Ma’rifah and ‘ilm: Two Islamic Approaches to the Problem of Essence and Existence
Nicholas Heer
(1)
Throughout much of Islamic history Sufis and theologians have ignored each other’s methods for the attainment of knowledge. Sufis have in general stressed insight, inspiration and other forms of mystical experience over reason as primary sources of knowledge. The theologians, or mutakallimên, on the other hand, have considered sense perception and rational demonstration to be only valid sources of knowledge, and have been skeptical of claims that knowledge of any sort could be attained through mystical experience. This paper examines the problem of essence and existence as it was conceived by Islamic thinkers and attempts to explain why some of the later theologians, although continuing to reject mystical experience as a source of knowledge, nevertheless show an interest in certain Sufi doctrines concerned with essence and existence.
(2)
According to Sufi belief, mystical experience in the form of insight (‘iyan), unveiling (kashf), or inspiration (ilhàm) was a valid source of knowledge. The Sufis asserted that there was a difference between rational or cognitive knowledge, which they called ‘ilm, and the type of knowledge that results from mystical experience. This latter type of knowledge they called ma‘rifah, or sometimes ‘irfàn, terms which have often been translated by European scholars as “gnosis.” The Sufis further asserted that God could be truly known only through gnosis and that gnosis is achieved only as the result of strenuous spiritual exercises. Reason and demonstration, they claimed, were useless in achieving this true knowledge of God. Al-Hujwiri (d. circa 465/1072), a 5th/11th century mystic, says in his Kashf al-mahjêb:
“Ordinary objects of search are found by means of demonstration, but knowledge of God is extraordinary. Therefore knowledge of Him is attained only by unceasing bewilderment of the reason.” 1
Comparing the knowledge gained from reason and the knowledge gained from mystical experience, al-Hujwiri says:
“The knowledge gained is in the one case a matter of logic, in the other it becomes an inward experience. Let those who deem reason to be the cause of gnosis consider what reason affirms in the minds concerning the substance of gnosis, for gnosis involves the negation of whatever is affirmed by reason, i.e., whatever notion of God can be formed by reason, God is in reality something different. How, then, is there any room for reason to arrive at gnosis by means of demonstration?”2
Al-Ghazàli (d. 505/1111) in a passage in his Mishkàt al-anwàr3 describes the human soul as having five faculties. The first, which he calls the sensory spirit (al-ruh al-hassàs), receives the information gathered by the senses. The second faculty, called the imaginative spirit (al-ruh al-khayàli), records and saves this sensory information. The third faculty is the intelligential spirit (al-ruh al-‘aqli.) This is the faculty which apprehends meanings and concepts along with necessary and universal premises and propositions. The fourth faculty is that of syllogistic reasoning and is called the discursive spirit (al-ruh al-fikri). The fifth and last faculty is what al-Ghazàli calls the transcendental prophetic spirit (al-ruh al-qudsi al-nabawi). He describes this faculty as follows:
“This is the property of the prophets and some saints. By it the unseen tables and statues of the Law are revealed from the other world, together with several of the sciences of the Realms Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-eminently theology, the science of Deity, which the intelligential and discursive spirit cannot compass.”4
Addressing the reader al-Ghazàli goes on to say:
“And here a word to thee, thou recluse in thy rational world of the intelligence! Why should it be impossible that beyond reason there should be a further plane, on which appear things which do not appear on the plane of the intelligence, just as it is possible for the intelligence itself to be a plane above the discriminating faculty and the senses; and for relations of wonders and marvels to be made to it that were beyond the reach of the senses and the discriminative faculty?”5
Further on al-Ghazàli advises the reader to:
“Strive earnestly to become one of those who experience mystically something of the prophetic spirit; for saints have a specially large portion thereof. If thou canst not compass this, then try, by the discipline of the syllogisms and analogies set forth or alluded to in a previous page, to be one of those who have knowledge of it scientifically. But if this, too, is beyond thy powers, then the least thou canst do is to become one of those who simply have faith in it … Scientific knowledge is above faith, and mystic experience is above knowledge. The province of mystic experience is feeling; of knowledge, ratiocination; and of faith, bare acceptance of the creed of one’s fathers.”6
A later Sufi of the 9th/15th century, ‘Abd al-Rahmàn al-Jàmi (d. 898/1492), says in his al-Durrah al-fàkhirah:
“The basis of the position taken by the Sufis is mystical revelation and insight (al-kashf wa’l a‘yàn) rather than reason and demonstration. For indeed, since they have turned towards God in complete spiritual nudity by wholly emptying their hearts of all worldly attachments and the rules of rational thought, and by unifying the will, persisting in concentration, and persevering along this path without slackening, interruption of thought, or dissolution of will, God has granted to them a revealing light to show them things as they really are. This light appears within at the appearance of a level beyond the level of intellect. Do not think the existence of that improbable, for beyond the intellect are many levels whose number is hardly known except by God.”7
(3)
The passages quoted above from al-Hujwiri, al-Ghazàli and al-Jàmi present a clear picture of the Sufi method of attaining knowledge with its emphasis on mystical experience. In sharp contrast to the Sufi method was that of the theologians, who relied exclusively on reasoning, and rejected any form of mystical experience as a source of knowledge. The theologians’ argument for their method started from the premises that it is the duty of every Muslim to acquire knowledge of God and His attributes. According to the theologians, however, this knowledge can only be acquired through reasoning (nazar), and reasoning, if it is to result in certain knowledge, must be based ultimately on necessary (daruri) and self-evident (badihi) premises, that is, on premises that are known for certain to be true. The importance of reasoning in the acquisition of religious knowledge was stressed by ‘Abd al-Qàhir al-Baghdàdi (d. 429/1037), an Ash’arite theologian of the 5th/11th century, in the following words:
“The truth of religion is based on the truth of prophecy and the truth of prophecy is known through reasoning (al-nazar) and demonstration (al-istidlàl). If it were known by necessity through sense perception or were self-evident, then anyone opposing it would be pigheaded (mu‘ànid) like the skeptics who deny sense perception.”8
For the early theologians the premises on which such reasoning and demonstration could be based were of three types: 1) premises based on reason (al-‘aql), such as the axioms of logic and mathematics; 2) premises based on the senses (al-hawàs), and 3) true narrative (al-khabar al-sàdiq).
Al-Nasafi (d.537/1142), a theologian of the sixth/twelfth century, explained these three types of premises as follows:
The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative, and reason. The senses are five, namely, hearing, seeing, smelling, taste, and touch, and by each of these senses one is informed concerning that for which it was appointed.
True narrative is of two kinds: one of them the mutawàtir narrative, and it is the narrative established by the tongues of people of whom it is inconceivable that they would agree together on a falsehood. It brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in past times and of the distant countries. The second kind is the narrative of the messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge established by it resembles the knowledge established by necessity in certainty and fixity.
Then as for reason: it is a cause of knowledge also; and whatever of it is established by immediate perception is necessary, just as the knowledge that the whole of a thing is greater that the part of it; and whatever is established by deduction is acquired.9
Later theologians usually adopted Ibn Sinà’s (d. 428/1037) division of these necessary premises into six categories rather than three.10
These were: 1) first principles or axioms (awwaliyàt), such as the statement that the whole is greater than any of its parts; 2) propositions containing their own syllogisms (qadàyà qiyàsatuha ma‘ahà), such as the statement that four is an even number; 3) particular propositions based on sense perception (mahsêsàt, mushàhadàt), such as the statement that this fire is hot; 4) propositions based on the reports of a sufficient number of eye-witnesses to preclude to possibility of their having agreed on a lie (mutawàtiràt, qadàyà tawàturiyah), such as the statement that Mecca exists, for one believes this statement to be true regardless of whether one has actually been to Mecca or not; 5) propositions based on experience (mujarrabàt, tajribiyàt), such as the statement that scammony is a laxative, or that wine is intoxicating, or that fire burns; and, finally, 6) propositions based on intuition (hadsiyàt), that is, what one might call universal theories or hypothesis tested by experience and observation, such as the statement that the light of the moon is derived form that of the sun.
(4)
In sum, for the theologians knowledge of God could be attained only through reasoning that was based on premises known for certain to be true. Other ways of knowing God, they asserted, did not exist. They maintained, for example, that no one has a necessary knowledge of God, for His existence is not self-evident, nor can He be perceived by the senses.11
Furthermore, God cannot be known on the basis of faith in an authority, such as a prophet, because authorities differ and only reasoning can determine which authority is to be believed. One must, for example, be able to distinguish a true prophet from a false prophet, and only reasoning can determine which is the true one and which the false.12
Reasoning, moreover, must be based only on those necessary premises known through reason and sense perception, such as those enumerated by Ibn Sinà. All other possible sources of knowledge are rejected by the theologians. They rejected, for example, emotions and feelings (wijdàniyàt), which, although they provide certain knowledge to the person experiencing them, are subjective in nature and therefore imperceptible to anyone else.13 They also rejected as a source of knowledge the inspiration or illumination (ilhàm) which results from concentration or meditation (al-tawajjuh al-tàmm), as practiced by the Hindus, or from the purification of the inner self (tasfiyat al-bàtin), which was the practice of the Sufis. The reason for their rejecting inspiration is that it is granted only to some people and not to others, and therefore it cannot be considered a general source of knowledge for all people. Furthermore, they asserted, one cannot be sure that the source of one’s inspiration is God rather than Satan.14 Al-Nasafi says in his creed:
“Inspiration (ilhàm) is not one of the causes of the cognition of the soundness of a thing with the People of Reality.”15
Al-Taftàzàni (d. 791/1389), a theologian of the 8th/14th century about whom more will be said below, explains this statement in his commentary on al-Nasafi’s creed:
“He meant that inspiration is not a cause by which knowledge results to creatures in general nor by which it is right for one to force knowledge on another; otherwise there is no doubt that knowledge does result from inspiration.” 16
In a commentary on a work of his own entitled al-Maqàsid al-Taftàzàni says:
“As for inspiration (ilhàm), he who experiences it cannot trust it unless he knows that it comes from God, and that is [known] through reasoning [alone].17
In his commentary on al-Iji’s al-Mawàqif al-Jurjàni (d. 816/1413), another important theologian of the 8th/14th century, takes a position on inspiration similar to that of al-Nasafi and al-Taftàzàni.18 Both al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, moreover, reject the knowledge which Sufis assert results from the purification of the inner self (tasfiyat al-bàtin). In his commentary on al-Iji’s al-Mawàqif al-Jurjàni says:
“The Sufis said that the exercising of the self through exertions and its being set free of human troubles and corporeal impediments by means of concentration (al-tawajjuh) on the Eternal Presence, taking up seclusion and persevering in dhikr and obedience, results in true beliefs about which there can be no shadow of doubt.”19
He then goes on to say, however, that the knowledge gained from purification is like the knowledge gained from inspiration. One cannot be sure whether it is from God, and therefore true, or whether it is from some other source. “Do you not see,” he says, “that the [spiritual] exercises of those who deny Islam, such as the Jews and Christians, lead to false beliefs.” He concludes that reasoning is invariably required to distinguish those beliefs which are true from those which are false. 20
The quotations cited above make it clear that for the theologians the only way to achieve certain knowledge was through reasoning based on necessary premises, and that mystical experience could not be a source of necessary premises nor could it be a substitute for reasoning.
(5)
Because the theologians rejected mystical experience as a source of knowledge, they took very little notice over the centuries of Sufi thought in their works. Nevertheless, in the 8th/14th century, two of the theologians mentioned above, al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, began to express an interest in certain Sufi doctrines. In spite of their continued rejection of mystical experience as a source of knowledge, both al-Taftàzàni, in his Shar al-Maqàsd, al-Jurjàni, in his glosses on al-Isfahàni’s commentary on al-Tusi’s Tajrid, take up and discuss one of the principal doctrines of the school of Sufism founded by Ibn‘Arabi d. 638/1240) and his followers in the 7th/13th century. This is the doctrine that asserts that God is to be identified with absolute existence (al-wujêd al-mutlaq).21
Why do these theologians now show an interest in Sufi doctrine when earlier theologians had for the most part ignored it? It cannot be because they now accept mystical experience as a source of knowledge, for they both reject it. There are, I should like to propose, two reasons for this interest in Sufi doctrine on the part of the theologians.
The first is the rationalization of Sufi doctrine which was carried out by Ibn ‘Arabi’s followers. Many Sufis had traditionally written in a style that could not be fully understood except by initiates, and even Ibn ‘Arabi himself, who was familiar with philosophical thought, wrote in a very obscure manner.
His followers, however, began to take an interest in some of the philosophical problems that had been of concern to theologians and philosophers and began to adopt the vocabulary and logical terminology used by such writers.
Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi (d. 672/1273). For example, who was perhaps the most influential of Ibn ‘Arabi’s disciples in the later development of his school, carried on a correspondence with Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274), the foremost philosopher of that period, on a number of philosophical questions to which al-Qunawí believed his own views, based on knowledge gained through mystical experience were relevant.22 This correspondence between al-Qunawi and al-Têsi was possible only because al-Qunawi could use the language of philosophy. Later Sufis of Ibn ‘Arabi’s school followed al-Qunawi’s example and continued to express their doctrines using philosophical terminology and arguments.
(6)
Nevertheless, the fact that theologians were now able to understand works written by Sufis does not seem to be a sufficient reason for their showing an interest in their doctrines. I should like to suggest that an additional reason for their interest was the fact that Sufis had something important to say on a question which was of great concern to theologians. This was the question of whether or not existence could be distinguished from essence, that is, whether existence was the same as essence or superadded to it.
There were three positions on this question. The early Ash‘arite theologians, as well as some of the Mu‘tazilites, had held that no distinction could be made between essence and existence and that existence, therefore, could not be superadded to essences, but was, in fact, identical with them. The position of the Islamic philosophers, on the other hand, was that the existence of contingent beings was distinct from their essences and superadded to them, but that the existence of God, or the Necessary Being, was identical with His essence and not superadded to it. The later theologians, beginning with Fakhr al-Din al-Ràzi (d. 606/1209) took the position that existence was superadded to essence in the case of both the Necessary Being and contingent beings.
Among the arguments given by the early Ash‘arite theologians23for their position that existence and essence could not be distinguished was the argument that if existence were distinct from essence, then existence would have to be an accident inhering in essences, and essences would constitute substrata for existence. If such were the case a number of absurdities would follow.
One could ask, for example, what the state of an essence was before existence came to inhere in it. If it was non-existent until existence came to inhere in it, then there was no existent substratum for existence to inhere in. It was commonly held, however, that a substratum must first exist before an accident can inhere in it. On the other hand, if the essence was already in existence when existence came to inhere in it, and if this prior existence was also an accident inhering in the essence, then an infinite regress of existences would result.
One might also inquire about the state of the existence inhering in the essence. Does it exist or not? If one says that this existence does not exist, then existence is qualified by non-existence, which is absurd. On the other hand, if existence exists, and its existence inheres in it as an accident, an infinite regress of existences will again result. For reasons such as these the early Ash‘arite theologians concluded that existence could not be distinguished from essence but must, on the contrary, be identical with it.
There were also, however, a number of arguments, used particularly by some of the later theologians, that seemed to indicate that existence was, indeed, distinct from essences and superadded to them.24 For example, if existence were the same as essence, it would not be possible to deny existence of an essence. One could not say, for example, that griffons do not exist, because that would be the same as saying that griffons were not griffons. Similarly, one can informatively predicate existence of an essence. To say that human beings exist is an informative statement (mufid), that tell us the class of all humans is not empty.
The concept of existence, moreover, is a single concept predicated univocally of different essences. If existence were the same as essence, it would not be a single concept, but many, and could not be predicated univocally. Finally, one can distinguish in the mind between an essence and its existence, because one can conceive of an essence while at the same time having doubts about is existence. For these reasons among others both the philosophers and the later theologians held that in the case of contingent beings existence was distinct from essences and superadded to them.
With respect to the Necessary Being, however, the philosophers held that essence and existence were the same. They argued that were the existence of the Necessary Being superadded to its essence, then its existence would be in need of its essence for a substratum. Its being in need of a substratum would indicate that it was contingent and in need of a cause. Its cause, however, could only be its substratum, that is, the essence of the Necessary Being. A cause, however, must always be prior in existence to its effect, and therefore the essence of the Necessary Being would have to precede its own existence in existence, which is absurd.25
The later Ash‘arite theologians disagreed with this position, however, holding that the existence of the Necessary Being was, in fact, superadded to its essence. One of their arguments was that although God’s existence was known, His essence was not known, and that consequently His existence could not be the same as His essence. Another of their arguments was that because the concept of existence was a single concept, all instances of it being similar, it followed, if God’s existence were not conjoined to an essence, that His being self-subsistent and the basis or cause (mabda’) of contingent beings would be due to His existence alone. However, since all instances of existence are the same, the existences of contingent beings would also be self-subsistent and the causes of other contingent beings. This is absurd.26
(7)
These, then, were the arguments which the theologians and philosophers gave in support of their respective positions on the question God’s essence and existence. What did the followers of Ibn ‘Arabi’s school of Sufism have to say on this question that was of interest to theologians like al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni? The central doctrine of Ibn Arabi’s school was that God, or the Necessary Being, was to be equated with absolute existence (al-wujêd al-mutlaq). Existence was not an attribute of God, but was, on the contrary, God Himself. Being God, absolute existence was not a universal concept which could be predicated of many essences; it was, rather, a single individual entity or substance, which could not be predicated of anything else. Thus, what is meant by saying that something exists is not that it is qualified by existence in the sense that the accident of existence inheres in it or is superadded to it, but that it has a certain relation to existence. And to say that something does not exist is to deny that it has such a relation.27
How is this relation between an essence and absolute existence to be conceived? It is not the relation of substance to attribute or substratum to accident in which existence is an attribute or accident inhering in an essence. It is, rather, the reverse of this relation, one in which existence is the substance or substratum and essences are attributes or accidents inhering in existence. In such a relation essences are predicated of existence rather than existence being predicated of essences.28 Another way of thinking of the relation of existence to essence is by analogy with form and matter, with existence corresponding to matter and essence to form.29
Sufis often mention in their works the image of the sea and its waves, the sea being analogous to existence and the waves representing essences.30
What is important to note with respect to this Sufi theory is that it preserves the distinction between essence and existence, but makes existence a necessary and self-subsistent substance rather than an attribute inhering in substances or essences. The problems stemming from the assumption of both theologians and philosophers that existence is an attribute predicated of essences are thus removed.
(8)
In view of this Sufi “solution” to the problem of essence and existence, it is not surprising that theologians such as al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni should find Sufi doctrine of sufficient interest to warrant their views and including it in their works when discussing the relation of God’s existence to His essence.
Although both theologians show an equal interest in the Sufi position on this question, their reactions to it differ. Al-Taftàzàni rejects the Sufi claim that existence is a substance that can be equated with God. He claims that absolute existence cannot be God because existence has certain qualities that are inapplicable to God. In his Sharh al-Maqàsid he says that absolute existence is a mental predicate (mahmêl ‘aqli) and a universal of the secondary intelligible (ma‘qêl thàni) and that neither of these can exist in the external world. Absolute existence can also be divided into necessary and contingent existence, and it becomes multiple with the multiplicity of its subjects (mawduàt) or substrata. Moreover, it is, he says, predicated analogically (bi’l tashkik) rather than univocally of individual existences. Thus, if God were absolute existence, He would exist only in the mind, be divisible into parts, would be multiple rather than one, and would be an accidental concept since only accidental concepts are predicated analogically.31
Al-Jurjàni on the other hand, in his glosses on al-Tusi’s Tajrid, makes no attempt to criticize or refute the Sufi doctrine equating God with absolute existence, but simply presents it as another possible theory, along side those of the theologians and philosophers. He is careful to point out, however, that the Sufi theory could only have been arrived at on the basis of knowledge gained through mystical experience. It could not have been derived by means of demonstrative reasoning.32
(9)
To summarize the attitude of the theologians to Sufi doctrine, one can say that the early theologians ignored it, because they rejected mystical experience as a source of knowledge and consequently held that beliefs based on mystical experience could not be justified. Later theologians, such as al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, although still formally rejecting mystical experience as a source of knowledge, nevertheless are willing to discuss and criticize doctrines which were of interest to them regardless of the epistemological source of such doctrines. It is no longer necessary for doctrines to be justified on the basis of their sources; it is sufficient that they be judged on the basis of how well they stand up to rational criticism.
Using the terminology of Karl Popper, one might say that the theologians have shifted from an epistemology of justification to one of criticism and falsification.
It should be noted in conclusion that many of the Sufis of the 8th/14th and 9th/15th centuries welcomed this shift on the part of the theologians, and devoted much of their energy to the rational defense of Sufi doctrine. Some of them, such as al-Jàmi and his disciple, al-Làri, went so far as to adopt a principle attributed to al-Ghazàli that beliefs based on mystical experience could never contradict reason, even though they considered mystical experience to be on a plane above reason.33
NOTES
1. Al-Hujwiri, Kashf al-mahjêb, pp.269-270 (Nicholson translation), p.345 (Zukovskij edition).
2. al-Hujwiri, Kashf al-mahjêb, p.270 (Nocholson translation), p.346 (Zukovskij edition).
3. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.143-149 (Gairdner translation), pp.76-78
4. ( ‘Afifi edition).
5. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, P.146 (Gairdner translation), p. 77 (‘Afifi edition).
6. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.146-147 (Gairdner translation) pp.77-78 (‘Afifi edition).
7. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.148-149 (Gairdner translation), p.78 (‘Afifi edition).
8. al-Jàmi, al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, pp.5-6 (Arabic text), p.37 (English translation).
9. al-Baghdàdi, Usêl al-Din, p.15.
10. al-Nasafi, ‘Aqidah, p.308 (Macdonald translation), p.15 (Elder translation).
11. Ibn Sinà’s premises may be found in al-Ishàràt, I, 213-219; Danishnamah, I, 109-117; Le Livre de Science, I, 68-70; al-Najàh, pp.60-66; Burhàn al-Shifà, pp.63-67.
12. al-Baghdàdi, Usul al-Din, p.15.
13. See, for example, Elder, Commentary, p.27; al-Taftàzàní, Sharå al-Maqàæid, I, 34; al-Jurjàní, Sharå al-Mawàqif, II, 49.
14. See, for example, al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsd, I, 20; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 123-124.
15. See, for example, Elder, Commentary, p.27; al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 34-35; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 257-258; al-Baghdàdi, Usul al-Din, p.15; al-Ràzi, Muhassal, p.27; al-Isfahàni, Matali’ al-Anzàr, p.34.
16. Elder, Commentary, p.15; Macdonald, Development, p.309.
17. Elder, Commentary, p.27.
18. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 35.
19. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 258.
20. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 257.
21. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 258.
22. See al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 55-56, and al-Jurjàni, Hashiyah ‘alà Sharhal-Tajrid, fols. 62b-63b.
23. The correspondence comprises al-Qênawi’s al-Risàlah al-Mufsihah, written to al-Tusi, al-Tusi’s Risàlah written in reply, and al-Qênawi’s al-Risaleh al-Hadiyah, written in reply to al-Tusi’s Risàlah.
24. These arguments are summarized in al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 50-51, and al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 127ff.
25. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 47; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 142f.
26. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 47; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 136ff.
27. These arguments and others may be found in al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-maqàsid, I, 48-49; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-mawàqif, II, 156-169; al-Ràzi, al-Arba‘in, p.57; al-Mabàhith, I, 30-37.
28. This Sufi theory may be found in numerous works. See, for example, al-Qênawi, al-Nusus, pp.294-299; al-Fanàri, Misbah al-uns, pp.52-76; al-Qaysari, Matla’ Khusês al-Kilàm, pp.5-13 (Tehran ed.), pp.4-11 (Bombay ed.), pp.8-107 (Ashtiyani commentary); al-Khàshàni (al-Qashani) Sharh Fusês al-hikam, pp.3-4; al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus, pp.20-23; Lawà’ih Flash 25, pp.29-37; Risàlah fi’l wujêd, pp. 223-256; al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, pp.33-43 (English translation), pp.1-12 (Arabic text); al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas‘alah, pp.3-13.
29. See, for example, al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus p.21, gloss 5; al-Jàmi, al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, p.92 (English translation), p.55 (Arabic text).
30. See, for example, al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas’alah, p.38.
31. See, for example, al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas’alah, p.62; al-Jàmi, Lawà’ih, p.35 (English translation), fol. 23b (Persian text); al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus, pp.22-23.
32. .al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al- maqàsid, I, 55-56.
33. al-Jurjàni Hàshiyah ‘alà Sharh al-Tajrid, fols. 16a-16b, 22a, 62b-63b.
34. See, for example, al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nususæ, p.24, al-Làri, Sharh al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, p.82, English translation p.122-123. And Mullà Sadrà (Sadr al-Din al-Shiràzi, d. 1050/1641) mentions that this is the position of some Sufis in his Risàlah fi Sarayàn al-wujêd, p.138.
LIST OF SOURCES CITED
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36. al-Taftàzàni, Sa’d al-Din Mas’êd Ibn ‘Umar, Sharh al-‘Aqà’id al-Nasafiyah. Cairo 1358/1939. (A commentary on Najm al-Din ‘Umar ibn Muhammad al-Nasafi’s ‘Aqà’id)
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39. al-Têsi, Nasir al-Din Muhammad Ibn Muhammad, Risàlah. MS Warner Or. 1133, fols. 22a-39a, University of Leiden Library; MS Vat. Arab. 1453, fols. 14b-25b, Bibliotheca Vaticana (with al-Tusi’s glosses); MS Wetzstein II 1806, fols. 34b-45b, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin.