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The most important Avicennan source of Mulla Sadra is al-Shifa, and he mainly deals with the Illahiyyat (theology) section of that book. Due to his great attention to this part and, most probably, teaching it in his classes during his period of teaching philosophy, he wrote a commentary on it. Since it is incomplete, it might have been related to the last decade of his noble life. This marks the importance and significance of this book in teaching philosophy. He had frequently regretted and repented teaching the words and books of certain philosophers; however, even during the last years of his life, he could not still put down the book of al-Shifa and continued teaching it and writing commentaries on it.

Ibn Sina's other book which, naturally because of its importance, attracted Mulla Sadra's attention was al-Isharat wa'l-tanbihat and its commentary by Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi. He also paid great attention to Ibn Sina's Ta'liqat, which possibly contained the scattered notes he made during his life, as well as a selection of his achievements and deliberations. The disorderly presentation of the discussions of this book reveals that this philosopher did not intend to write it.

Mulla Sadra sometimes dealt with Bahmanyar, Ibn Sina's most famous student, and his book al-Tahsil and considered it to be a commentary on his master's ideas and theories.

Farabi was also one of the philosophers whose ideas were of interest to Mulla Sadra. Some of his books that Mulla Sadra mainly used as a source of reference was Fusus al-hikam and al-Jam bayn al-rayyin. Some believe that this book has been wrongly attributed to Farabi; accordingly, one must place his works among less important references.

After the above sources, Mulla Sadra mainly paid attention to Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishraq), Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Ibn Arabi. He was inspired by them and benefitted from them in founding his school of philosophy.

Suhrawardi is the representative of oriental wisdom and the philosophy remaining from ancient Iran which is sometimes referred to as Khusrawani wisdom or Fahlawyyun.[1]

Generally speaking, we can consider Mulla Sadra and Mir Damad to be two Ishraqi philosophers advocating oriental philosophers. That is why some Western researchers have sometimes called them neo-Pythagoreans (that is, Ishraqi). Suhrawardi believed that the realities could be attained through intuition rather than through rational reasoning. Mulla Sadra also followed the same method. However, in spite of his complete attention to Shaykh al-Ishraq and the principles of Ishraqi philosophy, where his basic principles are not consistent with Suhrawardi's words, he does not agree with his ideas.

His main disagreement with Suhrawardi is related to the belief in the principiality of quiddity, which has been attributed to this Ishraqi philosopher and can be inferred from his words. Attributing this principle - in the sense common today - to Suhrawardi has led to some contradictions in his words and ambiguities and difficulties in understanding his ideas. For example, in one place in his Talwihat, he says that non-material objects, whether the human soul or the supreme souls, are all pure existence. In another place, however, in order to reject the principiality of existence, he refers to the argument of the necessity of infinite regression and says that, if existence is principial, and if the externally realized object represents its existence (not quiddity), that existent will also need another existence, and there will be no end to this cycle.

Mulla Sadra had also understood this contradiction and frequently expressed his surprise at Suhrawardi's belief in the principiality of quiddity.[2] One of his other positions, is his bizarre belief in the gradation of quiddity.

Another theory of Suhrawardi is famous as activity-by-agreement, which he propounded in opposition to the Peripatetics and theologians. Nevertheless, Mulla Sadra did not accept any of his theories and presented a new one called activity-by-manifestation. Concerning the discussion of Almighty God's Knowledge from Suhrawardi's philosophical point of view, Mulla Sadra said, "This point of view belongs to someone who considers God's Knowledge of objects to be one that comes into being through Ishraqi relation." That is, God's light illuminates all the objects of the world, and all of them come into being due to this illumination and become a part of His knowledge. He further adds, "Beware that Shaykh al-Ishraq has proved God's Knowledge based on the principle of illumination (ishraq). I also advocated him in this regard in the past until I learnt about the truth and my God revealed his argument to me."[3]

Mulla Sadra's position against Shaykh al-Ishraq and rejection of his principles regarding other issues are also quite clear. In this respect, we can refer to the problem of disconnected imagination, rejection of the category of motion in quantity, and the problem of visions.

He also quotes some words from Suhrawardi's students, such as Qutb al-Din Shirazi, Ibn Kamuneh, and Shahrzuri, and mainly rejects them.

One of the other sources that we can possibly refer to for Mulla Sadra is Fakhr al-Din Razi (1149-1209 AH), who is better to be called his reference rather than his source. Some believe that this scholar is the same person whose ideas Mulla Sadra adapted to a great extent. Fakhr al-Din Razi is a theologian speaking the language of philosophy and is, more or less, similar to Ghazzali. For example, both of them are greatly intelligent and talented, are extremely knowledgeable, enjoy an amazing power of reasoning, and have written more than one hundred books or works on the sciences of their time. However, both are like capable travelers who follow a stony by-way and all their efforts, and talents are wasted on that uneven route. We should also say that, unlike Ghazzali, Fakhr al-Din Razi lacks proper scientific and philosophical taste and, in spite of his great power of scientific analysis and ramification of peripheral principles from the fundamental ones and doubting most ideas and theories, always chose the worst. Like Mir Damad, Mulla Sadra also called him the "leader of skeptics" (imam al-mushakkakin). This is because all of his followers called him "imam" (leader) out of respect.[4]

Fakhr al-Din Razi has many works the most important of which is The Interpretation of Mafatih al-ghayb (sometimes called The Great Interpretation), which Mulla Sadra sometimes referred to in his Qur'anic discussions. He also resorted to Fakhr al-Din Razi's philosophical-theological books, namely, al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah wal-muhassil and his Commentary of Ibn Sina's al-Isharat. Wherever their ideas agreed with each other, Mulla Sadra used his words as a confirmation of his own ideas. However, in different places in al-Asfar and some of his other books, he called Fakhr al-Din Razi Imam al-mushakkakin (leader of skeptics), maintained that he was incapable of attaining the truth, and responded to his questions and doubts very easily.

Mulla Sadra quoted his wrong words about resurrection by reference to al-Waqiah chapter in the Holy Qur'an and said; "This is the end of what the understanding of the people of theology (mutakallimin) has touched..., and, finally, his idea is more similar to the ideas of deniers of the Hereafter rather than those who believe in it."[5]

Moreover, he considers Fakhr al-Din Razi's other interpretations of the Qur'an to be wrong. This is against the idea of those who assume that Mulla Sadra was a microphagous of this philosopher.

Fakhr al-Din Razi had also some incorrect views concerning certain philosophical topics. For example, he believed that knowledge and perception are "relations", as he referred to in his Sharh al-isharat. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, Mulla Sadra, and many other philosophers have rejected this idea of his because, obviously, sometimes knowledge is there, and there is a form in mind without having any external existence so that relation is actualized.

I am surprised at the extent to which this person, who is called Imam (!), has deviated from the right path in the field of science. What has led to his confusion is that he sees no difference between the "quiddity" of a thing and its "existence".

Some of Fakhr al-Din Razi's other unfounded ideas and also arguments concerning certain problems have also made Mulla Sadra criticize him. For example, he has presented some arguments in order to deny the union of the intellect, the intelligent, and the intelligible and maintains that being intelligent and intelligibility are two separate realities. After quoting his words in this regard, Mulla Sadra says, "Although this scholar possesses an ocean of knowledge, he has not yet understood the difference between the concept of a thing and its external existence and assumes that the difference between the concepts of being intelligent and intelligibility is the same as the difference between their existences."

Lo! I wonder if there is anyone in the world who can match him in terms of amount of research and discussion and number of written works and theories and still moves so far from the truth and remains incapable of perception and developing a profound insight so that he becomes blind at viewing his own soul and its various acts (...) and does not understand that the soul is the only perceiver and intelligent... and it is the same soul that performs these various activities in different ways and through different means.... and as if he, in spite of being called an Imam and an authority, assumes that the perception of objects is possible by means of a tool in the sense that the perceiver (in this case), rather than the soul, is the tool, and the soul itself is unaware that it perceives by means of a tool.

The above irony of Mulla Sadra pertains to Fakhr al-Din Razi's objections to philosophers because of their attributing various acts and effects to a single agent (soul). When beginning to quote Fakhr al-Din Razi's reasoning, Mulla Sadra says, "This is one of the things that the writer of al-Mulakhkhas boasts about, and he is also happy about nullifying the philosophical principle related to the multiplicity of faculties."

Relying on his great intelligence, Mulla Sadra not only rejected the basis of the fallacies of Fakhr al-Din Razi, who was the master of all Ash'arite theologians (mutikallimun) but also portrayed his character and psychological features in various places in his books. For example, in one place, he says, "This man, who before contemplating the point, quickly objects to Ibn Sina and the like, lacks courtesy and enjoys a slapdash nature, and haste is the job of Satan."

Like Ghazzali, Fakhr al-Din Razi represented a group of opponents of philosophy who, in spite of their familiarity with a great number of philosophical terminology and quoting the words of other philosophers, had failed to find a way into the royal court of wisdom and the depth of philosophers' intended meanings. Neither were they totally unaware of philosophy and philosophical problems like the laymen, nor had they touched them from the depth of their souls and perceived their essence like the elite and true philosophers. They were in fact living in limbo.

Although knowledge, however limited, is better than ignorance, the laymen and those know nothing about philosophy are superior to residents of the limbo of philosophy and intelligibles. This is because their ignorance is not compound, and they know that they don't know. They make no claims about philosophy, do not tarnish the face of wisdom and philosophy, and do not throw stones at their firm structures.

Those like Ghazzali, who wrote Maqasid al-falasifah, and Fakhr al-Din Razi, who wrote Mabahith mashriqiyyah wal-muhassil, are like jackals that have fallen into a barrel of paint and view themselves as glorious peacocks.

In spite of all his natural talent in relating different subjects to each other and recording them, if Ghazzali had really grasped the essence of the Peripatetics' words, he would have never humiliated himself in the history of science. And, if Fakhr al-Din Razi, who was so gifted and knowledgeable, instead of merely speaking empty words, collecting disciples around himself, and pretending to know all sciences and have all skills, had tried to perceive the depth of philosophers' words through scrutiny and contemplation, he would have never rejected them so relentlessly and boldly and never developed such weak and absurd ideas and principles.

There is a reason why knowledge is divided in Islamic tradition into two luminous and darks types. Muslims believe that true knowledge is "a light that God shines not on every heart." If philosophy and philosophical problems can by simply acquired through reading books, extracting the ends from preliminary things, and perceiving theoretical judgments from axiomatic premises, why is there so much difference between Ghazzalies and Fakhr al-Din Razis, on the one hand, and those philosophers who have granted human life to the world by their words, on the other?

Another point here is that even if we ignore the role of the cursed Satan in this phenomenon, we can never deny the role of the despotic soul. Because of his talent, youth, and competence, Ghazzali was a very good candidate for working in the Nizam al-mulki politics of his period. Accordingly, the hand of politics dragged him to the Nizamiyyah Schools of Nishabur and Baghdad and, in defense of the unrightful vicegerency of the blood thirsty Abbasids, used this eloquent scholar and writer in order to suppress Shi'ism, whose active and combative branch was the same Batiniyyah. Due to the fact that the intellect, philosophy, intellection, and reasoning comprise the main front and means of the Shi'ites in demonstrating the truth, they made philosophy their initial target of destruction. Therefore, most of the life of this talented Ash'arite scholar was spent on propaganda against philosophy and rationality.

All through his life, Fakhr al-Din Razi was after something which he finally managed to attain, that is, a seminary full of naive students and disciples, the support of the rulers of his time, and the financial support received from the treasury. In order to reach his goals, he followed a policy based on protecting the survival of the tyrannical Abbasid government of Baghdad and the suppression of Shi'ism in any possible way.

The truth is that beyond the misunderstandings and compound ignorance of such people, who can be found in all historical eras and even in the contemporary period, the hand of politics, whether secretly or openly, is always the main director and programmer, particularly regarding cultural phenomena and categories. Whenever there is a trace of an uncommonly knowledgeable scholar, we will soon hear the footsteps of politics, as if the enemies of Islam and Islamic nations are lying in ambush, carefully observing the people of knowledge and science. Wherever they locate such a person, they rush to make him a tool of their politics and purposes, use him to create conflicts, dispersion, and diversion, and create Shi'isms from Shi'ism.[6]

The school of Shiraz deserves to be studied for several reasons. It links the School of Maraghah (or, according to some people, School of Tabriz) and the School of Isfahan. Moreover, it has revived the Ishraqi tradition and the Iranian-Islamic identity in philosophy. In contrast to some orientalists who believe that Islamic philosophy died with Ibn Rushd, the School of Shiraz managed to continue this philosophical tradition and introduce a number of prominent philosophers in the intellectual history of Iran to the world.

One of the distinctive characteristics of this school which has not been studied as it should have is the Illuminationist tendencies of some of its important philosophers such as Jalal al-Din Dawani and Qiyath al-Din Dashtaki. Both of them had reacted to the grand book of Hayakil al-nur and wrote commentaries on it following two different approaches. This work is one of the important books of Suhrawardi on Iranian-Illuminationist philosophy which connects him to the Shi'ite-Isma'ilite's point of view. During the period of decline after the 6^th century (AH) 'Allamah Dawani and the Dashtaki family paid attention to this work as the reviver of Iranian-Illuminationist philosophy and identity and extended Suhrawardi's important ideas which had been presented in three fields of Illuminationist philosophy, the theory of Imamat (leadership), and Iranian identity. This paper is a study of Suhrawardi's Hayakil al-nur and its commentary by 'Allamah Dawani.

Principle of the One and the Problem of the First Emanation of Almighty Necessary

Mansur Imanpur

The Principle of the One is one of the universal and useful principles of Islamic philosophy which plays a basic role in interpreting the problem of the regular appearance of existents from each other, particularly the rise of the first effect. Through analyzing and demonstrating this principle, Islamic philosophers have introduced the creation of the first effect by Almighty Necessary as its main application. They believe that based on this principle, only one effect is emanated directly from the simple Necessary Being.

Although the above principle is certain and has no exception in terms of its content and arguments, some deliberation over them and the fundamental principles that Islamic philosophers believe in reveals that their theory concerning the application of this principle to the problem of the first creation does not seem consistent with their theories and principles regarding the continuity of the emanation of Almighty Necessary, the need of effects to causes in their survival, the inclusion of the truth of all effects in the essence of their first cause in a superior and simple way, and the principle of the truth in its simplicity contains all things.

Mehdi Najafi Afra

Although Mulla Sadra followed the early theological and philosophical theories concerning the discussion of time, he still tried to create a tight relationship between time and being. By doing so, he corrected many of the ideas and theories of early philosophers in this regard and brought time from the domain of quiddities to the domain of being; he moved it from the soulless world of the body into the vast dimension of being and, finally, brought it into the domain of human mind and wisdom. In this way, human beings will be able to understand and experience changes not in the external world but in their own existence and all over the world of being. A study of the strong and weak points in his view of time is of importance to us because it provides us with a great insight into the future.

A Critical Study of Some of the Most Important Versions of the Argument of the Righteous

There are many paths to reach God because He enjoys an infinite number of perfections and directions, and each person follows his own path to move towards Him. Men of God, believers, and mystics all speak of the same truth; however, they use different languages, words, and proofs.

In terms of firmness and perfection, the noblest of all arguments on demonstrating the existence of God is one in which the middle term is nothing but He Himself. In other words, it is one in which the end and the aim are the same. This is the same path and method of the righteous, who demonstrate the Necessary Being by means of the Necessary Being Himself. The unique feature of the "argument of the righteous" is that there is no mediator for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being in it.

It was Ibn Sina who used the term the "argument of the righteous" for the first time. However, it was Mulla Sadra who explained it on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Transcendent Philosophy in an innovative and most solid manner. His interpretation is superior to those of Ibn Sina and others in certain respects.

This argument was interpreted and presented in different ways after Mulla Sadra; however, the writer believes that, given its philosophical premises, Sabziwari's interpretation is the shortest, and, given its objective reality and needlessness of philosophical premises, 'Allamah Tabataba'i's is the most direct one. The interpretations known as the arguments of the people of knowledge and theology (kalam) suffer from formal and content-related problems. Moreover, most of their discussions refer back to the principles and consequences given by Ibn Sina and Shaykh al-Ishraq. These interpretations did not create a basic change in the presentation of arguments on the demonstration of the Necessary Being. Therefore, Mulla Sadra's is the soundest, firmest, and most problem-free argument on the demonstration of the existence of God.

This paper has accomplished two tasks: 1) A study of the different interpretations and explanations of the argument of the righteous; 2) a comparison, critique, and examination of these interpretations in terms of their solidity and comprehensiveness to be used for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being based on the same argument.

Prime philosophy or metaphysics is one of the ancient sciences in the field of human thought. Since it was introduced and explained in a disciplined manner in specific and prominent books, its related theories have always been studied and criticized by the scholars of this field. Of course, research on the nature of the subject of this science has not remained untouched by philosophical critical views and analyses. After Aristotle, due to some of his apparently opposing statements, a debate started on the nature of the subject of metaphysics. On the one side, some introduced a number of immaterial divine affairs as the subject of metaphysical deliberations, and, on the other side, some believed that the study of existents in an absolute form was the main concern of this science. Nevertheless, in the middle of such opposing ideas, some thinkers moved towards a unifying theory based on which we can say that there are no contradictions and differences among Aristotle's statements. A unique interpretation of this unifying theory can be found in a consistent manner in Ibn Sina's works.

On the one hand, he believes that the subject and main focus of metaphysical deliberations is existent qua existent, and, on the other, he introduces existent qua existent as the same divine and immaterial affairs. He is of the view that the limit and definition of universal science is the same definition of divine science. In Ibn Sina's view, prime philosophy is a single science with only a single subject which is absolute existence. However, the domain of this subject is limited to immaterial affairs. Careful attention to Ibn Sina's words reveals that one should pay attention to the specifity of the self and essence of "existent" in his philosophy. The specifity of the "existent" means its decline from its station of absoluteness and the appearance of some natural or acquired characteristics in it which are only possible when non-existence accompanies it. A material thing is an existent which has dramatically been demoted from the station of the essence of "existent" and approached the borderlines of non-existence. According to Ibn Sina, the subject of philosophy is not a mental affair; rather, it is an external thing which, while enjoying external realization, possesses breadth and inclusion. This theory clearly explains Ibn Sina's viewpoint, which is based on the principiality of existence.

Philosophical Innovations of Seyyed Mustafa Khomeini in Theology in its General Sense

Seyyed Mustafa Khomeini had been trained in the school of the Transcendent Philosophy and had several innovations in Islamic philosophy. His ideas had been propounded in a big book called al-Qawa'id al-hakamiyyah, which has been lost. The writer of this paper has collected his new theories by reviewing 29 of his books. From among his 50 new philosophical ideas, 32 are related to problems in theology in its general sense which are also discussed in philosophy, existence and quiddity, mental existence, the tripartite division of being, motion, substance and accident, ontology, and cause and effect. This study deals with his theories and also refers to the ideas of philosophers before him, particularly Mulla Sadra, so that, while comparing them with each other, the place of each theory is clearly revealed. The classification of Mulla Sadra's ideas in the table of contents of the book al-Hikmat al-muta'aliyyah is a great step towards compiling the history of contemporary Islamic philosophy.

Amir 'Awiti Purdeylami and Muhammed Sa'idi Mehr

Given the epistemological features of the principle of "essences of causes", Ibn Sina claims that the certain knowledge of those affairs which require a cause can only be attained through the knowledge of their causes. Accordingly, the other possible ways for attaining this knowledge, such as resorting to "absolute posteriori demonstration" or the argument of "cause", are apparently invalid. However, he explicates that whenever the middle term and the positiveness of the major premise for the minor premise are two necessary premises for the minor term, it is possible to adduce a kind of certain posteriori proposition. Thus emphasizing the epistemological role of the cause does not negate the attainment of any kind of certain knowledge through other ways. Moreover, he maintains that particular intellection in general is similar to perception through relying on causes and concomitants and believes that it is useful for universality and certainty. On the other hand, according to Ibn Sina, the knowledge of the cause does not necessitate the presence of the actual knowledge of the effect. He asserts that, in order for potential knowledge to become actual knowledge, two conditions are necessary: 1) the necessary relation between the cause and effect must be stated based on the predication and convention and in the form of a proposition, 2) in addition to the knowledge of cause, other types of knowledge must be provided in the propositions so that a certain conclusion can be derived. The present paper investigates the epistemological role of the cause in various discussions in Ibn Sina's philosophy.

[1]. If Fahlawiyyun (Pahlawyyun) refers to Pahlaw, which is the changed form of Partho, i.e. the Partian race, from which the Ashkanids descended. It seems that this attribution is wrong because the historical basis of Ishraqi and Persian wisdom goes back to before them to the periods of Acaemenoids and Mades and even before them.

[2]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, chapter 4: On the True Objective Existence.

[3]. al-Asfar, vol. 6, al-mawqaf al-thani, ch. 11.

[4]. Some Iranian writers, without paying attention to the historical background of such group-related prejudiced title givings, call him Imam Fakhr al-Din Razi, as Ghazzali is also called so by the opponents of Shi'ism due to his campaigns against the Batinites and Shi'ites.

[5]. al-Asfar, vol. 9, p. 156.

[6]. al-An'am chapter: 159.

Mulla Sadra's Life, Works, and Philosophy

Prof. S. M. Khamenei

Mansur Imanpur

Mehdi Najafi Afra

Amir 'Awiti Purdeylami and Muhammed Sa'idi Mehr