Mulla Sadra's Life, works, and Philosophy
Prof. S. M. Khamenei
Faydh was a master of philosophy and theoretical gnosis and believed in a number of basic principles directly decreed by the Divine Law. He also believed in jurisprudence, hadith, tradition, and the Manifest. His jurisprudence (he introduces himself as a perfect jurisprudent in his biography) is hadithi but inferential and is, thus, close to that of Mulla Sadra. He might have developed such a jurisprudential taste after Sayyed
Majid Bahreini and Shahid Thani's grandson (residing in Hijaz). Like Mulla
Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy, Faydh's method, which sometimes resulted in issuing new and unfamiliar decrees, provoked the wrath and anger of a great number of his contemporary and succeeding jurisprudents. They even made him, like his master, the target of arrows of excommunication, interdiction, and opposing propaganda.
Faydh, who was quite familiar with the atmosphere of his period, believed that it was his necessary responsibility to pronounce such ideas and write such books. In the light of his intrinsic courage, he talked about his beliefs openly and bravely and planted the seeds of horror and distress in his opponents' hearts. He hurt the delicate feelings of turban wearing people of his time sometimes through jurisprudential decrees, sometimes through Gnostic gestures, sometimes through narrating traditions and hadiths, and sometimes through reasoning and demonstration, and, in this way, he invited misery and threats to his own life.
The author of Ruzat al-jinnat says about him,
"Some absurd ideas which smell of blasphemy are attributed to him. These ideas include believing in the unity of being and disbelievers' lack of permanent residence in hell, which are both attributed to Muhyaddin ibn Arabi.
Moreover, Faydh had some famous jurisprudential views and decrees that were against the current views of his time. Those views and decrees were blameless, and their truth was quite evident for him and his followers due to their dexterity in independent reasoning
(ijtihad), relative and apparent infallibility, and belief in jurisprudential inference. However, the limited patience of some of his contemporary or succeeding jurisprudents, some of whom were perhaps pseudo-jurisprudent followers, did not allow them to tolerate such views and decrees.
One of Faydh's famous decrees pertains to
'profane singing'. In his well-known book, al-Wafi, he narrates some hadiths that consider paying female singers and minstrels (who were called muqanniyah) in wedding parties that were exclusively attended by women as being lawful and allowed, provided that no man were present there (and in today's terms, provided that such parties were not mixed ones held for whimsical purposes). Faydh says the reason and condition for the prohibition of profane singing is this very mixed presence of men and women in pleasure parties, as it was common in the Umayyad and Abbasi courts at the time of Imams' issuing the narrations. However, he emphasizes that singing by itself is not prohibited.
Concerning this issue, some jurisprudents, instead of conducting historical research on the time and occasion of the descent of hadith, resorted to the definitions provided by common and ignorant philologists in their books (sometimes invalid ones) and said that, for example, qena
(profane singing) literally means sout (sound or voice) or madd al-sout
(flow of sound) or tahsin al-sout (singing beautifully or appraisal of voice). We read in history that Imam Sajjad (AS) had one of the most euphonious voices of his time, and all passersby, when hearing his heavenly voice at the time of prayer, lost control and stood listening to him involuntarily. In short, we can conclude that, evidently, singing, by itself, does not mean qena
(profane singing), much less sheer sound.
Following a research-wise and technical method, Faydh concluded that, as stipulated and documented in Shi'ite texts, the elements of caprice and mingling of men and women led to sin and iniquity in singing. In his time, minstrelsy and singing were exclusively women's jobs, and, as indicated in hadith,
in all places only the word 'muqanniyah' (Arabic for a female singer) has been used to refer to singers, and there is not a single reference to a male singer in them.
Research also indicates
that the word 'qena' at the time of the issuing of hadith, in spite of the definitions provided in different books, has been derived from the very act of muqanniya (female singers and minstrels of that time) and refers to what voluptuous Abbasi caliphs spread and promoted in their places of dissipation. In fact, profane singing had numerous customers and was so different from the singing of nomad musicians of the time of the Prophet (pbuh).
Therefore, the word 'qena' did not refer to its literal meaning. As we know, words undergo certain changes over time: sometimes their meaning expands; sometimes it is narrowed down, and sometimes it changes completely so that it would be so difficult to associate that meaning with the original word.
In some hadiths, qena, for example, has been considered the same as
'party' or the nature of the job itself.[1]
Such hadiths led Faydh to view the essence of qena as being permissible. However, this view is not in contradiction with its loathsomeness in the Divine Law, and it seems that all hadiths are in agreement in this regard.
Nevertheless, Faydh's idea concerning this issue was practically regarded in opposition to other jurisprudents' consensuses, which were mainly famous as documental ones, and following this, he became the target of accusations and verbal attacks once more, as he had become previously at the time of issuing the decree of the objective necessity of Friday prayer.
This other unique decree, the objective necessity of Friday prayer, was also based on a defensible view, and his contemporary scholar, Muhaqqiq Sabziwari agreed with him concerning both of these decrees. If we consider the conditions and necessities of the Safavid period, as well as the power of the foreign enemies of Shi'ism, we see that the best interest of Iranian Muslim society lay in the necessity of Friday prayer. Some other jurisprudential views have also been attributed to him, including the following:
He decreed that water, whether qalil (under-kurr water) or kathir (kurr
water), is not contaminated if unclean substances enter it, unless its triple features are changed. Faydh's view in this respect, like his other one, is an inferential view based on independent reasoning and in no way similar to Traditionists' (Ikhbariyun) dogmatic acts of worship. He says, in spite of all related generalizations, water is absolutely and at all times clean and pure and its nature always remains the same, unless its triple features change. It always solves unclean substances or other things in itself and makes them like itself. However, one must not make a distinction between qalil and kathir
water in this regard, since if the criterion for purity of water and its being free from the uncleanliness of the very unclean substance was the water's being
kurr, it would be impossible to remove impurity and vice by means of qalil
water and obtain purity and piety, while all jurisprudents unanimously vote for the opposite.[2]
Abstracts
The Paradox of Liar (jadhr asamm) and Fazil Sarab's Solution
Muhammed Ali Ejei
In spite of the various responses and solutions provided for the paradox of liar, different scholars and thinkers are still trying to discover some new points in this regard. We can say that this paradox has attracted the attention of a lot of philosophers due to its simplicity of formulation, long history and complexity of solution. In fact, the existing diversity in the presented solutions to this paradox is not less than the diversity in the solutions provided for the very puzzling paradox. The clarification of this issue, alongside with explaining the existence or the possibility of existence of different solutions to this paradox on the basis of the analysis provided by Fazil Sarab, will be useful not only in solving the paradox of liar but also in removing ambiguities from other philosophical problems.
Key Terms
paradox of liar law of non-contradiction
law of excluded middle self-reference
verifiability or falsifiability of statement unity of signification and the signified
appearance in statement family resemblances
structure of the paradox of liar distinction between signification and the signified
The Knowledge of God in Aristotelian Philosophy and Sadrian Wisdom
Ali Allah Bedashti
One of the methods for comparing two philosophical systems with each other is probing into the responses they provide for some basic questions arisen from human thought with respect to the origin and end of being. Such problems have been posed and answered in both Aristotelian and Sadrian systems of thought.
In both systems we are dealing with a transcendent being called Allah (God) or Theos. The important point here is to know how they have apprehended and interpreted this transcendent being, which attributes and perfections they have ascribed to Him (glory be to His Majesty), and how close they have come to that inaccessible infinite reality.
Through a study of the related responses provided by these two schools of thought, we can judge their strength and validity from this angle.
Key Terms
Knowledge of God origin of being
end of being transcendent being
A Comparison of Mulla Sadra and Ibn-Sina's Views on the
Zahra Mustafawi
Two completely contrasting theories have been ascribed to Ibn-Sina in this regard. Some of his words indicate his rejection of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, while some of his other words indicate his confirmation of this theory. Conversely, Mulla Sadra is a great supporter of this theory and has adduced various arguments to demonstrate it. The theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, which is either denied or accepted by Ibn-Sina, is not in harmony with the one supported by Mulla Sadra, and the views of these two philosophers concerning this theory are totally different from each other.
Their disagreements can be summarized in two points:
1. Reality of intellection: According to Ibn-Sina, intellection means the perception of concepts, limits, and nature of objects in terms of their mental existence, and acquiring the form of objects in an abstract existent, whether the soul or the intellect. According to Mulla Sadra, intellection means the presence of the existence of an object before the perceiver; a pure existence which is free from non-existence and privation.
2. Reality of the union: In Ibn-Sina's view, the union of the intellect and the intelligible, as viewed by its advocates, means the change of the soul into the intellect at the time of intellection. He believes that this theory is not demonstrable (and, of course, he sometimes defends it). Nevertheless, in Mulla Sadra's view, the soul is perfected at the time of intellection, and without leaving its existential status, can contemplate the intellectual forms and luminous existents in the world of the intellects and unite with them.
Considering the above two points of difference between these two philosophers, we can say that their conceptions of the union of the intellect and the intelligible are so different from each other that they represent the intellectual confrontation between them much deeper than what it really is.
Key Terms
union of the intellect and the intelligible reality of intellection
reality of the union soul
intellect mental existence
A Critical Study of the Issue of Mental Existence in Sadr al-Muta'allihin's Philosophy
S. Sadruddin Taheri
The philosophical version of the issue of mental existence has an anti-sophism orientation and concerns the validity of man's knowledge of conceptual and judgmental particulars and the universal issues derived from them. After a critical study of this theory, theoretical philosophers tried to provide a number of new ideas in order to defend or modify it. Surprisingly enough, Fakhr Razi's idea, which had been put forward prior to the philosophical presentation of this issue, is referred to as a solution, though an invalid one, to this problem. After a critical analysis of his predecessors' views concerning the problem of mental existence, Sadr al-Mutaallihin provided a new solution in this regard. His solution has been considered a valid and acceptable one by his succeeding philosophers, whether at his own time or at present.
Key Terms
mental existence God's knowledge
validity of human knowledge Sadr al-Mutaallihin
Sayyed Muhammed Hakkak
Knowledge means the presence of the known before the knower, and it is either presential or acquired. Presential knowledge means the presence of the known's existence before the knower, such as man's knowledge of himself.
Acquired knowledge means the presence of the known form before the knower, such as man's knowledge of external objects. Here, what is directly present before the knower is a concept of the known, and what is known by essence is that very concept, and the external object is known by accident.
Logic is the collection of principles of thought. Observing such principles, which are totally in the domain of acquired knowledge, protects the mind against errors in the process of thinking.
Muslim logicians, following Farabi, divide man's knowledge into two types: concept and judgment; accordingly, they divide the science of logic into two parts: one part deals with the issues related to concept and the other with issues related to judgment. The two types (concept and judgment) represent the primary division of acquired knowledge into its different kinds.
On second division, acquired knowledge, i.e., the very concept and judgment, is divided into evident and theoretical types. Evident knowledge is known by itself and is needless of idea and thought (if it is concept, it is needless of definition, and if it is judgment, it is needless of proof). Theoretical knowledge is not known by essence and, in order to be known to the mind, it requires thinking. It is here that the science of logic comes of use in acquiring the theories from evident things or other theories.
What was said about the primary division of acquired knowledge into concept and judgment and its secondary division into evident and theoretical types is acceptable to most Muslim logicians except for Fakhr al-Din Razi. He does not believe in theoretical concept; however, no one agrees with his views.
Key Terms
presential knowledge acquired knowledge
concept judgment
evident theoretical
innate conjectural
illuminative
Qur'anic Fragmentary (Muqatta'a) Letters in Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy
Abulqasim Hussein Dust
The fragmentary letters at the beginning of some of the chapters (surahs) in the Holy Qur'an have always been of particular interest to Qur'anic researchers, and all prominent interpreters have presented an interpretation in this regard in their works. Most of these interpretations have been studied critically by Mulla Sadra. The author of this paper intends to clarify the nature of these letters from the viewpoint of the sublime interpreter and supreme philosopher, Mulla Sadra, by reference to his magnificent works, al-Asfar and Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Karim.
From among all related views, Mulla Sadra only prefers Ibn-Sina's view and expresses his ideas in this regard on the basis of the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy. The reality of the Qur'an is one and of different levels; therefore, everyone enjoys a specific knowledge of this graded reality, since what is required here consists of different conditions such as faith, piety, and relation with the Prophet's Household. Besides, each of these attributes has some levels, and each person is qualified by a specific level of them. When interpreting the fragmentary letters, Mulla Sadra believes that each of these letters refers to a particular level of the world, and his method of justification in this regard is based on the instrumental employment of the well-known Abjad letters system (arithmetical arrangement of the Arabic alphabet) so that, through the combination of these letters by summing up or multiplication processes, they could be related to or adjusted with a certain level of the world of being.
At the end of his discussion, Mulla Sadra explains how all Qur'anic fragmentary letters refer to a specific level of being.
Key Terms
fragmentary (muqatta'a) letters graded being
the Transcendent Philosophy breath of the Merciful
Abjad letters
Trans-substantial Motion and Stability of Knowledge
Ali Hasan Beigi
When inquiring into the issues related to motion in substance and its relation to the issue of stability of knowledge, the question which might arise is how it is possible for our knowledge not to undergo any change or evolution and, in other words, to remain consistent despite the trans-substantial motion.
To respond this question on the basis of Mulla Sadra's principles, one can say that, firstly, change and transformation are other than motion, and, secondly, those who insist on the unity of subject in objects seem not to heed the fact that viewing changing and evolving objects as one thing is a point that the mind has abstracted from the relations among its own perceptions.
Key Terms
motion trans-substantial motion
unity of the knower and the known soul
stability of knowledge change
Theoretical Foundations of Corporeal
Resurrection in Mulla Sadra
Mohammed Jawad Pirmoradi
1. Resurrection is only corporeal;
2. Resurrection is only spiritual;
3. Resurrection is both corporeal and spiritual.
From among these three views, Mulla Sadra agrees with the third one. However, some believe that what he has demonstrated in this regard is not equal to Qur'anic resurrection. The writer of this paper, through a review of Mulla Sadra's words, has tried to prove that this philosopher's view of resurrection is a Qur'anic one, and that, to prove their theory, it is necessary for Mulla Sadra's opponents to deny the Hereafter and the cause-effect relation and final order of the world.
Key Terms
corporeal resurrection final order
principiality of existence gradation of existence
the trans-substantial motion intellect
Ideal body Transcendent Philosophy
Ontology epistemology
Cosmology anthropology
Mulla Sadra rational soul
Corporeal origination spiritual subsistence