The Ontological Explanation of Time in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy

                                                                                             Reza Akbarian

In his philosophical system which is based on the reality of being (wujęd), Mulla Sadra provides a definition of time which is related to being (wujęd) and one might not understand this definition without first attending to being (wujęd) itself. His idea of time is fundamentally different from that of Ibn-Sinŕ. Among the works of Muslim philosophers, Ibn-Sinŕ’s philosophy best represents the relationship to Aristotelian concept of time and reflects its transition. Like Aristotle, Ibn-Sinŕ asserts that time is the measure of motion, expounding it as a natural concept in the Physics.⁽¹⁾ Ibn-Sinŕ believes that time is an essential concept in Aristotle’s table of categories and is inflicted upon objects through motion. Mulla Sadra has given the same explanation in many of his discussions. However, after facing a series of vague and debatable issues concerning the concept of time, and after a final analysis of the question of motion, he postulates a new theory which solves the problem of time and the trans-substantial motion.

Mulla Sadra does not ignore the Aristotelian idea of natural time, nor does he believe it is original. He believes that natural time is a peripheral aspect of existential time which he expounds as a metaphysical issue in his ontology. Mulla Sadra’s idea concerning wujęd qua wujęd culminates in an innovative theory which was first propounded and expanded in his philosophy. This theory arises out of the concept that the fluid wujęd is essentially time bound . In this theory, time is not a receptacle for physical objects; but it is regarded as an attribute for them. This attribute emanates from their modes of being and interferes with their entities.

On the same basis, Mulla Sadra claims that time is the truth of the fluid wujęd and the temporality of physical objects is at the service of continuity of their existence. His statements approve the existence of four dimensions for physical objects. His consideration of the ontological state of time leads us to the notion that time, in its continuous entity, is a unique stage of the stages of primal causes and an inferior stage of the inferior stages of being. Of course, he asserts that the stages of the truth of existence are like the truth of existence. Such an idea of time can be found neither in Greek nor in Aristotelian philosophical system.

This article attempts to present a general picture of time in Mulla Sadra’s ontology and explain his theory of the reality of time with reference to the trans-substantial motion. It also undertakes to clarify how and why the concept of time has found another imprint in the light of Sadrian  wujęd and why it differs from what Aristotle and Ibn-Sinŕ have proposed in this regard.

The Importance and the Place of Time in Mulla Sadra’s Ontology

Mulla Sadra’s attempt to define time contradicts the views of those who believe that time is unreal and simply emanates from the mind. In this regard, he is a realist philosopher and acknowledges the reality of time. In his view, the gap between the past, present, and future is real.

Mulla Sadra uses Aristotle’s interpretation of time as the starting point for his discussions. Aristotle states that time is so intimately associated with motion that in defining them, one cannot possibly dispense with the other. He argues that time is the number of motions with regard to precedent and subsequent entities.⁽²⁾ He has also tried to define time on the basis of natural philosophy and associate it with motion; however, Mulla Sadra has proposed the necessity of an existential view for the understanding of the reality of time in his discussions of time. He emphasizes that the perception of the reality of time depends on abandoning the general model which natural philosophy has provided within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy for understanding nature.

In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the Aristotelian natural motion is substituted by the ontological and trans-substantial motion emanating from the perpetual source of Divine Grace. It must be noted that the source of grace does not create motion, but brings about interrelated perpetual forms whose product is motion. This idea does not correspond with Aristotle’s idea either in content or in the relationship among the four causes. All motion, which Aristotle sees in and from nature, Mulla Sadra sees in wujęd and associates it to the Divine creative power.

It is the point at which Mulla Sadra’s philosophy drastically differs from that of Aristotle. Aristotle proposes his theory of motion in the domain of Physics and in this way moves towards the metaphysical disparity between palpable and impalpable existence; whereas, Mulla Sadra holds that motion is related to metaphysics and propounds it under one of his philosophical divisions entitled the permanent  and changing being. What he means here is the reality of being (wujęd), not the concept of being. The distinction between the reality of being and the concept of being is of such great significance that without its understanding one cannot properly understand his metaphysics. Mulla Sadra’s idea of time relies on this distinction. He holds that time is the reality of the fluid being and the fluid being is one of the stages of the objective reality of wujęd. This idea is properly understood when we pay attention to the exact distinction between the “existent” which means “what is”, and the wujęd which means “being and existing” as an all-important issue in the Transcendent philosophy. Mulla Sadra bases his philosophical system on the primacy of wujęd over quiddity. In this way, he moves from  common conceptual matters in the past philosophy to existential discussions, constantly emphasizing the necessity of distinguishing between the two meanings of wujęd, that is, the existent which is the second philosophical intelligible and the external objective reality of being which may be perceived by immediate knowledge by presence. Instead of distinguishing between the mobile object and the immobile object, to both of which the word being can be applied, he proposes the distinction between the analogical gradations of the reality of wujęd. He does this through transition from the existent to the existence. Mulla Sadra believes that the reality of being consists of two stages; one is the stage of the permanent being and the other is the fluid being, and time is the reality of the fluid being and is absolutely necessary for its existence.

The important point that helps us to explicate the issue of time is that the analogical gradations of the reality of wujęd are nothing but the  manifestations of the reality of wujęd, and that all the universe, from the sublime beings to the physical objects, is metaphysically one and the same. Concerning unity and multiplicity, Mulla Sadra propounds that the wujęd is one and manifold at the same time and  adopts this issue  as one of the most important principles in his metaphysical system. He affirms that the existents exist through their illuminationist relation with the physical objects. Thus they should not be conceived of as independent beings which are related to their source.

This contemplation upon the ontological state of particular beings leads us to the idea that the wujęd is a unique reality consisting of different stages based on its weakness or strength, perfection or imperfection, priority or posteriority, and so on. In this way, time is a continual state of the prime causes and one of the inferior stages of the wujęd.⁽³⁾

This idea transforms the question of time greatly and gives a newer and deeper outlook to philosophers. According to this idea, time is the manifestation of the wujęd. One cannot make a distinction between time as one of the stages of being and the changing being as another stage, as earlier philosophers did between the nature and metaphysics. In this worldview, the superior stage is the inner being of the inferior stage and the inferior stage is the outer being of the superior stage.

In explicating this view, Mulla Sadra sees wujęd as the origin of the universe and objects. He holds that the being is a pervasive process which  encompasses everything and that everything gains its existence from being. Time, which is a transient entity and existentially dependent on its own cause, is no exception to this rule, and is encompassed by the reality of wujęd.

The universality of the reality of wujęd in its different stages including time does not, in the least, correspond with the dominance of the whole over the parts or the dominance of general concepts over particular referents. Mulla Sadra asserts that it is impossible to conceive the universality of the reality of wujęd in different stages. In his view, the wujęd or the ultimate reality is something luminous and is understood not by reason but by some inward illumination. Thus he claims that such a reality cannot be conceived by the mind unless through knowledge by presence.

Mulla Sadra’s Idea of the Reality of Time

Different ideas⁽⁴⁾ have been put forward with regard to the reality of time and all of them emphasize that time is a continuous measure and quantity. In many of his discussions, Mulla Sadra accepts this definition. However, after proving the trans-substantial motion and explaining the temporality of the existence of physical objects, he offers a new definition of time hitherto unprecedented.⁽⁵⁾ This definition can be regarded as causing a fundamental change in the history of philosophical thought. He opposes Ibn-Sinŕ’s idea⁽⁶⁾ that motion in substance is impossible and propounds the trans-substantial motion within his world view.⁽⁷⁾ Thus he criticizes Aristotelians’ views concerning time and space.

He agrees with earlier philosophers that time is a restless reality inflicted on objects through motion. First, he accepts that time has two characteristics: 1) it is a divisible matter belonging to quantitative categories; and 2) it is inseparably related to motion.  However, he finally refers to something which provides the foundation for his basic differences from his predecessors concerning the reality of time. In his eyes, time, motion, and the physical existent enjoy a unified existence. He rejects the duality between motion and time and claims that motion and time are no external accidents for the material beings.

Mulla Sadra’s clear statement of his ideas in this regard stems from his view of substance and accident.⁽⁸⁾ His idea of the relation between substance and accident differ from those of Aristotle and Ibn-Sinŕ. He states that the attributes of any object arise from the stages and aspects of the existence of substance. The general consensus is that objects are in need of their own attributes in their distinction from each other; however, according to the primacy of being in the Transcendent philosophy, these diverse attributes are not the cause of distinctive qualities but the signs of distinction.⁽⁹⁾

All beings are intrinsically and on the basis of their own modes of being distinct from each other; and due to this distinction in entity, they differ in their attributes, but not the other way round. Thus, each being is nothing but an entity which appears in different forms. According to this statement, a distinction is not imposed on beings from the without but stems from the within. As such, every attribute of any object is exactly like its entity.

Such a concept of time must be regarded as one of Mulla Sadra’s innovations. In line with this idea, he sees the source of precedence or subsequence of objects in the very accidents themselves. There is a time and space for every motion, and coming out of that space or that time is coming out of the existence of oneself.⁽¹⁰⁾ It is impossible for an entity which is not space-bound to be contained within a space. Besides, something which is intrinsically permanent and constant can not be conceived of as being time bound. Time signifies something which is essentially time bound and its entity has an internal tie with time. Hence, one cannot possibly imagine the physical objects to be emancipated from the bonds of time or space and form a being dissociated from them. Thus, the material beings cannot be held to be intrinsically restful and at times restless.⁽¹¹⁾

In such an existence, time becomes a sign of precedence or subsequence, but not its cause. Mulla Sadra attributes the essential precedence or subsequence to an entity which is essentially endowed with renewable and different modes. These differences are rooted in the intrinsic precedence or  subsequence in which  “before” and “after” cannot be collected in one place.⁽¹²⁾

The exact meaning of essential precedence or subsequence in physical objects is that the temporality of accidents and their sequence of occurrence originate from themselves, not from any external factors. Based on such analysis, time is not like a container in which accidents are placed. Each accident is so time bound that one cannot possibly separate them from each other. These are all due to the fact that the time of each object is, ipso facto, a facet of that object, not an object outside of it; in other words, the container and the contained are one and the same.

Thus in Sadrian concept, time does not fall into the category of accidental quiddities, nor is it like a container independent of the physical objects contained by matter. Time is the essential constitutive of physical substance; hence, all physical objects and phenomena have a time of their own, for time is one aspect of their existence.

Mulla Sadra states that time is an invisible extension or a fourth dimension of the physical being. He believes that the temporality of objects signifies some kind of continuity in their being. His words on the four dimensions of objects have manifest certitude.⁽¹³⁾ In his accurate analysis, objects have two extensions: temporal and spatial. The spatial extension generates three geometrical dimensions and the temporal extension springs from the inner flux of physical beings.⁽¹⁴⁾

The statement quoted above best reveals Sadrian concept of time. That the time is the fourth dimension of matter and has no other entity except for this in the outside, is a grave step in discussing the reality of the existence of time. The reason for repeating this point is due to its novelty in the Transcendent philosophy. The philosophical expression of the fourth dimension in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy should be equated with its physical expression in Einstein’s general theory of relativity.⁽¹⁵⁾ The quality of physical objects’ having four dimensions in Sadrian philosophy is metaphysical and non-empirical. This dimension is not a quantitative dimension but an existential one which emanates from the mode of the being of physical objects and interferes with their entity. Time is, in fact, a fluid entity and a renewable and correlated being from which the mind can abstract a rational value which is called time. According to this statement, motion  (and, as a result, time) is not a categorical  and essential concept , but a fluid and correlated being which is like the motion and the fluid being in the outside, and it is only through rational analysis  that the mind can distinguish between them.

Accordingly, the answers to the questions posed with regard to the issue of time would be different from those explicated in previous philosophical systems. That is why we say it is impossible to offer an essential definition for the nature of time in the Transcendent philosophy; for such a definition falls into the category of essential concepts. That is also why Mulla Sadra is said to conceive of time and motion as rational values for the physical beings and the fluid wujęd.

The Comprehension of the Reality of Time and its Rational Consideration

Such an idea of time is best understood if we differentiate between the reality of the existence of time in the outside and the concept of time. What has been discussed so far is the reality of the existence of time and not its concept. The reality of the existence of time which is, indeed, the reality of the fluid being, is exactly some thing, which neither has quiddity nor is quiddity itself. Thus, one cannot perceive it unless by presence.⁽¹⁶⁾

Instead of sense perception of time proposed by Aristotle, Mulla Sadra propounds the immediate comprehension of the existence of time. According to him, understanding the reality of existence of time is different from the conception of time, and the concept of time is different from its rational consideration. The concept of time signifies the reality of the existence of time within the limits of a conceptual clue, just like creating a concept like “I” for our self which we understand by presence and use for having access to this immediate reality.

 The conceptualization of time is axiomatic, that is, primal and apriori. What is grasped by our minds without the intermediary of any inference is exactly the conceptualization of time; however, the reality of the existence of time is hidden and veiled as the reality of the fluid existence. Mulla Sadra asserts that the axiomatic nature of the conceptualization of time does not commonly mean that it is metaphysically axiomatic as well. Thus he seeks to elucidate this concept of time in his philosophy and set forth its necessary principles.

In his rational analyses, Mulla Sadra is concerned with the rational consideration of time. Unlike Aristotle, he proves the existence of time in the outside through rational analysis and not through sense perception and esoteric experiences. He believes that time is a philosophically rational consideration and not an essential concept which can be conceived through senses, and that the related discussions should be carried out in the domains of philosophy and metaphysics rather than the realm of natural sciences and empirical perceptions. He believes that the concept of time is not formed through the abstraction or generalization of sense perceptions, but through mental analysis of immediate percepts like other metaphysical categories.

Considering what we shall quote from Mulla Sadra, this fact can be explained differently; that is, since time belongs to the rational consideration of wujęd, the status of time is not manifestly separate from the status of wujęd. What lies in the outside is only a restless essence and these two are only separate from each other in rational analysis as is the case with all metaphysical concepts which imply different kinds of wujęd. As stability is not an attribute inflicted upon the object from the outside, time is not an attribute to be inflicted from the outside on the fluid being; but the two concepts imply two kinds of wujęd.

Prior to the Transcendent Theosophy, time was considered to belong to the category of primary intelligibles and essential concepts; however, based on the principles of the Transcendent Theosophy, time does not exist outside of the wujęd, but is abstracted from the mode of the existence of time. Thus, as Mulla Sadra believes in the primacy of wujęd, one cannot accept time and motion as abstracted from the mode of the fluid being as an external accident for the mobile being. Generally speaking, he introduces quantities and measures as analytic accidents and not external ones.⁽¹⁷⁾ However, the important point regarded as an innovation in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is that he conceives of both time and motion as being separated from the mode of the fluid being. This is what we cannot find in earlier schools of philosophy. The issue of time’s being an analytic accident for motion can also be found in Ibn-Sinŕ’s works. Mulla Sadra’s innovation lies in considering time and motion as being the secondary intelligibles for the fluid being.⁽¹⁸⁾ Mulla Sadra explains the issue of time’s being a rational value in different ways and offers a new stipulation in each of them.⁽¹⁹⁾

The rational consideration as mentioned by Mulla Sadra is a nafs ul-amr value and we know that all secondary intelligibles are used in this sense. It goes without saying that the consideration he refers to is rational and not imaginative or estimative.⁽²⁰⁾ This is what he calls the analytic accident with regard to the imposure of time on motion and secondary intelligible considering the relation of time and motion to the fluid being.

Although, Mulla Sadra regards time as an analytic accident for motion and motion as a secondary intelligible for the fluid being, in many cases he directly refers to the external unity of time, motion and the fluid nature. These three issues are different in the mind but in the outside world, they exist in one existence. It is obvious that time is what we interpret as the reality of the being of time and consider it as a fundamental issue in the discussion of time in the Transcendent Theosophy.⁽²¹⁾

So far, we have discussed the perception of the reality of the existence of time and its rational consideration from Mulla Sadra’s view point as compared to that of Ibn-Sinŕ. Now let us consider what Aristotle states in this respect.

According to Aristotle, time is an essential concept. He has treated this issue in Physics. He has tried to offer a picture of time which can be conceived through experience, and this is in contrast with Kant’s idea indicating that time is not an empirical concept to be derived from a particular experience.

According to Aristotle, time is a sensible concept.⁽²²⁾ Yahyŕ Ibn ‘Uday and Abulhasan Ibn Samah, two commentators of Aristotelian philosophy, claim that Aristotle has informed us of the suspicions of the deniers of time; therefore, he does not need to present any argument for the existence of time since the sense is more powerful than any form of reasoning.⁽²³⁾ The evidence for the truth of this statement can be sought in the following quotation from Aristotle:

Aristotle acknowledges the fundamental role of time in the realm of mind and is well aware of the truth of the subjective nature of time. He referred to the close relationship between conscience and time as follows:

Aristotle does not intend to reject time in the outside and consider it an illusive entity. He aims to illustrate the close relationship between conscience and time⁽²⁶⁾ because, according to Ross, he has accepted the existence of motion in the absence of the soul and has just refuted its quantitative representation, that is, time. As quoted from Ross by Copleston, counting does not create the component parts but is the confirmation of the already existing components. According to Copleston, this approach is in line with Aristotle’s idea about the conjunctive. He holds that potentially conjoined components and time are both created by the mind.

The Comprehension of the Reality of Time through Moment

The distinction between moment and time and also the relationship between the two in the history of philosophy is of great importance. By resorting to the conceptualization of moment, man can capture the feeling of being in eternity. In Ibn-Sinŕ’s philosophy, and the philosophy of the illuminationists such as Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, moment has a special place.⁽²⁷⁾ In their views, moment is essentially a religious moment in which the divine grace is extended to all beings and the infinite has become finite.

To understand the reality of time and also the reality of the fluid being, one must pay more attention to the fluid moment. As mentioned before, Mulla Sadra regards time as a fluid entiity and renovative being from which the mind is capable of abstracting a rational value known as time. Enough has been said about the reality of time and its rational value. Now, it is time to explore the kind of relationship between time and moment.

By moment, we mean the potential moment from which time is derived and is interpreted as the fluid moment of time. With respect to such an interpretation of time, Mulla Sadra believes that moment is a real entity whose overflow allows time to be realized and we can consider it as the creator of time. In other words, if the conjoined reality does not reach and cross moment, neither motion nor time can be realized in the outside. Those rejecting such an interpretation of moment believe that the proponents of the existence of moment have intended to consider for it a being independent of “the existence of time” and “the fluid being” while it is not so. Moment, in this sense, is held to be a philosophical concept and has the origin of abstraction in the outside. In philosophy, moment has a different meaning which is usually interpreted as “the active moment”. “The active moment” which is the container and the measure of time and the common borderline between the past and the future is derived from time. Moment in truly a non-existential entity in this sense and is abstracted from the lack of extension of time to infinity; however, it is a reality and one cannot regard it as an illusive entity.

The issue of time and moment and the relationship between the two are closely associated with the two meanings of the traversed motion (harakat tawassutiyyah) and the mediated motion (harakat qatiyyah). Mulla Sadra does not include motion in the category but regards it as the mode of the fluid being. Unlike the apparent meaning of Ibn-Sinŕ’s words,⁽²⁸⁾ he believes in the external existence of traversed motion. Rejecting the negation of the external being of the mediated motion, he seeks to justify Ibn-Sinŕ’s words in this regard.⁽²⁹⁾ He believes in the existence of traversed motion and the external existence of mediated motion.

According to Mulla Sadra, the trans-substantial motion and the fluid being have two distinctive philosophical features. On the one hand, they have a continuous existential unity and; on the other hand, they have a being dependent on their origin and creator. While believing in the existence of continuity for the trans-substantial motion and interpreting it as time, Mulla Sadra argues that separation is necessary for the trans-substantial motion and calls it the potential limit whose container is the fluid moment. The coexistence of union and disunion presents a richer and more general image of the reality of the fluid being as posed by Mulla Sadra.⁽³⁰⁾

According to Mulla Sadra, the existence of the past, present and future is a real issue in time and as long as one division of time is not realized and finished the realization of the next period will not be possible. However,  the important point is that the precedence and subsequence of time divisions do not contradict their togetherness in the wujęd and their very  togetherness is their wujęd. It is necessary for coexisting variables to be the same in their modes because of their gotogetherness. The modes of time divisions consist of their renewable unity and because of the weakness of this wujęd we cannot think otherwise.⁽³¹⁾ In fact, Mulla Sadra attributes some kind of existence to time which is similar to nonexistence, that is, the existence of each of its divisions necessitates the nonexistence of the other. Therefore, the wujęd of such an entity is like restlessness and becoming.⁽³²⁾

Hence, according to Mulla Sadra, the fluid being has both stability and renovation in the sense that it is something permanent and constant on the one hand, and renewable and fluid on the other.  The first quality is similar to the traversed motion but the second one indicates that the time is not constant and the assumption of survival in time is impossible, for its occurrence is like transience and its survival is like annihilation. Mulla Sadra believes that both of them are real. That is, both fluidity and renovation which are the same as occurrence and transience, and motion as a continuous and fluid entity are real. In this sense, time is both permanent and transient and its survival is like its annihilation.

Based on such a view, Mulla Sadra regards continuity as a necessity for the mode of the continuous wujęd.⁽³³⁾ He holds that the assumption of lack of connection among the stages of motion destroys the unity of the mobile entity which renders the motion meaningless. Existential union means the presence of all past existences in the present existence of the object. Clearly, such presence is not  due to the combination of the present existence with past existence but is a unique reality which contains the existential perfection of past existences in addition to a higher existential perfection in a holistic and united fashion. Although, such an existence is really contingent and novel, it contains all its past within its entity. This approach contradicts the view of those who hold that there is an existential distinction between the past and future. It is evident that, due to its present and past qualities, this unique existence is by no means potentially absolute with regard to future. The more the existential actualities of an object increase, the more its powers decrease in future. On the same basis, the past, future, and present are equally instrumental in establishing the reality of time.

With respect to the question of which of the triadic time divisions is the origin of others, Mulla Sadra is of the view that time is a unitary and continuous reality whose realization relies on the past, present, and future. The present is not realized without past, and as long as the present is not realized, there will be no future. He also believes that both precedence and subsequence are attributes of time. Without present, before and after have no meaning; moreover, the past is necessary for time as a container for existence.

Concerning the relation between time and moment, he accepts that moments are not the cornerstones of the reality of time but elements in which time can be analyzed. Mulla Sadra considers some moments and potential limits for time and motion which comprise the body of a unitary and conjunctive entity which exists in reality as a fluid being. Accordingly, one might infer that the Giver of being creates a specific form which is different from the preceding and succeeding forms at every single moment.

Time and the Trans-substantial Motion

The trans-substantial motion and moment are so closely interrelated that we cannot understand one without taking the other into consideration. In order to prove the trans-substantial motion, Mulla Sadra resorts to a piece of evidence one of whose premises is related to understanding the “reality of time”. Time, he believes, is an analytic accident both for the motion and the fluid being. After demonstrating that precedence and subsequence are rooted in accidents themselves, and that time is not an independent receptacle for physical objects, and precedence or subsequence are inherent qualities of the beings, he encounters the question of the kind and nature of such a being which is mingled with precedence or subsequence. By responding to this question, he concludes that this essence, which is mingled with moment and embodies it, is something that is accompanied by precedence and subsequence. It is worth to mention that the precedence and subsequence that Mulla Sadra encounters at the beginning of his way is other than the ones he deals with at the end of the way. The first one is an axiomatic and sensible entity whereas the second one is the existential precedence or subsequence which cannot be perceived by the senses.

Thus, Mulla Sadra offers a proof for the existence of motion in essence through the recognition of the reality of time as a fluid and transient dimension among the dimensions of physical beings. He asserts that each physical being is time bound and has a temporal dimension, and if any being has such an extension in its essence, it will have a gradually acquired being and extensive components in the spread of time. The conclusion is that the existence of the physical substance is a gradual, transient and renewable existence and the time which is involved in time bound phenomena is the time of the trans-substantial motion, and the interception of the trans-substantial motion means the interception of time. This view indoctrinates us that the matter and substance are prone to a fundamental motion, and as the personal entity of physical essence is not realized without geometrical dimensions, it is not also realized without temporal dimensions. Accordingly, one cannot imagine any physical being to be permanent and independent of time and hold the same relation to all times.

In line with this view, the entire universe is a fundamental motion and this motion is like its existence and identity. In fact, the entire universe is a mobile entity with a single motion and each being and accident is a part of the body of this unitary motion that develops a new “self” and “identity” at every moment. The sign of this eternal motion is time itself which is in eternal flux and denotes a fundamental motion in the universe. This motion never leaves the universe to itself and creates a new world at every moment. Thus the exact meaning of trans-substantial motion is that all particles in the universe are in a permanent state of destruction and contingency. This continual destruction or contingency embraces not only all states of objects but also their entire entity and existence as well.

Mulla Sadra extends this view to the domain of man. In his view, the reality of man is a fluid and gradual reality that after passing the earlier stages of life will reach to the level of abstraction and connection to the Holy Truth. That man’s soul is a temporal being, and that time is an “existential being” and not a gradual attribute is a sublime concept in Mulla Sadra’s thought. Such an idea is very close to what Heidegger proposes. In his magnus opus (Being and Time), by clarifying the temporality of man’s existence, he presents an image of man’s becoming and trans-substantial motion which is pretty close to what we have in Sadrian philosophy. However, there are striking differences among their basic philosophical ideas.

One of the most important differences is that in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, time, like wujęd, is closely associated with perpetual creation. The meaning of perpetual creation is one of the basic concepts in Islamic thought. Several Muslim scholars have differently interpreted this idea. Besides the Asharite philosophy of atomism, we have before us the mystics’ renovation of ideas best presented by Ibn ‘Arabi. After Ibn Arabi and his connection with mystical thought, one can interpret Mulla Sadra’s trans-substantial motion as one of the most original philosophical interpretations of perpetual creation.

On the basis of what Mulla Sadra has stated in this respect, each physical phenomenon is susceptible to change in its essence, and its existence at any presupposed moment is other than its existence at another moment. Accordingly, the act of perpetual creation by the Most High is constantly carried out.

According to the trans-substantial motion, no “self” remains constant in existence and no two similar selves can be found in two successive moments. Even in cases where some scientific changes occur, there is a widespread change of identity with respect to the trans-substantial motion. The trans-substantial motion implies that all changes occurring in different ways, whether quantitative, qualitative, physical, or chemical, emanate from the substance and essence of objects.

Furthermore, at the point of physical and chemical changes, there is a trans-substantial motion and a new “self” is created in the universe. This change involves a continuous and perpetual process which affects each single being in the world. Therefore, each entity develops a new “self” and a new entity at each moment so that no two particles are ever the same at two different points in time whether the apparent motion is observable or unobservable.

Now, we can understand better why one cannot claim that the universe “is”, and that the time passes over it; but it must be said that the world of the next moment does not exist and must emerge. In fact, the passage of time is the motion of the universe and not the stability of the universe and time’s crossing over it. The motion of the universe means its gradual origination, and the gradual origination means its emergence at each moment. In this regard, Mulla Sadra uses the expression of “the renovation of identity” indicating that the universe consists of a series of continuously renovated identities. In certain cases, Mulla Sadra generalizes this term to all beings other than God and agrees with the mystics who believe in the renovation of ideas. As a result, he accepts the notion that the will of God stands for continual creation. Basically, continuous creation is not limited to the fluid being and the natural and physical essence. In this universe, each being is inherently poor in terms of existence, that is, everything in this universe is nothing but non-existent. Hence, if it is left to itself, it runs in the course of its own destruction due to his existential poverty. Thus every object can have merely a momentary existence because exactly at the moment it is born into the world of existence, its soul leads it to the realm of non-existence. That every being tends to negate itself due to its existential poverty, is exactly the meaning that is normally inferred from the concepts of flux and renovation. It is here that the concept of “the new creation” or “perpetual creation” is realized from the combination of these two elements, namely the existential poverty of all objects and the perpetual emanation of Divine Grace from the absolute metaphysical source.

No one can ever argue the dependence of creatures upon the Creator and the continual need of the universe to God more deeply. The momentary character of the universe elucidates its needy nature and shows that the universe is in a state of becoming and flux not only in its appearance and mode, but also in its essence and entity. Dependence and need have penetrated to its very core, covering its entirety. Mulla Sadra uses the glorious verse of the Qur’an⁽³⁴⁾ as a piece of evidence for the confirmation of his idea.⁽³⁵⁾

There is nothing more speculative and deeper than the trans-substantial motion in the work of God. This is the same philosophical meaning of “new creation” stated in the Holy Qur’an.⁽³⁶⁾

From the viewpoint of the mystics, the meaning of new creation includes the meaning of time in its general sense. On the basis of this meaning, they do not see time as being exclusively limited to physical beings and believe that all beings are time bound in this sense. The other meaning of time is what they interpret as renovation and perpetual creation in the physical world. Mulla Sadra places great stress on this point and explicates it in relation to the trans-substantial motion.

Notes:

[1]. Ibn Sinŕ, al-Shifŕ, al-Tabiyyŕt, al-Sam‘ al-tabi‘i, ed. Ibrahim Madkur, Ayatullŕh Mar‘ashi Najafi, Qum, 1405 A.H. pp. 148-166.

2. Aristotle, Physik, W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1961, 220b, pp. 16-17.

3. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Asfŕr al-arba‘ah, Vol. 1, 4^th edition, Beirut, Lebanon, Dar al-Ihya al-Thurat al-‘Arabi, 1410 A.H. 1990, p. 382.

4. Ibn Sinŕ, ibid, p. 148.

5. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, ibid, Vol. 3, p. 108.

6. Ibn Sinŕ, ibid, p. 101, pp. 123-124.

7.Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, ibid, Vol. 3, p. 101-103.

8. Ibid. p. 180; ibid, ‘Allŕmah Tabŕtabŕ’i’s notes, p. 69.

9. Ibid. p. 103.

10 Ibid. p. 252.

11. Ibid. Vol. 7, pp. 290-29.

12- Ibid. Vol. 3, p. 139; cf. al-Shawŕhid al-rubębiyyah.

13. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Asfŕr al-arba‘ah, vol. 7, p. 304; Hikmat al-‘ars’hiyyah, ed. Ghulŕm Husayn Ahani, Mawla publication, Tehran, 1361, p. 231.

14. al-Asfŕr al-arba‘ah, Vol. 3, p. 146.

15. Einstein theory of relativity is different from Mulla Sadra’s trans-substantial motion. Einstein, who makes the space temporal, does not want to prove that, being of the natural beings are gradational and flowing. He only shows that the geometrical and physical measurements are dependent on the speed of measurement and the speed of object, measured. And since the concept of time is implicit in the concept of speed, so physical measurement cannot be performed free of time. For Einstein, time is introduced in this fashion; and this has nothing to do with Mulla Sadra’s philosophical time; just as psychical time, which has nothing to do with philosophical time. Here, time is a real direction, whether it governs a visible object or not. Another difference between Einstein and Mulla Sadra is in this fact that Einstein’s theory is a scientific and experienceable one, while Mulla Sadra’s is a metaphysical and unexperinceable one, which neither will be verified nor refuted empirically.

16. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Asfŕr al-arba‘ah, Vol. 3, p. 133; ibid, Vol. 1, p. 282.

17. Ibid. Vol. 4, p. 33, cf. Misbah Yazdi, Ta‘liqŕt ‘alŕ nahŕyat al-Hikmah, p. 159, p. 289.

18. Ibid. pp. 139-140, p. 32, pp. 180-181; ibid, Vol. 7, p. 284, p. 304.

19. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 141. Also see ibid. p. 200.

20 Mulla Sadra makes distinction between rational consideration of time, and its sensational and imaginary form. For him, time, beside having form, can be conceptualised in the mind in the form of rational consideration. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Asfŕr al-arba‘ah, Vol. 3, pp. 132-133; cf. ibid. pp. 32-33.

21. Ibid. pp. 109-110; cf. ibid. p. 173, pp. 140-141, pp. 180-181; ibid. Vol. 4, pp. 33-36.

22. Aristotle who stipulates the sensibility of time and space, by sense means the common sense. Aristotle, in De Anima, has considered the motion and stillness, dimension and shape, number and unit, among such cases. Aristotle, De Anima, 418A17, 425A15. Ross has introduced the possibility of adding time to these cases. W.D. Ross, Aristotle, U.S.A., 1966.

23. Aristotle, Physik, (translated to Arabic by Ishŕq ibn Hunayn, with commentary of Ibn Sam‘ah, Ibn ‘Uday…Research by ‘AbdulRahman Badawi, Vol. 1, p. 416.

24. Aristotle, Physik, p. 219, the Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1, p. 371.

25- Aristotle, Physik, W.D. Ross, 1961, 220, b, 16-17.

26. About the fundamental role of time in human conscience and perception, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) has a phrase similar to that of Aristotle words. He says: “If a tribe were imprisoned in a jail underground from the childhood, they understand time definitely; even if they do not understand sensible motions in the world. Ibn Rushd, Tahŕfat al-tahŕfat, ed. Morris, 3^rd. edition, Beirut, 1992, p. 7. 

27. Ibn Sinŕ, ibid. pp. 16-172; Suhrawardi, Collection of Shaykh al-ishrŕq’s Writings, ed. Henry Corbin, Tehran, 1355. 2^nd. Edition. Al-Talwihŕt, p. 11, al-Mutarihŕt, p. 278; Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, ibid. Vol. 3, p. 166, pp. 173-174; ibid, Vol. 7, p. 284; notes of Ilŕhiyyŕt-i Shifŕ, Qum, p. 106.

28. Ibn Sinŕ, ibid, pp. 83-85.

29. Sadr  al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, ibid. Vol. 3, pp. 32-37.

30 Ibid. pp. 267-268.

31. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Shawŕhid al-rubębiyyah, p. 61.

32. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, al-Asfŕr al- arba‘ah, Vol. 3, p. 28, p. 157.

33. Ibid. p. 152.

34. The Holy Quran, 55:29.

35. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirŕzi, ibid, Vol. 7, pp. 281-283.

36.The Holy Quran, 50:15.

37. Time in both foregoing sense is different from Abul Barakŕt’s words in “al-mu‘tabar” and Qaysari’s words in Nahŕyat al-bayŕn fi dirŕyat al-zamŕn. For, the former considers time as the “quanity of being” and the latter considers it as the quantity of the survival of being. Cf. Abul Barakŕt Baghdŕdi, al- mu‘tabar  fi’l hikmah, Heydarabad Dakan, 1358 A.H. Vol. 2, p. 69; Qaysari, Rasŕ’il Qaysari.