This accurate method is clearly visible in many of the chapters and discussions of Mulla Sadra's book. It is quite obvious that this great philosopher, who is the founder of a firm, comprehensive, and living school called the Transcendent Philosophy, has no inhibition about quoting others' words. Unlike what a few exoteric people assume, Mulla Sadra does not plagiarize and does not introduce others' ideas as his own ideas and innovations. Quite the contrary, even when demonstrating his own theories, he tries to relate them, in a way, to one of the early philosophers.
However, some people, by finding in Mulla Sadra's books some sentences that have appeared in the books of earlier philosophers, some quotations the original writers of which have not been mentioned, and even some general titles of philosophical problems which have previously been mentioned in others' books, accuse him of abusing the works and books of other philosophers. They have frequently boasted about such discoveries and filled some of the annotations about al-Asfar with some insulting words which does not suit a philosopher at all. It has been quoted from Khwajah Mihnah, "It is far from humanity and fairness to retell others' shortcomings",[1] let alone attribute a defect to someone who is free from it.
It cannot be denied that in al-Asfar or some other books of Mulla Sadra there are a few lines or, sometimes, more lines quoted from others without using the word "intaha" (ended) at the end or referring to the names of their writers, so that any reader might assume that they were originally written by Mulla Sadra. It has even been narrated that his Iksir al-'arifin is the translation of Baba Afzal's Jawidannamah.[2]
In his Introduction to Iksir al-'arifin, Mulla Sadra himself admits that this book contains the noble points that he has adopted from the "books of the people of God", added some of the gnostics' ideas to it (and translated into Arabic), and called it Iksir al-'arifin. Nowadays, such works are called "translations and adaptations". However, concerning the quotation of others' words, instead of backbiting and bad-mouthing, one must resort to common sense, pure intellect, and other realities of human nature and look for its main reason.
Plagiarism is sometimes seen in poetry and literary works in the sense that one who has a weak poetic ability or lacks poetic taste presents others' poems in his own name. However, it has never happened that a gifted and skillful poet possessing all poetic arts, having composed tens of thousands of well-praised lines of poetry, and having always been the target of the jealousy of his contemporary philosophers and literary men steal the poems of lower level poets and present them in his own name, specially not those of poets who are famous, and their poems have appeared in various books and collections and are recited by both ordinary people and experts. Even laymen do not take this risk, let alone an intelligent philosopher such as Mulla Sadra. More specifically, his virtue, religious beliefs, character, and pure nature would never allow him to do so.
Mulla Sadra's school, thoughts, reasoning, truth of intuition, and inspirations are as bright as the sun and uniquely glorious, so that no one, unless the blind-hearted, can doubt their magnificence. He has adduced several firm arguments concerning various philosophical issues and criticized the theories of many philosophers. He has challenged the likes of Fakhr al-Din Razi (whom he calls the leader of skeptics or Imam al-mushakkekin) or Ghazzali, whom he considers to lack philosophical perception and tens of others similar to him. He also introduces philosophers higher than them such as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Dawani, and the like as being unable to perceive some of the intricacies of philosophy. Thus, why does he need to downgrade himself by restating the words of thinkers like Fakhr Razi, Ghazzali, Hamid al-Din Kermani, Ikhwan al-Safa, etc. particularly, when they present neither a new theory, a firm argument, or a new and strong reasoning. They add nothing to his knowledge but are, rather, some sentences that Mulla Sadra only brings at the end of his words in order to confirm or complete them or to inform philosophy students about them.
Many of these quotations for which critics have criticized Mulla Sadra are literary adaptations. This kind of adaptation is one of the literary figures and poetic or writing arts which we can see even in the works of great poets. For example, Sa'di or Hafiz have sometimes adapted one of the verses of the Qur'an and included it within the lines of their poems, or Sa'di has included one of Ferdowsi's couplets exactly as it is in one of his poems.
An example of such adaptations, which is considered to be a kind of advantage or perfection rather than a defect, and a sign of a writer's mastery over others' views, is Mulla Sadra's words in al-Asfar on love.[3] He has been criticized as to have extracted them from Ikhwan al-safa.[4]
What does the comparison of these two extracts show to a fair, intelligent person? Does it really show the scientific poverty of the narrator and his dependence on what has been narrated? Or, does quoting the classification of different types of love in the definitions given by other scholars reveal not only the amount of the efforts involved in changing the sentences but also the mastery of the narrator over others' books and words? Quoting such phrases, which represent a simple classification of the ideas of those who speak for or against love, is not a new theory, opinion, or argument that has been stolen from another philosopher, thinker, and researcher. Neither is it a violation of the rights of an unknown scholar whose theory Mulla Sadra has dastardly presented in his own name.
Almost all the people that some of these pessimists and perverts have referred to and accused Mulla Sadra of stealing their phrases are among the distinguished figures of wisdom and philosophy and their books are among the most famous sources and references used by the philosophers after them. This so-called important discovery of a few of Mulla Sadra's critics had already been declared by those philosophers who were familiar with philosophical books without defaming him for following a habit that was quite common among them.
One of the so-called discoverers of the secrets of history (!) who has written a treatise called Hamish Asfar wa kashif astar says about himself in a part of this work as follows:
I saw Fakhr al-Din Razi's Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah by accident ... It became clear to me that at least two-thirds of this book, certainly, consists of the statements phrased by others which the writer has attributed to himself and has not referred to the name of the original writer. Therefore, because I do not want the rights of others to be violated (!) and wish to make the souls of some people happy with myself, I decided to collected the related examples in this book ...
Then he refers to the names of about 100 books which he claims Mulla Sadra has used in order to fill his al-Asfar from their sentences. Finally, he concludes that this philosopher had no knowledge of himself, and he was neither a sage nor a philosopher, but a swindler who put the words, ideas, and arguments of others together in order to (!) demonstrate the principiality of existence and write those many important theories and ideas about quiddity, introduce the trans-substantial motion based on evident philosophical arguments, and present the theories of the truth in its simplicity contains all things, the corporeal createdness of the soul, the demonstrative and philosophical immateriality of imagination, and many other foolproof theories based on new and unprecedented philosophical arguments to philosophers such as Mir Damad and his other contemporaries. This is certainly a ridiculous idea because this critic cannot refer to any book in which the writer has demonstrated any of these theories in the way that Mulla Sadra has. Besides, how is it possible that no other authority in the field of philosophy, apart from this critic, was ever able to detect this so-called deceit of Mulla Sadra during the four-century interval between him and this discoverer?!
As we know, the greatest part of al-Asfar was written before Mir Damad's death (1041 AH), and Mulla Sadra and Mir Damad were continually in contact with each other. Mir Damad was one of the researchers and philosophers who had complete mastery over the ideas of his predecessors and had access to their books. If he had found out that any argument or idea of his student had been stolen from those philosophers, he would have left a note in this regard, and we would certainly know about it today.
One of the surprising events in the history of philosophy is the allusions of the philosopher of the Qajar Period, Aqa Mirza Abulhassan Jilwah (1312 AH) which Ashtiyani has quoted in his book and said, "... Instead of solving the problems of philosophical books, this late philosopher looks for different copies of books and, most of the time, according to our great philosophers, conducted his classes by comparing them with each other".
Mutahhari has an explanation in this regard which is exactly quoted here:
In the Qajar period, particularly in Tehran, the philosophers of the time were divided into two groups: some advocated Mulla Sadra, such as Aqa Muhammed Reza Qumshei, and Aqa Ali Mudarris Zunuzi, and some followed Ibn Sina, such as Mirza Jilwah. The followers of Ibn Sina tried to find Mulla Sadra's sources and prove that he had no innovation but merely combined different ideas and theories to each other without being a philosopher. Some also made rough comments and accused him of plagiarism.
Zia' al-Din Durri, who passed away about 20 years ago and was a professor of theology at the university, was one of the staunch followers of Ibn Sina and one of the opponents of Mulla Sadra.
... Moreover, Jilwah himself, who was Durri's master, has conducted a lot of research in order to discover (!) the sources of al-Asfar.
... After an accurate study of Mulla Sadra's books, on the one hand, and the sources of his books, on the other, any realist person will clearly understand that Mulla Sadra's philosophy is a specific and systematic school of philosophy that did not exist before, and it is impossible to have been developed through a blending of different schools. The principles and pillars of this philosophy have not been adapted from another school and it is quite innovative. Given the fact that Mulla Sadra's books cover a specific period of philosophy and not merely his own philosophical theories, they naturally present a number of theories from sources other than those of his...
Surprisingly enough, Durri refers to some of the titles of al-Asfar's chapters which are exactly the same as the topics and titles of Ibn Sina's Rasa'il. Apparently, he expected the titles of al-Asfar to be different. It is even more surprising that in some cases he has not even paid attention that if the titles of chapters are the same, their contents are totally different.
In another place in the same work, Mutahhari says:
It is impossible that such a systematic school of philosophy appears out of the mixture of others' book. Even if it were possible, this is by itself a kind of innovation. This is like the case in which one combines the different parts of automobiles, weaving machines, sugar making machines, etc. and creates a new machine which is different from all of them.
Secondly, the main pillars of Mulla Sadra's philosophy have been innovated by him. They had never been propounded in the books of his predecessors, or even if they had, they had been considered to be false. He demonstrated such problems. Or, they had been propounded in gnostic books and were considered to be a beyond-reasoning problem, for which Mulla Sadra presented a firm and substantial philosophical basis…
Basically, the difference of scientific and philosophical books from literary books is that the former discover the realities. Science is like a palace which is gradually constructed by a number of people and all of them are considered to be its builders. An innovator is one who adds something to that palace. It is impossible that true knowledge or philosophy has various palaces because truth is only one… However, literary men, poets, and artists are each constructors of a separated palace. That is why adaptation is allowed in sciences but not in poetry.
As we saw, when we look fairly and impartially at the quoting of the words and ideas of philosophers and theologians or Sufists in Mulla Sadra's books, it becomes clear to us that the writing of a great philosophical and content-rich book such as al-Asfar is impossible without quoting the statements and ideas of others, whether the original writer is cited, which is called quotation, or not. The sublime palace of philosophy cannot be built without adding to what others have done, and quoting others is not in contrast to Mulla Sadra's being innovative and the independence, modernity, and consistency of this school, i.e. the Transcendent Philosophy. Of course, some have even objected to Mulla Sadra's naming his book as such and maintain that they have seen it (as an attribute and not a noun) in the works of Ibn Sina, Mir Damad, Qaysari, and even their own contemporaries such as Mulla Shamsa Gilani and Mir Seyyed Ahmad 'Alawi Amuli.
Nevertheless, they are ignorant of the fact that neither has Mulla Sadra claimed that no one has ever created that title before, nor does anyone is expelled from the line of researchers and innovators in the field of philosophy because of such denomination. This is particularly the case because before these philosophers of the Qajar period no one had ever accused Mulla Sadra of stealing others' ideas or denied his station. His contemporaries and heirs had truly nicknamed him the highest of all theologians and the supreme master of all researchers. Fayyad Lahiji, who was himself one of the teachers of Ibn Sina's school and theology, wrote about his master, Mulla Sadra, that anyone who stepped on this way tried to mend something, but he created a totally new structure.[5]
Indeed, the essence and truth of everything that has been said for or against Mulla Sadra is the above few words.
* * *
Those who have implicitly accused Mulla Sadra, particularly in his al-Asfar, of plagiarism (rather than adaptation), if we do not say that they have fallen in the trap of satanic temptations and slandered him out of malevolence pursuing unknown purposes, are in fact unaware of the tradition of early philosophers. That is perhaps why they not only accuse Mulla Sadra of plagiarism but also draw their swords recklessly at many others who are famous for their creativity and innovation and complained against them to the court of history.
Zia' al-Din Durri, one of the most famous of such people, writes about Ghazzali as follows:
He has written the book of Yahya Deylami Nasrani called Bitariq, which has been written on the rejection of philosophers in his own name and called it Tahafut. However, he has replaced the name of Aristotle by Ibn Sina in his book. In his book Ma'arij al-quds he has plagiarized most of the chapters of Ibn Sina's al-Nijat and presented it from the beginning to the end in his own name. From page 128, printed in Egypt and on the subsistence of the soul, he has copied the sentences of al-Nijat and from page 168, on happiness and adversity, up to the end of page 177 he has again copied the words of al-Nijat, although full of errors. Apparently, he has not noticed its errors.
Abstracts
Esoteric Interpretation (Ta'wil) of the Holy Qur'an in Mulla Sadra's School
A study of Mulla Sadra's method of interpretation reveals that he considers Ta'wil to be a method based on three elements: revelation (Qur'an), rational analyses (argument), and purification of the soul (gnosis). Mulla Sadra's genius lies in the fact that he combines these three elements, which lead to a single truth, with each other and removes their apparent inconsistencies with the aid of ta'wil.
He has frequently emphasized that the basic condition in ta'wil is being in agreement with the Book and Sunna, so that both testify to its being true. Otherwise, the ta'wil will be absurd and sinful and nothing but idle talk and blasphemy.
Key Terms
ta'wil method of interpretation
philosophical ta'wil gnostic ta'wil
Disengagement of the Soul in the Context of Concept and Judgment
Man cognizes existents through either acquired or presential knowledge. The former includes concept and judgment, and concept consists of sense perception, imagination, and reason. Having access to sensual and imaginative concepts about corporeal existents is possible for all human beings. However, some philosophers believe that most people cannot reach the level of rational (universal) concept.
One cannot receive sensual imaginal knowledge from abstract existents. Therefore, the only possible concept of abstract existents, just for a few of them, is the (universal) rational concept. Man cannot perceive the objective disengagement of the soul through universal concepts.
Philosophers such as Mulla Sadra who believe that acquired knowledge cannot help man to understand the reality of the soul, while presenting some arguments in order to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul, believe that they lead to certainty. Given the fact that arguments produce acquire knowledge, their purpose is to create rational certainty rather than one that can be attained through intuitive knowledge. The arguments adduced for the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul can be classified based on their principles.
Key Terms
soul immateriality
judgment intuition
argument Mulla Sadra
concept
Semantics of the Devine Decree based on the Interpretation of the Transcendent Philosophy
In comparison to the universal worlds of being, the divine decree is the same level of intellectual forms, which is beyond natural and soulish forms. These forms, which are emanated from Almighty Necessary in a sudden and immediate form, are considered to be one of the levels of divine Knowledge called scientific decree, which, at a higher level, leads to the essential divine Knowledge. On the other hand, the cause-effect order of the world of being and the attribution of this world to its perfect and life-giving cause, which is the origin of the necessity and appearance of the world of being, is the same objective decree. Therefore, the divine decree manifests the attribution of the whole world of being at two scientific and objective levels to Almighty Truth.
A correct explanation and analysis of the issue of the divine decree must be done by paying attention to both divine knowledge and the necessity of the order of the world. This is because the divine decree clarifies both of them, and paying attention to one of them and ignoring the other cannot reveal the truth of the issue of the divine decree to us. This paper is intended to explain and analyze this issue in the Transcendent Philosophy based on the works of Mulla Sadra and 'Allamah Tabataba'i.
Key Terms
decree necessity
destiny order of being
causality divine Knowledge
The Extent of the Influence of Gnostic Teachings on the Analysis of the Quality of the Origination of the World
The rise of the Transcendent Philosophy and the opportunity to benefit from the interplay of philosophy and gnosis provided the chance for researchers to examine philosophical issues based on gnostic principles, while appreciating the rational-philosophical explorations of early philosophers. From among these issues, we can refer to the createdness of the world.
Apart from the four different theological and philosophical analyses of this issue, that is, temporal createdness, essential createdness, perpetual createdness, and natural createdness, some of the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy have tried to present a new design of the createdness of the world which is essentially different from previous ones. They have done this based on gnostic teachings, such as the principiality and unity of being, manifestation of existence in the arc of descent, the necessity of the nature of existence, and the like.
Based on the three theories of nominal createdness, actual createdness, and createdness by truth, which were presented by Haj Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, Ilahi Qumshe'i, and Allamah Tabataba'i, respectively, there is no word about the precedence or non-precedence of the existence of the world by non-existence, in the sense that is discussed in theological philosophical sources, anymore. Rather, exiting the interiors has replaced it in the analysis of the createdness of the world. This is because, in the gnostic view, the world is one of the manifestations of the divine existence, which is not prone to non-existence.
As a result, when going through its descending levels, existence has moved from unity to plurality, from inward to outward, and from hiddenness to openness, and the material world gradually shows itself.
In this state, there remains no place for lengthy and, at times, useless discussions about the quality of the union of the created and the pre-eternal, and the changing and the fixed.
Key Terms
existence createdness
world nominal createdness
actual createdness createdness by truth
An Analysis of the Application of the Concept of Substance in Aristotle's Philosophy
Historians of philosophy claim that Aristotle was the first to discuss substance extensively. He analyzed this issue in his books, Categories, Metaphysics, and Physics, for three different purposes. In Categories, after examining the different types of subject and predicate, the first and second substances have been distinguished from each other. In Metaphysics, he has dealt with substance with the purpose of a search for the existentiality of existents based on four aspects: essence, universal, genus, and subject. Finally, in his Physics, another interpretation of substance has been given in order to clarify the issue of a fixed subject in the course of motion. Consequently, some of his critiques have accused him of self-contradiction in these works. This paper is intended to clarify this problem by reference to the works of Aristotle and the analyses of his commentators.
Key Terms
substance predicate
Catgories essence
Physics universal
Metaphysics genus
subject existence
matter form
Intellects in Sadrian Philosophy and the Angelology of Nahjulbalaghah
In this paper, the writers have compared Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas concerning the intellects and the angelology of Nahjulbalaghah. In doing so, they have studied all of Mulla Sadra's philosophical and interpretive books and collected his ideas on the intellects. Moreover, they have also had a thorough study of the content of Nahjulbalaghah in relation to angels. Then, only by the study of the two attributes of the "abstraction" and "plurality" of angels (in Nahjulbalaghah) and the intellects (in Mulla Sadra's philosophy), they have concluded that favorite angels correspond to the intellects only if they are at the level of perfect abstraction. However, in the case of ontological decline and assimilation of those angels in form and configuration to their lower world, they will not correspond to the intellects. In terms of plurality, angels are also as numerous as the intellects and enjoy specific and gradational multiplicity. Nevertheless, nothing has been mentioned concerning the origin of angel's plurality in Nahjulbalaghah.
Key Terms
angel assimilation
intellects station of the known
abstraction plurality
Inconsistency of the Principle of Presupposition with the Principle of Conversion by Contradiction
One of the most important principles of old logic and Aristotle's philosophy is the principle of presupposition, based on which "the affirmation of an attribute for a subject is posterior to the affirmation of that subject." From among the important consequences of this principle, we can refer to the following two propositions:
1. An affirmative proposition without a subject is false.
2. A negative proposition without a subject is true.
The following two propositions are in opposition to the principle of conversion by contradiction because of the following example:
A. The general negative proposition of "no non-existent is non-existent" is true because of the lack of subject (according to proposition 2).
B. The conversion by contradiction of this proposition, i.e. "some non-existents are not non-existent", is false (This is because it is the same as the particular negative proposition of "some existents are not in existence". The opposite of this proposition i.e." every existent is in existence, is true.
This indicates that the principle of the conversion by contradiction does not preserve the truth of the proposition, whereas the "preservation of truth" has been mentioned in the definition or the principle of conversion by contradiction. This example of this principle is in contrast to the second consequence of the principle of presupposition (proposition 2). In this paper, some other examples of the principle of conversion by contradiction will be presented which are inconsistent with the second consequence of the principle of presupposition proposition. Since the principle of conversion by contradiction has two definitions (given by early and contemporary philosophers), the inconsistency of the principle of presupposition with this principle will be explained based on both definitions and with the help of some related examples. Some solutions will also be provided in order to remove this inconsistency, and it will be shown that none of them will be helpful in accomplishing this task. Finally, the standpoint of modern logic in this regard will be evaluated.
Key Terms
conversion by contradiction principle of presupposition
true and external propositions labatiyyah proposition
simple whatness prediction
primary and common
[1]. It is said that one day when Abu Sa'id Abu al-Khayr was in the bath, the man who was rubbing his body, showed him the dirt on the sponge at all times. At that time Abu Sa'id asked the wise man of Mihnah who a real honorable and fair man is. He responded it is not fair to show one the stain of dirt on his body.
[2]. Chitick, W., in a letter dated September 1999 and Iranka Encyclopedia, vol. 3.
[3]. al-Asfar, vol. 3, pp. 142-147.
[4]. Rasa'il Ikhwan al-safa, vol. 3, p. 261.
[5]. Fayyad Lahiji's Diwan (Collection of Poems).