Quarterly of the History of Philosophy
Volume 39
A Different Version of Immortality in Plato's Symposium
Hamidreza Mahboobi Arani
Assistant Professor, Philosophy and Logic Department, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
A well-established and common view in Plato's philosophy is that the immortality of the soul after death is a persistent and fixed type of immortality. The human soul, or at least an important part of it, which is the same intellect, is a substance of a different type and from a different world, which remains alive after death. However, Plato's Symposium portrays a perspective of immortality that, through creating a phenomenological image of the soul and attributing the tendency for immortality to Eros, considers the soul to be vulnerable to change. Hence, he maintains that the immortality of the soul is different from the common sense interpretation of this concept.
The present paper argues that, in order to understand and interpret Plato's intended meaning of immortality in Symposium, it is necessary to pay careful attention to some of his remarks in this regard, as well as to his discussions of birth and education, and remembrance and reminiscence. In this way, one could infer a dynamic and creative model of immortality which neither necessitates the after-death subsistence of the identical soul, which enjoys the passive and stagnant introversion of the Ideas, nor presupposes the existence of a soul of another type. The present paper, while referring to and describing Plato's four-fold model of immortality, explains their important, similar, and, in some cases, different characteristics. It also demonstrates that this immortality is in permanent unity with the creation of certain words regarding true virtue or its images and life in the memory of future generations and indirectly affects the world affairs.
Key Terms
immortality
soul
remembrance and memory
forms
virtue
Plato
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Concept of "Perennial Essence" and the Problem of "Revival or Establishment" in Suhrawardi's Philosophy
Ali Babaei
Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Mohaghegh Ardabili, Ardabil, Iran
The concept of "perennial essence" and its relationship with "Khosravani wisdom" in Illuminationist philosophy has prompted some researchers, such as Henry Corbin, to consider the purpose of Illuminationist philosophy and Suhrawardi's "huge lifelong project" to be the revival of the philosophy of ancient Persia known as Khosravani wisdom. The present study reveals that several pieces of evidence in Illuminationist philosophy indicate that his goal was to establish a new school of philosophy rather than merely reviving a traditional one. An analysis of the concept of "perennial" and the related concepts and the attention to the newly emerged referents of perennial essence in various civilizations disclose the truth of Suhrawardi's view. There are several differences between the concepts of "establishment" and "revival"; revival is a secondary, dependent, and imitative job, while establishment is an original, fundamental, and innovative endeavor which can also be followed by revival. Moreover, revival is consistent with historical changes, while pre-eternity is not a historical entity and is, rather, metahistorical, and any reception from perennial essence means receiving from a metahistorical source. Hence, discovering the relationship between ancient Persia and Suhrawardi's Illuminationist philosophy could never be Suhrawardi's main purpose. If he considers Khosravani wisdom to be a manifestation of the perennial essence, his view of Pythagorean philosophy and other schools of philosophy in some civilizations such as those of India and Babylonia should be the same. As a result, the advocates of the idea of the revival of Persian wisdom should repeat exactly the same views regarding the revival of Greek philosophy and other philosophical schools, while this is not the case. Therefore, Suhrawardi's main purpose, unlike what some researchers claim, was to establish the Illuminationist philosophy and not to revive Khosravani wisdom. A careful scrutiny of the content of the theory of perennial essence and its concomitants nullifies any claim as to Suhrawardi's being a Shu'ubi philosopher or the dominance of neo-Shu'ubism over his philosophical thoughts.
Key Terms
perennial essence
Illuminationist philosophy
Khosravani essence
Pythagorean essence
pre-eternity
Khosravani wisdom
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An Approach to the Concept of Knowledge in Pahlavi Texts and its Connection with Morality and Education
Sheyda Riyazi Heravi, PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Education, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran
Masud Safaei Moghaddm, Professor at the Department of Education, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran
Mohammad Jafar Pakseresht, Professor at the Department of Education, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran
Shahram Jalilian, Professor at the Department of History, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran
Knowledge has been manifested in Pahlavi texts, such as Avesta, in the word "wisdom". In such texts, Ahura Mazda is the origin of wisdom and knowledge and controls the beginning and end of creation in the light of His Omniscient wisdom. In Pahlavi texts, Bahman or good thought is the first Amosa Spenta that Ahura Mazda created and, in this way, actualized His role in creation. Moreover, Bahman is the symbol and manifestation or Ahura Mazda's Omniscient wisdom of His created things through which Man attains the knowledge of religion and Ahura Mazda Himself. Additionally, moral life, as the ultimate goal in Zoroastrianism is realized in Pahlavi texts in the word pledge or moderation. This moral virtue is based on knowledge. In Pahlavi texts, training is also the foundation of developing asn kherad (intrinsic wisdom), wisdom, and adopting moral virtues; therefore, it is considered to be one of the different types of perennial wisdom). Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study investigates the concept of knowledge and its different types in Pahlavi texts and analyzes the quality of its unity with morality and education.
Key Terms
knowledge
Pahlavi texts
asn kherad (intrinsic wisdom)
gush soroud kherad (acquired wisdom)
morality
education
perennial wisdom
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The Discussion between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa'id Sirafi on Grammar in the Cradle of History
Atefeh Ranjbar Darestani, MA Student of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam (corresponding author), University of Birjand, Birjand, Iran
Morteza Mezginejad, Assistant Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, University of Birjand, Birjand, Iran
Mohammad Fazl Hashemi, Professor at Uppsala University, Sweden, mohammad.fazlhashami@teol.uu.se
An important part of disagreements with Greek sciences in the world of Islam pertains to their opposition to the field of logic. The discussion of Abu Bishr Matta (died in 328 AH) with Abu Sa'id Sirafi (died in 368 AH) over logic and grammar is among the first manifestations of such disagreements. The studies focusing on this discussion mainly emphasize Sirafi's attempts at proving the superiority of syntax over logic, which, by itself, has resulted in the dominance of a linguistic approach over this debate. As a result, the whole discussion has been reduced to a number of linguistic debates in the mentioned studies. Nevertheless, this debate enjoys some hidden and profound methodological and epistemological aspects which could play a significant role in the correct recognition of the historical context in which it has taken place. In the present paper, the authors not only refer to these almost forgotten methodological and epistemological aspects but also demonstrate their central role through identifying them in the structure and texture of the words of the two scholars. Finally, they connect such aspects to a much vaster historical context.
Key Terms
logic
Abu Bishr Matta
reason
Abu Sa'id Sirafi
syntax
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Socio-political Roots and Consequences of Gandhi's View of God and God's Relationship with Truth
Alinaqi Baqershahi
Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
The present paper investigates the socio-political roots and consequences of Gandhi's view of God and God's relationship with truth. His idea of God and truth is rooted in Vedanta School of philosophy, Vaishnavism, and his studies of Islam and Christianity. Based on Vedanta philosophy, truth is discussed at two levels of nirguna (a truth without attributes or station of essence) and saguna (a truth with attributes or the station of names and attributes). In Vaishnavism, reference is made to Vishnu, who is one of the Vedic deities, as a personal God and the preserver of the world. Because of his philosophical interest in Vedanta and his family belief in Vaishnavism, Gandhi believed in both impersonal (Vedantic) God and personal (Vishnu) God. At the beginning of developing his philosophical thoughts, for several reasons, he concluded that God is the same as the truth for he believed that one can only refer to God as the truth. In his view, truth is not an attribute of God and is, rather, the same as God. In Indian philosophical texts, the term satya is used to refer to the truth. The root of this word is /sat/ (is) meaning that God is the same as the truth and being. Later Gandhi decided that, instead of saying, "God is the truth", he should say, "the truth is God". In his view there is a subtle difference between these two statements. Gandhi states that the only way through which one can attain the truth is ahimsa (non-violence) and, in order to clarify this term, he refers to the concept of satyagrah (holding to the truth), which, he believes, is the technique of using ahimsa. This mainly focuses on the great influence of Gandhi's approach to God and the truth over the quality of his socio-political campaigns against British colonists.
Key Terms
God
truth
Gandhi
ahimsa
Socio-Political consequences
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Place and Time of Mulla Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezarjaribi in the History of Rational Sciences with an Emphasis on the Content of Theological Manuscripts
Ali Ghanbarian, PhD in Islamic Studies (corresponding author), University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Abbas Bakhshande Bali, Assistant Professor, Islamic Studies Department, Mazandaran University, Sari, Iran
One of the Shi'ite thinkers whose scientific contributions have rarely been explored is Mulla Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezarjaribi Astarabadi (died in 1234 AH). He was one of the Shi'ite scholars of the late Zand and early Qajar periods who conducted several scientific studies in different fields of theology, particularly on Islamic beliefs. Hezarjaribi's works have never been published; however, a great number of his manuscripts in Persian and Arabic are available today. His writings and translations have played a significant role in the dissemination and expansion of the Shi'ite culture and philosophy. When composing, he always paid attention to the point that his writings should be readable by all the people interested in the field of theology, and that is why most of his works are written in Persian. Following a descriptive-analytic method and relying on library resources, particularly, a number of critically corrected manuscripts, the authors of this paper aim to investigate the nature and content of Hezarjaribi's most important discussions regarding theology. The findings of this study demonstrate that, in his view, theology is intrinsic while Islam is not. In order to prove the existence of God, he resorted to a variety of proofs such as possibility and necessity, order, and fiṭrah (human nature) arguments. Moreover, he tried to provide the correct meanings of some divine attributes such as will, justice, and wisdom to remove some theological ambiguities.
Key Terms
Mulla Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezarjaribi
faith
God's existence
God's attributes
religious ambiguities
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Principle of the One in the View of 'Ali Quli Ibn Qarachaqay Khan
Mehdi Asgari, MA in Islamic Philosophy and Kalam (corresponding author), University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran
Mansour Nasiri, Associate Professor, University of Tehran (College of Farabi), Qom, Iran
Daneshvar Nilu , Assistant Professor, Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran
The principle of the one has always attracted the attention of philosophers and mutikallimun in the history of Islamic thought. Some of them have tried to demonstrate it, and some others have criticized and rejected it. One of the philosophers who has criticized this principle is 'Ali Quli Ibn Qarachaqay Turkamani, one of the students of Mulla Rajab'ali Tabrizi. He initially quotes three arguments from Ibn Sina on demonstrating this principle and then critically examines them. He also adds a fourth argument to those of Ibn Sina and introduces it as his own innovation. 'Ali Quli Ibn Charachaqay Khan believes that a key point which has been ignored in these arguments is knowledge and its relationship with the essence of the Necessary Being. Regarding God's knowledge, he maintains that the simple essence of the Necessary is the same as the knowledge of quiddities and argues that an essence who enjoys the knowledge of Himself and other than Himself, who has absolute power over Himself and other than Himself, and whose knowledge is the same as His essence could emanate multiple things. Accordingly, he criticizes the arguments adduced to demonstrate the principle of the one. Following a historical and rational method, the present paper explains, examines, and criticizes the viewpoint of Qarachaqay Khan, as one of the unknown but important philosophers of the Safavid period, regarding the principle of the one. The Findings of this study indicate that he succeeded in criticizing Ibn Sina's arguments; however, his view was not much comprehensive.
Key Terms
the One
emanation
'Ali Quli Ibn Qarachaqay Khan
the First Emanated
commensurability