule, the reality of the Essence of the Necessary, who enjoys the highest degree of simplicity, possesses all the perfections He has bestowed to the world of other than Him, and His Holy Essence is free from any composition, especially one consisting of perfection and imperfection, possession and deprivation, and existence and non-existence, which are among the worst kinds of composition. Therefore, He enjoys all perfections, in the highest, noblest, and simplest form, and in spite of being undifferentiated and simple, He knows all other than Him in a differentiated form, and that is why we said: His holy Essence is like a mirror, by looking at which all things are seen by the truth.

The above rule is not only useful in solving the problem of the pre-creation knowledge, so that one will be able to conceive of it as being the same as essence and the very differentiated unveiling of all other than Him in its un differentiated ness and simplicity, but also in proving the unity of God and the objectivity of the Necessary’s Attributes with His Essence.

This rule is inconsistent with the rule of “Sarf al-shay’”, which is attributed to earlier philosophers. However, the rule of “basit al-haqiqah” is attributed to Mulla Sadra.

According to this rule all possible beings can be predicated on the Necessary Being. Since, he does not lack any of the ontological perfections, without involving composition, indwelling, or union. Nevertheless, concerning the last part of the rule that says “But it is none of them,” it should be kept in mind that predicating the possibilities on the Essence of the Necessary is neither correct in common technical predication, nor in the essential primary predication, since the former requires the union in existence and the latter entails union in conception. It goes without saying that the Necessary Being has neither union in existence nor union in concept with other than Him. This is what accounts for the other than Him to be predicated on the Necessary Being in another predication called the real and subtle predication.

Considering what was stated before, since the Essence of God is known by presential knowledge to the Essence, and since the Essence does not lack any existential perfections of other than Him, and since the Essence is at the highest level of simplicity, then how it is possible for other than Essence to remain hidden and unknown to the Necessary Being? This is the real meaning of the pre-creation differentiated knowledge of Essence in Mulla Sadra’s view.