Conception and Assent
Mohammed Taqi Fa'ali
Knowledge is initially classified into acquired knowledge and knowledge by presence. The acquired knowledge itself is divided into conception (tasawwur) and assent (tasdiq).
Regarding the above classification, logicians, theologians, and philosophers have posed a series of extensive discussions which outnumber those related to the first classification of knowledge. Perhaps, the most accurate of all writings concerning this issue is Mullà Sadrà’s treatise called al-Tasawwur wa’l tasdíq (Risàlah fí) (Treatize on Conception and Assent). We can also claim that no one has ever discussed this issue as precisely as Ibn Sínà. Our discussion here is mainly a logical one, since both conception and assent are among logical intelligibles, and this is because their qualification is mental, in the sense that their subjects of qualification are in the mind. In other words, what is conceived and what is assented to, or the conceived and the assented (certified), are both in the domain of the mind. The external thing is never qualified by conception or assent unless it enters the mind. Besides, in order to abstract the two notions of conception and assent, a lot of mental considerations and inquiries are necessary. These two issues are not the reflections of the external world to be acquired immediately and without any deliberation. Rather, they appear through mental activities and rational contemplations. Thus the occurrence of two concepts of conception and assent and their qualification is mental; they are among logical secondary intelligibles; and their original place is the field of logic. However, due to some reasons, they were later transferred to other disciplines such as theology and philosophy. Ibn Sínà has classified concepts into primary philosophical, and logical ones. He has also made some interesting remarks about the third type.
Different people have defined conception and assent in different ways. In Ibn Sínà’s definition, conception has been defined in separation from judgment, and assent has been defined in union with it. Therefore, the main difference between them relates to the presence or absence of a judgment.
In the definition provided by the author of Sharh al-mawàqif, too, judgment is considered as the criterion for distinguishing conception from assent.
In ‘Allàmah Hillí’s definition, assent is companied by corresponding, certain, and fixed conditions. Under such conditions, assent is a judgment belonging to the relation between two conceptions – affirmative or negative. Therefore, irrespective of its kind, assent is based on four pillars: judgment, relation, the conception of subject, and the conception of predicate. Such a definition of assent, in fact, corresponds to the definition of proposition. On the contrary, the above-mentioned conditions and pillars are not realized for conception and, thus, it is nothing more than the acquisition of a cognitive form by the mind.
According to the definition provided by Sabziwàrí, the main distinction between the two lies in the presence of judgment, which is nothing but a mental acknowledgment or confession.
In his definition, ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í maintains that conception has two characteristics. Firstly, it should belong to a single known; and, secondly, there should be no affirmation or negation in it. These two characteristics naturally work in the reverse direction for assent, in the sense that it results from more than a single known and is accompanied by affirmation or negation. Of course, the second characteristic includes the first one, since if a kind of knowledge is accompanied by affirmation or negation, there will inevitably exist more than one known for it. This is because in affirmation something is affirmed for something else, and in negation something is denied to something else.
Consequently, there is no judgment in conception, while it is there in assent, thus the analysis of the nature of the two will not be possible without the study of the content of judgment. At the same time, the effect of judgment on assent needs to be clarified. In this way, there are three key concepts to deal with; namely, conception, assent, and judgment. In what follows, we will try to explain each in detail.
There are four views concerning the problem of conception:
1. Conception can be considered as non-conditioned being as a source of all ontological division. From this point of view, it can be called ‘absolute conception’.
2. Conception can be viewed as non-conditioned being as a division
3. Conception can be regarded as absolute being conditioned by nothing. In this approach, the condition of absence of judgment has been taken into consideration, and the conception is called ‘abstract conception’.
4. Conception can be considered as conditioned being as a thing, i.e. as something dependent on judgment.
In the first view, conception is the same as knowledge, rather than a division of it or a divider for assent. In other words, absolute conception is the same mental form that is attained by the knower. Therefore, if we define conception as ‘the attainment of the from of something by the mind’, as ‘Allàmah Hillí says, we have in fact defined knowledge. In this sense, conception is the same as absolute conception, which is synonymous with knowledge. Therefore, it is neither a source of division for assent, nor a division of knowledge.
In the last view, conception is the same as assent, since if it is conditioned by a judgment, it will turn into it. Assent is nothing other than a conception involving a judgment, and, basically, any knowledge which is accompanied by a judgment, whether affirmative or negative, is the same as assent. Therefore, the first and the last views are out of question, and only the other two are taken into consideration. There is of course some disagreement in this regard too, and we must deal with two approaches as follows:
1. A conception which is the source of division for assent must be attained in an absolute and non-conditioned being as a division. In this approach, no condition, whether affirmative or negative, whether conditioned by nothing or conditioned, being as a thing is taken into consideration, and even if there is a condition, it is the very non-conditioned being. Thus neither the presence of judgment nor its absence is considered in it. And this is the very condition for conception; that is, non-conditioned being and absolute. In other words, conception is conditional upon not being accompanied by any condition or limit. Suhrawardí’s words in al-Talwíhàt could be considered as support for this view. 
2. Conception is conditional upon lack of judgment, and it cannot be taken into consideration in an absolute and non-conditioned sense. In this view, the absence of judgment is the condition of conception, and it is considered as being conditioned by nothing. This view belongs to those whom Ghazzàlí refers to in al-Qistàs.
This view has been criticized on the grounds that conception in a way, for example as a condition or a component, takes part in assent; on the other hand, the criterion for assent is judgment. Therefore, how is it possible for conception, which is conditional upon the non-existence of judgment, to be present in an assent, which is conditional upon the presence of judgment? A conception conditioned by the non-existence of judgment is the same as a conception conditioned by the non-existence of assent, and such a conception could not play a part in assent, while the presence of conception in assent is certain. Therefore, it is better to say that with respect to the existence and non-existence of judgment, conception is non-conditioned being; it is neither conditional upon the existence of judgment, so that it would turn into assent, nor is it conditional upon the non-existence of judgment, so that it could not be present in assent. Rather, we must view conception in an absolute and non-conditioned sense, so that it could come together with assent, which is conditional upon judgment. In this way, it can be said that ‘conception is the apprehension of the form of the object by the mind, without considering a judgment’. The first part of this definition, the apprehension of the form of the object by the mind, is the same as genus and, thus, includes assent as well. The second part, without considering a judgment, is the same as differentia. Phrasing the differentia in this form is better than stating ‘as separated from judgment’, since the later suggests the negatively conditioned conception, while the former refers to the same non-conditioned conception. This issue has been clearly explained in Sharh hikmat al-ishràq.
In sum, there is no judgment in conception, and it is not conditioned by the existence of judgment; otherwise, it would be the same as assent. Furthermore, the absence of judgment is not a condition or limitation for conception; otherwise, it could not come together with assent, while conception accompanies assent in a way. The only reasonable assumption is that conception is non-conditioned with respect to judgment, and considering the fact that it is so, either as a source of division or division, and that the non-conditioned being as a source of division is the same as knowledge or absolute conception, conception is non-conditioned as a division in relation to judgment. In other words, conception – the production of the form of the object in the mind – is the same as a kind of knowledge in which judgment has been taken into consideration; however, neither the presence nor the absence of judgment is a condition for conception. Rather, with respect to both cases, conception is regarded as absolute and non-conditioned being.
Types of conceptions
As mentioned before, conception is a knowledge that is non-conditioned with respect to judgment. This kind of knowledge consists of the following types:
1. The Conception of singular: The examples of this type include the conceptions of man, tree, stone, angel, etc. Such conceptions are singular, and there is no combination in them.
2. Imperfect compound conceptions: The examples here include the combination of a noun and a genitive, a subject and an attribute, a relative pronoun and a relative clause, or any of the two sides of a conditional sentence, provided that each is taken into consideration by itself. In all these cases we are faced with an imperfect combination. The relation resulting from a genitive or attributive combination, or the other two types would be a notional conception – the combination of a conditional clause and the dependent clause is an assent –; however, if any of these clauses is taken into consideration by itself, an imperfect combination will result.
3. The Conception of compositional relation: This kind includes the different types of compositional combinations such as command, prohibition, interrogation, and request. On the other hand, there are declarative combinations. If such combinations are perfect, they will be of the type of assent.
4. The Conception of declarative relation: This conception is conditional upon not being accompanied by an absolute judgment. This is like doubting someone’s standing or the existence of an intelligent creature in Mars. In such cases the judgment is not negative or affirmative, and is, therefore, out of the domain of assent.
As a result, conception is, firstly, more general than absolute conception, thus ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í’s equating conception with the single known is open to criticism. Conceptions could also be present in combinations; therefore, being single or one is not a criterion for conception and cannot distinguish it from assent; however, it could be the distinctive feature of one of the types of conceptions. Secondly, the basis of conception in notional combinations is the absence of judgment. In fact, the only thing that distinguishes such combinations from those related to assent is the presence or absence of judgment. Of course, judgment itself has certain characteristics; for example, whenever there is a judgment, it refers to beyond itself in some way; second, all words come to an end with it; third, it makes the statement either true or false; fourth, all statements expressing a judgment in Persian include the verb ast (is). All the above characteristics are among the effects and concomitants of judgment. Therefore, the pivot, the criterion, or the main distinguishing feature here is judgment. And if there is no judgment in some knowledge, there is a conception, either in a compound or a simple form.
From another perspective, conception is divided into universal and particular types. Universal conception is a conception which can be applied to different objects or individuals, such as the concept of book, which can be applied to numerous instances of books. On the other hand, a particular conception is a concept which can only be applied to one individual and has no more than one referent, such as the mental image of Plato. Thus if the concept is such that it cannot be applied to many individuals, it is particular; otherwise, it is universal. Nevertheless, Mullà Sadrà and his followers maintain that a concept is always universal as long as it remains a concept, and if thousands of other concepts are added to the first concept, it can still have several referents, since it is a concept. Yet, if we refer to the outside and relate an objective existence to a concept, since existence is individuated, the concept will also be individuated and have a single referent. Accordingly, concept is universal by itself, and the external existence is individuated and personal. In this case, there will be no particular thing, since the mind is always universal and the outside is always individual, unless we consider the particular in the sense of the individual.
Particular conceptions – if they exist at all – have various levels and stages, including sense, imaginal, and estimative conceptions. Rational conceptions are always universal and are themselves divided into primary and secondary intelligibles. The second types itself is sometimes a logical concept and sometimes a philosophical one.
There are different views as to the ways conceptions represent the reality or their verisimilitude:
First view: Some contemporary philosophers consider knowledge, whether tasawwurí (related to conception) or tasdíqí (related to assent), as representing the real world. An essential and indispensable characteristic of knowledge is discovering and representing the reality at all times. If knowledge does not represent what is beyond itself, it is nothing but ignorance. Therefore, conceptions, as a kind of knowledge, actuality represent the external world and always lead the knower towards what is beyond them. Thus the verisimilitude of conceptions is always actual.
The general Correspondence between knowledge and the known is one of the necessary characteristics of knowledge. More clearly stated, the reality of knowledge is one which represents the external world, so a scientific assumption that is not representative of the outside is an impossible one. It is also impossible to assume that there is a kind of knowledge that discovers and represents the outside without having something discovered out of it.
In this theory, the actual value of concepts and conceptions has been taken into consideration. In other words, we are realists with regard to our conceptions. Although conception is always accompanied with a mental form, this form will always direct us towards what is out of it. As a result, when dealing with conceptual concepts, we will be in relation to reality. One of the concomitants of this theory is that there must be no error in conceptions; for example, the senses cannot commit any error. Through accepting the validity of all conceptions, ‘Allàmah tries to justify the mechanism of error in conceptions. Mullà Sadrà, too, is of the same view.
Second view: The actual conception does not recount the external world; it rather represents the outside world. Conception, by itself, cannot represent the external world, while it is capable of recounting it. If another conception, relation or judgment is added to it; in other words, if that conception becomes a part of a proposition and is accompanied with assent, it will represent the world outside. In this way, the conception of subject along with that of the predicate can present its referent in the external world. Thus if conception is considered by itself, it will be potentially a representative of the external world, and what brings this potentiality into actuality is an annex consisting of the very judgment and assent.
Conception … is a simple mental phenomenon which is capable of recounting what is beyond itself, such as the conception of Mount Damawand and the concept of mountain.
Therefore, regarding the two types of acquired knowledge – conception and assent – we could say that it is only assent which is of actual epistemological value. Concepts, by themselves, cannot represent the reality. In fact, we have just discussed the details with respect to the different types of knowledge, and we have been realists only in terms of assents.
Third view: Conceptions, whatever form they have, are of no epistemological value. They even have no potential value, for conception is nothing more than the existence of a thing in our cognitive perceptions. Such a thing can never lead us to the external world. This is because these are only assents that are capable of unveiling and representing the outside. One can only be a realist with respect to assents; therefore, conceptions, even potentially, are not capable of unveiling the reality and recounting it.
This theory is not acceptable because, firstly, a specific conception always develops under specific conditions. For instance, if we open our eyes to a liquid, we will see it as water. If we go out of the house in a cold winter day, we feel cold, and if we do the same in a hot summer day, we feel hot. When we see a particular thing, we always see it in the color it has, for example, green, and if we turn our back to it, we will see something else. These facts indicate that the development of conceptions in our mind is rooted in certain causes that are out of it, thus the conceptions recount these causes in the external world. We can also refer to the variety of conception. The variety of conceptions has no reason except for the variety of their bases and causes. Therefore, a specific conception originates from a specific source, corresponds to it, and recounts it. Second, the denial of the recounting feature of conceptions is the same as the denial of the principle of causality. This is because sense conceptions, for example, appear as effects for the soul, and the mind is affected when sensing something. If sensing is the same as being affected, according to the principle of causality, it requires something effective. The effective agent cannot leave an effect at its own level; therefore, it is out of its own level and plays a role in the development of a notional effect in the mind. Such sensory effects will naturally recount and report external effective agents. Third, if we do not view conceptions realistically, when dealing with self-evident perceptions, we can never consider them or their content as being true, while Muslim philosophers view them and their content, whether notional or affirmative (related to assent), as being true. This is one of the points that relates the problem of conceptions and assents to the discussion of immediate perceptions or self-evident issues. One who denies the ability to recount conceptions, and separates them from reality can never acknowledge the truth of self-evident conceptions in the context of immediate perceptions, and if he does, he has in fact adopted two contradictory positions. This judgment also includes the second view, since the ability to recount means that if we take conception into account by itself, without relating it to a proposition, it is not capable of representing the reality. In sum, any theory which disrupts the connection between conception (since it is a conception) and the external world – whether with the ability to recount or without it – cannot vote for the truth of self-evident conception, and if it does, it has spoken contradictorily.
Realism itself is of two direct and indirect types and means to acknowledge that whatever we perceive, for example through our senses, exist independently of our experiences and possess at least some of the features we believe they do. Direct realism means having a notional perception of an object without the perception of an intermediary. On the contrary, indirect realism means perceiving an object through an intermediary. According to this classification, we can say that the first view is in line with indirect realism, for, on the one hand, it indicates that conception represents the external world and, on the other hand, since conception is a kind of acquired knowledge, it is accompanied with an intermediary or form. However, a person like Shaykh al-Ishràq, who considers the sense as knowledge by presence, believes in direct realism, and if one denies the relation between conception and the external world and does not consider it as representing the reality, from an epistemological point of view, agrees with a kind of cognitive phenomenology, and is in fact satisfied with appearances in the context of conceptions. Such appearances could never come together with realities.
Since judgment is the criterion for assent, as well as a distinctive feature separating conception from assent, it is necessary to inquire into the reality and nature of judgment prior to dealing with assent. There are different views as to the problem of judgment. In what follows we will explain these views in detail.
A. Judgment is one of the acts of the soul. When we make a judgment, an act has been emanated from our soul. Therefore, the relation between judgment and the soul is an emanating one rather than an immanent one. The soul is not the place of judgment; it is its origin. In this sense, judgment is the same as will, and both emanate from the soul. Accordingly, judgment is not of the type of accidents which indwell in the soul. The soul has in fact a causal relation to accidents. This idea has been attributed to Qutb al-Dín Ràzí (refer to his treatise), Suhrawardí (al-Talwíhàt and Mutàrihàt), Ibn Kamunah (his glosses upon al-Talwíhàt), and Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí.Reference has also been made to this idea in Sharh al-mawàqif without attributing it to a specific person.
This view has been criticized on the grounds that assent is one of the types of knowledge, and that philosophers consider knowledge as a passive accident or mental quality. Therefore, how is it possible for judgment, which is one of the constituents of assent, to be one of the acts of the soul? Two answers have been given to this question:
1. Assent, which is accompanied with judgment, belongs to the category of act; however, it is not a type of knowledge. It is, in fact, parallel to knowledge and a point of division for it. In other words, knowledge is only limited to conceptions. The minor proposition has been eliminated from this response; that is, assent has been placed out of the domain of knowledge so that judgment could sustain its actuality.
2. This idea involves a metaphoric language, since judgment is not an act of the soul. A conception that necessitates the passing of a judgment is the act of the soul. Here we have applied the act of the soul to the necessary rather than to the necessitated, which is a kind of metaphor. This response has been provided by Qutb al-Dín Ràzí.
B. Judgment is a kind of perception rather than act. In this approach, judgment is considered an epistemological issue. The followers of this idea believe that if we view perception as an act of the soul, it will not be an epistemological issue anymore; in other words, being an act of the soul and recounting the reality are not consistent with each other, and cannot come together in the same place. Therefore, they emphasize that judgment is not an act and, in this way, decree that it is related to perception. The author of al-Qistàs, Qutb al-Dín Ràzí, Taftàzàní, and Mohammed Dawàní are among the followers of this idea. This view has also been discussed in Sharh al-mawàqif.
There are certain arguments for this view:
1. If man refers to his heart, he finds out that whenever he makes a judgment, it means that he has gained some knowledge. Making a judgment is the same as learning something new, and refuting a judgment is the same as losing some piece of knowledge and increasing one’s ignorance. Therefore, a clear and peaceful conscience testifies to the perceptual nature of judgment.
2. Judgment is the result of thinking, which is a kind of perception. Since thinking belongs to the category of perception, its result will also be the same.
3. Judgment can be qualified by attributes which are in conformity with being a perception, for example, judgment is said to be acquired. As we know, we acquire both knowledge and perceptions.
The last view suffers from certain drawbacks, as follows:
a. One could refute this view and claim that as his inner sense or conscience indicates, when passing a judgment, an act emanates from him. Furthermore, conscience-related issues are not essentially acceptable as proof, since conscience is something personal, and personal issues are not universal, while a piece of proof has to be universal and generalizable, and we must be able to present it to others and use it as a tool when exchanging ideas.
b. If we accept that judgment is the outcome of thinking, we can say that, firstly, not every judgment is the result of thinking, since there are also self-evident judgments. Secondly, one might say that theoretical judgments, which are the result of thinking, prepare the mind for issuing acts, and this act is the very judgment. Thus if something is the result of thinking, it does not necessarily mean that it is perceptual and not an act of the soul.
C. Judgment is a revealing act. To tell the truth, both of the above-mentioned views include some facts. On the one hand, judgment could be one of the acts of the soul, since, first, the words used in the phrasing of a judgment, including ‘I state’, ‘I admit’, ‘I confirm’, all have a content, denote the completing of an action, and report the emanation of an act from the soul. Therefore, it is the language of judgment and its assent that necessitate considering the reality of judgment as a psychic action. Second, the analysis of the nature of the proposition leads to the fact that judgment belongs to the category of acts. For example, if we see a red apple in the outside world, we have in fact encountered something and seen an object. In other words, what is seen and what makes one see something are both a single thing. When this single thing comes to the mind, it is divided and analyzed into two different things. The mind considers the concept of apple as a substantial one and views redness as an accidental essence. At the second level, the mind deals with two different concepts, the concept of apple and the concept of redness. At the same time, the mind pays attention to the point that in the outside and at the first level of the mind, there was only one thing, the red apple. In order to bring the second level of the mind into harmony with the external reality and acknowledge and present this act, man constructs a proposition. In this way, he places the concept of apple in the position of the subject, and the concept of redness in the position of the predicate, then establishes a relation between them and evaluates them in the light of each other, and finally makes a judgment as to the unity of these two concepts – subject and the predicate – in the outside, and admits its truth and applicability. Through passing a judgment, the mind intends to create a unitary relation between the subject and predicate in the outside and admit it. The proposition, which is related to the third level of the mind, returns to the first level, which is encountering a single thing, and is, in fact, a kind of combination after analysis. The philosophy beyond constructing a proposition basically is to admit the external unity of the subject and the predicate. This is the first building block of any proposition. The essence of a proposition is to bring two things, the subject and the predicate, together. The unity of these two concepts takes place in the context of reality, and if there is no external gotogetherness, there will be no proposition, and if there is any, it will be void of meaning and spirit. Assuming a proposition without the unity of its two sides in the outside is the same as assuming a proposition without a proposition. In other words, there would be a paradoxical and self-contradictory concept. Therefore, if we construct a proposition to establish a unity between the subject and predicate, and we show this relation through judgment, we have no choice but to admit that judgment is the act of the soul and the mind.
On the other hand, judgment should represent what is beyond itself. As discussed before, the content of judgment aims at presenting the external unity between the subject and the predicate, thus theoretical judgment, too, deals with the outside and recounts and reports external unity. In this way, one can prove the representational nature of judgment. In other words, the judgment’s being an act, and its perceptual and epistemological aspects are not mutually exclusive. We can assume something which could be an act of the soul on one hand, and represent what is beyond it, on the other.
Psychical issues are of two types: some of them like joy, will, and sorrow have no perceptual aspect. Such issues are not the forms of anything; for example, there is a clear distinction between joy and the conception of tree. The first is an absolutely psychical issue which bears no scientific and informational load, and is merely an internal state, while the second is a part of one’s knowledge, and of the type perceptual issues. Furthermore, such psychical states are revealed to the soul by means of knowledge by presence. Some of the other psychical issues have scientific and cognitive aspects but are passively acquired by the soul. Mental forms are of this type; that is, perceptual faculties, when encountering a real thing, receive its form and are influenced by external effects. For example, the conceptions of stone or sky are the forms of particular external things. All such conceptions are, firstly, the forms of objects and influence the soul; secondly, we have an acquired knowledge of them.
Judgment has both the aspects. One the one hand, it is a form representing the external world, in the sense that it reveals the external unity between the subject and the predicate, as well as the external existence of philosophical relation and copulative existence. From this aspect, judgment is a kind of acquired knowledge and mental form, representing and revealing the external world. One the other hand, judgment is the act of the soul, and, accordingly, it is like other psychical issues such as pleasure, will, and desire. From this aspect, judgment does not represent or discover anything. That is why it is called acknowledgement or judgment. From this point of view, judgment is merely an act of the soul, as the will is a psychical act. Therefore, it can be concluded that judgment has two aspects: on the one hand, it represents what is beyond itself; therefore, like all other sciences, it is of a scientific, cognitive, and perceptual nature. On the other hand, judgment, like the will, is an act of the soul and is created by it. When passing a judgment, the soul does the act of creating the objective unity between the subject and the predicate. Thus judgment is an act of the soul and, at the same time, opens a window towards the outside world. In sum, judgment is a revealing act. This idea was first proposed and developed by ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í and Mutahharí. However, it should be noted that Mullà Sadrà’s writings had completely provided the grounds for adopting this idea.
Here, the previous objection is raised again, indicating that judgment is constituted in assent; assent is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is among psychical accidents; therefore, judgment cannot be an act. Considering the last analysis, there are two answers to this objection:
1. We can make a major contradiction and deny the general principle that knowledge is an accident. Mullà Sadrà emphasized that knowledge is an ontological issue, and this ontological issue is the act of the soul. The soul is the origin of the realization of all types of knowledge, and they are the effects of the soul.
2. It was previously mentioned that judgment has two aspects and its revealing aspect was proved. From this aspect, judgment is a mental issue and a kind of acquired knowledge, and is passively obtained by the soul. As an accident or psychical quality, knowledge corresponds with this aspect of judgment.
D. Judgment is a conception which is followed by judgment. Therefore, we can say that the term judgment is applied to conception, since it is followed by a judgment – assent. In other words, the name of a requiring agent is applied to what is required, and we have in fact employed a metaphor here. Apparently, the author of Durrat al-tàj is of the same view.
It seems that the two terms, assent and judgment, have been confused with each other, since, as we will see later, a lot of views concerning assent suggest that conception follows judgment. Qutb al-Dín Shíràzí has based his definition of assent on judgment. However, it is emphasized that judgment is not the same as assent, and there are certain differences between them.
E. Judgment is the relation of the predicate to the subject. This view is attributed to the commentator of al-Qistàs. If we state that a proposition consists of four components, subject, predicate, relation, and judgment, it indicates that judgment is the same as the third component. The relation established between the subject and predicate is called judgment.
F. Judgment is not the same as the relation between the subject and the predicate; rather, it is the perception of this relation. From this point of view, judgment, in affirmative propositions, means the perception of the occurrence of relation, and, in negative propositions, it means the perception of non-occurrence of relation. This view has been attributed to the commentator of Matàli‘.
A general review of earlier views can help us in making a more limited classification of all of them. The last view apparently indicates that judgment is the same as perception. This idea is related to the second one, in which the subject of perception is determined. On the other hand, the fifth view is very close to the first one, since if judgment is a relation between the subject and predicate, it is, in fact, an act of the soul; therefore, this theory views the nature of judgment as an act of the soul. By reducing the above-mentioned ideas to a more general and, at the same time, more limited classification, it could be said that there are three principle views concerning the nature of judgment: 1) judgment is a perceptual issue; 2) judgment is a psychical act; and 3) judgment is a revealing act. Out of these three ideas, the last one is the correct one, and the discussions presented so far confirm the truth of this claim.
In order to clarify the nature of judgment, two points are worth a mention: First, judgment is not a relation. Whenever two concepts are presented to the mind, it considers one as the subject and the other as the predicate in a proposition, and after their conception, the mind relates and compares the subject and the predicate to each other. This act, which is the same judgmental relation, is one of the mental functions that is performed when dealing with a proposition. The comparison may be made between two distinctive forms or concepts, such as body and white, or between something and itself, such as man and himself; that is, the mind is capable of considering a single concept in two different ways and, in this way, establish a proposition in which a concept is predicated on itself. In such cases, of course, the predication will be essential. It is necessary to emphasize that judgment is other than a relation or comparison between two sides of a proposition; it is rather the acknowledgement of the realization of this relation. When the mind makes a comparison between two concepts, it either admits their unity or does not; in this way, we have either an affirmative or negative proposition. In either case acknowledgement and passing a judgment are mental acts that appear after making a comparison between the subject and predicate. This is because judgment is affirmed or negated, while relations in propositions are not such. It should also be added that judgment requires a subject, and that relation is the subject of judgment. Therefore, it is not possible to have a judgment without a relation; however, we could assume a case in which there is a relation between two concepts, without having a judgment involved. Therefore, if there is a judgment in a proposition, there will necessarily be a relation. Of course, it can be said that relation is not a part of the proposition and, thus, as ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í maintains, eliminate it from the nature of proposition. Nevertheless, the existence of judgment is necessary, since judgment has no subject except for relation.
The second point is that judgment is not the same as association of meanings. Sometimes, something reminds man of something else simply due to their similarity, adjacency, or contrast. The reason for this is nothing except for habit and mental familiarity. For example, since man has always witnessed day and night succeeding each other, he always expects the day to be followed by the night and vice versa. Or since he has always heard the name of Hàtam Tà’í in association with generosity, whenever he hears this name, he is reminded of generosity. Association of meanings is one of the mental functions attracting the attention of psychologists. Now it is necessary to pay attention to the point that judgment is not the same as association of meanings. In judgment we do not move from the subject to the predicate or vice versa out of a mental habit. The reality of judgment is other than the association of meanings, since there are many propositions which are presented to man for the first time, like scientific hypotheses concerning which man has no background knowledge, familiarity, and mental habit. In such cases the scientist evaluates the issue through empirical and inductive methods, and then passes a scientific judgment. Here there is no trace of association of meanings, but there is a judgment. On the contrary, sometimes there might be an association of meanings involved, for example, we might be reminded of generosity by hearing the name of Hàtam Tà’í; at the same time, we may make a judgment, or even for some reason, judge that Hàtam was not a generous man.
In sum, judgment is not the same as relation in propositions and is issued after establishing a relation. In the same way, it is not the same as the association of meanings. Judgment is a mental act which the mind performs in order to refer to what is beyond them and unveil the reality.
From what was said above, it can be concluded that assent is always accompanied with judgment and relies on it. Without judgment, there could be no assent. In sum, the basis of assent and what distinguishes it from conception is judgment. After getting familiar with different ideas and theories of judgment, it would be useful to study the relation between assent and judgment. In other words, all the discussions so far indicated that assent is in a way related to judgment; however, the quality of this relation has not been dealt with yet. This relation can be explained in different ways, and there are a number of views concerning this issue, as follows:
First View: Assent is the same as judgment. According to this view, assent and judgment are no different from each other. In other words, there is a relation of equality between assent and judgment. Of course, one can adopt any view concerning the nature of judgment, and this view will naturally explain the nature of assent as well. This view is quite popular among philosophers. It seems that Sabziwàrí, Muhaqqiq Tusí, and Qutb al-Dín Ràzí confirm this view, Mullà Sadrà considers it as being weak.
Second View: Assent is a composite. This view is attributed to Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí. However, there are some debates over whether assent is a combination of three components, the conception of subject, the conception of predicate, and the judgmental relation, or a combination of four components, the above-mentioned three components along with judgment. Qutb al-Dín Ràzí believes that in Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí’s view assent consists of three components, whereas Íjí and Sabziwàrí side with the second view. Mullà Sadrà, however, does not adopt a specific position in this regard, and has his doubts about each of them.
A review of Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí’s words suggest that he believes that assent consists of four components and considers judgment as one of the pillars of assent rather than its true nature. In sum, according to Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí, assent is a composite of four elements, namely, subject, predicate, relation, and judgment.
In this sense, assent is the same as a proposition. Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí presents a definition for assent that only corresponds with the definition of a proposition. As a result, for him and his followers, assent is the same as proposition; of course, this is true only if we consider a proposition as a composite of four parts. However, there are other views and positions which are worth our attention.
Components of a proposition
One of the issues which is mainly discussed in logic, and peripherally in other disciplines, is the nature of a proposition and its components. There are certain views concerning mental propositions (not pronounced ones). These views will be explained below to clarify other dimensions of the problem of assent and knowledge. In what follows, the theories concerning affirmative and negative propositions are discussed.
1. Affirmative and negative propositions consist of four components or parts: subject, predicate, judgmental relation, and judgment. The proponents of this theoryargue that from a logical point of view, no proposition, whether affirmative or negative, lacks a relation and judgment, since assent relies on judgment, which is itself connected to the relation of the two parts of a proposition, i.e. subject and predicate. Therefore, a proposition could be one only if it involves a judgment. And if there could be no judgment without a subject, any proposition, even a negative one, must be based on the above-mentioned four pillars, in the sense that the absence of even one of them would be equal to the absence of the proposition.
2. An affirmative proposition has four components. Here the mind considers the subject, the predicate, and the unifying relation between them, and then states that there is an external unity between this relation and those two components. Nevertheless, in simple propositions, whose predicates consist of the concept of existence (for example, ‘man exists’), there is no relation, since it is not possible for relation, which is the same copulative existence, to mediate between itself and an object.
Negative propositions consist of three components. In these propositions there is, in fact, no judgment, since the mind does not issue a judgment after the conception of the subject, the predicate, and the judgmental relation; that is, the non-externality and unreality of the unifying relation are established in the mind. In other words, in an affirmative proposition, we make a judgment suggesting the unity between the subject and the predicate in the outside. In a negative proposition, however, we do not make such a judgment, yet we do not state the lack of unity, either. Thus the content of a negative proposition is not a negative statement; rather, it is the negation of judgment; in other words, it is the negation of relation rather than the relation of negation. This theory is quite popular among philosophers, with Ibn Sínà and Mullà Sadrà as two of its followers.
Apparently, if we consider judgment as the most essential element of assent and proposition, no proposition, even a negative one, could be free from judgment. At most, in some propositions, we can make a statement as to the unity of the two parts of the proposition with reality, and in some others, we can make a judgment suggesting the lack of such a unity. Thus judgment also exists in negative propositions. However, after witnessing the lack of relation between the two sides of the proposition in reality, the soul issues a judgment to express such a notion of non-existence and acknowledges that, due to this very lack of relation, this proposition either corresponds to its reality or does not. As a result, the difference between negation and affirmation in propositions does not depend on the non-existence of judgment; rather, it relies on the subject of judgment. When making a judgment as to the unity of the subject and predicate in the external world, we will have an affirmative proposition, and if we state the absence of this unity and relation in the outside, we will have a negative proposition. More precisely, what is negated in a negative proposition is the relation between the subject and predicate. Therefore, in order to emphasize the lack of relation between the two, the subject should be evaluated in terms of the predicate and vice versa. In fact, they should be studied in relation to each other as well as to the outside. Therefore, considering the lack of external relation between the two, and in order to refer to this reality, we make a judgment stating lack of relation. Thus in negative propositions, too, relation means comparing the two sides of the proposition followed by making a judgment. At most, we can say that here the subject of judgment is lack of relation. Generally speaking, it is not possible to have a proposition without a judgment; therefore, there is no difference between affirmative and negative propositions, or between composite or simple ones.
3. An affirmative proposition has three parts: subject, predicate, and judgment. The conception of subject, predicate and relation prepares the mind to issue a judgment. It should be noted, however, that judgmental relation is not among the pillars of proposition; however, since there could be no judgment without a relation, it is necessary to have one, so a proposition consists of a subject, a predicate, and a judgment. Nevertheless, the soul requires a relation to make a judgment. This can be illustrated by the fact that a simple proposition, in spite of being a proposition, lacks a judgmental relation. Another fact indicates that a pronounced proposition also has three components, and that the speech and the meaning should correspond with each other.
A negative proposition consists of two parts. In such propositions, after conceiving the subject and the predicate, the mind stops and does not establish a relation between them. However, the mind considers not making a judgment as making a judgment suggesting non-existence, and contrary to affirmative propositions, in which we have the concept of ‘is’, it places the concept of ‘is not’ in negative propositions. It also assumes four components for such propositions, whereas negative propositions have no more than two components. One of the followers of this view is ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í.
4. Affirmative and negative propositions have no more than two components. When the mind makes the judgment that ‘Hasan is sitting’, except for the conceptions of Hasan and sitting, there are no other elements such as judgment and relation. Rather, the content of this proposition consists merely of the two concepts that have come into existence together in the mind, and have been taken into consideration at the same time. Relation and judgment represent the concomitance between the subject and the predicate, and, due to the universal principle of the association of meanings, recalling one causes the recalling of the other. The concomitance and association between the subject and predicate could be due to their similarity, adjacency, opposition, and the like. Therefore, a proposition consists of nothing but two concomitant and associated conceptions and, therefore, there is no difference between affirmation and negation. Some contemporary psychologists believe in this theory.
Consequently, a proposition, as such, is not possible without a judgment. The existence and essence of a proposition depends on judgment. Judgment is the backbone of a proposition, and if it is broken, the proposition will also break. Here, too, there is no difference between negation and affirmation. Therefore, even a negative proposition does not lack a judgment. Secondly, the realm of the mind should be separated from the external world, so that the two are not confused. Existence and quiddity are united in the outside, and they can even be said to be the same. In fact, one of the types of unity is the one between existence and quiddity. However, when they come to the mind, they are two different concepts. As a result, one can be considered the subject and the other the predicate; for example, one might say ‘the tree exists’. In this analysis, there should be a judgmental relation and a judgment, so that one could state that the content of this proposition corresponds with reality. Therefore, in simple propositions, too, there are four pillars. Thirdly, relation is one of the components of proposition. According to the previously mentioned analysis, the mind, after conceiving the subject and the predicate, makes a comparison between the two and, then, makes a judgment indicating their unity in the outside, as well as the realization of this relation in the objective world (in affirmative propositions). Thus relation is an inseparable part of a proposition. On the other hand, concerning the issue of copulative existence, ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í, himself, maintains that relation depends on both sides of the proposition, so that it cannot be separated from them. In the same place, he states that relation or copulative existence is one of the components of proposition. Fourthly, judgment is not the same as the association of meanings in propositions; rather, it is an act which the soul performs in order to adjust the content of the proposition in the external world with the unity of the subject and predicate in the objective world. In sum, we can say that a proposition, whether affirmative or negative, whether composite or simple, has four pillars. It is also noted that there are some other ideas and statements concerning the component parts of propositions, which will be discussed elsewhere.
Third view: Assent is the same as admitting or acknowledgement. Wherever there is a proposition, acknowledgement will be involved, too. In a proposition, we admit the requirements; however, this is different from the realization of the content of the proposition in the external world. Acknowledging the content of a proposition means believing that the proposition corresponds to reality, whether the essence of the proposition corresponds to the external world or not. In other words, believing in correspondence is other than correspondence itself. One might believe in the truth of a proposition, while it might not be true by itself. Thus there is a fundamental difference between these two sentences: ‘P is true’ and ‘I believe that P is true’. The former is a report of reality, representing the external situation in the form of a proposition. However, in the second sentence, we believe in and acknowledge the truth of a proposition. This belief may or may not correspond to the external world itself positively. This reveals the distinction between a belief and the truth. As a result, false propositions or pseudo-true ones may also be considered as propositions. This theory has been attributed to Qutb al-Dín Ràzí, who himself attributes it to Ibn Sínà (in al-Mujiz al-kabír) and Abharí. Ràzí has considered admitting the same as acknowledged quality.
It is also necessary to emphasize that the last view can be considered as being the same as the first one. Here, assent is equated with acknowledgement. It was also introduced as judgment in the first view. The similarity between the two views lies in the fact that judgment is the same as admitting and acknowledging that the content of the proposition corresponds with the external world. As a result, if we reduce judgment to psychical acknowledgement, the last view concerning assent could be viewed the same as the first one.
Fourth theory: Assent means a conception involving a judgment. Ibn Sínà believes in this theory, and no one before him had ever spoken about assent in the same way that he did. As Mullà Sadrà says, no thinker has ever explained the nature of assent as precisely as Ibn Sínà. He has some interesting points in this regard in al-Shifà, in the part on Mantiq. 
Ibn Sínà argues that knowledge or the known is of two types. The first type is conception, which is merely the reflection of nominal meaning in the mind. Truth or falsity has no way in conceptions. At the same time, Ibn Sínà does not deny the representational nature of conceptions, since the phrase ‘the conception of the object’ refers to external objects. Therefore, the conceived form of objects represents the external world and refers to what is beyond it.
The second type of knowledge is assent. Through contrasting doubt and assent, Ibn Sínà intends to present a clear interpretation of assent. If one doubts that whiteness is an accident, he has conceived the concepts of whiteness and accident; besides, he has also made a comparison between the two. However, since doubt is dominant here, there is no assent, neither an affirmative one, stating that all white things are accidents, nor a negative one, stating that no white thing is an accident.
Unlike others, Ibn Sínà does not divide knowledge into assent and conception. Rather, he classifies it into the two types of simple conception and conception with assent. The latter is what is commonly called assent. In other words, conception is of two types: simple conception, which does not involve a judgment, and a conception which involves a judgment, or to put it more precisely, a conception which is the same as judgment. By a conception accompanied with assent or judgment, he means one which is the same as assent or judgment. Thus assent is a conception that is exactly the same as judgment. Here, there is no distinction between conception and judgment.
Accordingly, we might better say that acquired knowledge is of two types: a conception which is not the same as judgment and is different from it in essence, and a conception that is the same as judgment; that is, all its reality consists of judgment, and vice versa. Therefore, assent is the same as conception, and a conception of the type of assent is nothing other than a judgment. As mentioned above, Ibn Sínà says that assent is a conception with judgment. One might interpret this definition as indicating that conception and judgment are two different things, and to prove his point refer to the word ‘with’, while it is not always used to indicate a distinction. For example, if we say that ‘man is an animal with the ability to think (rationalize)’, we do not mean that the animal in man has an existence different from thinking, and that the ability to think has a different existence form the animal. In fact, both of them exist in man through one existence; therefore, they are of the same making. Of course, animal and thoughtful or rational are two concepts in the realm of the mind and from a rational point of analysis, and since they are two concepts, they are different from each other. Nevertheless, these two concepts are the same in the world of existence and there is no separation between them. For example, concerning the issues of genus and differentia, it is said that genus is a totally ambiguous concept, and it can only be said to be of this or that type. Therefore, the animal, since it is a genus, is an unrealized quiddity which is a man, a horse, or the like. Differentia is also a quiddity representing the realization of genus and, thus, animal and rational exist through a single existence. In the same way, concerning Ibn Sínà’s claim that ‘assent is a conception with judgment’, we can say that he views assent as a conception which is the same as judgment. As a result, knowledge is of two kinds: a part of it consists of conceptions which are not different from judgment, and the other part consists of conceptions which are the same as judgment rather than being with it. Mullà Sadrà  has made the same interpretation of Suhrawardi and Muhaqqiq Tusí’s words and believes that Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí and the author of al-Matàli’ share the same idea.
Kàtibí Qazwíní defines assent as a conception with judgment.  Muzaffar  and Abi Bakr Urmawí  also provide a similar definition. Ibn Sínà’s words could be interpreted in the same way, and it can be said that by assent they mean a conception that is the same as judgment. Their view can also be interpreted in some other way, indicating that from their point of view, assent is a composite whose constituents are conception and judgment. In this way, the above-mentioned thinkers will be of a similar view to Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí, with the sole difference being that Ràzí’s assent consists of four components, while theirs consists of two.
It can also be added that Ibn Sínà’s idea of assent is in line with the theory of judgment having two aspects (judgment is an unveiling act), since as we saw, from his point of view, assent is a conception which is the same as judgment. Thus both assent and judgment are of the kind of conception. On the other hand, in Ibn Sínà’s opinion, conception represents and reports the outside. Therefore, judgment can represent what is beyond it and show a criterion for itself. On the other hand, the phrase ‘it is asserted’ and the like suggest that Ibn Sínà considers assent as a kind of act performed by soul. In conclusion, we can say that a conception which is the same as judgment (assent) has a double function; on the one hand, it represents the external world, and that is why it is called conception, and on the other, it is an act of the soul, and that is why it is called assent. These two functions are in fact the two sides of the same coin and the same reality.
It might also be said that the last view (Ibn Sínà’s view) is very similar to the first one. Of course, there is a lot of difference between them in terms of accuracy and subtlety. Finally, it can be said that all the ideas and theories concerning assent can be reduced to two general views. According to one view, assent is the same as judgment. Some maintain that assent is the essence of judgment, and some others have called it acknowledgement and, ultimately, Ibn Sínà, through an accurate analysis, considers assent as a conception which is the same as judgment. In the second view, assent is considered as a composite of four components by Fakhr al-Dín Ràzí, or of two components by Kàtibí Qazwíní and others.
One of the conclusions of the discussions of conception and assent is that both of them (assent as viewed by Ibn Sínà) represent and unveil the external world. Now we can add that it is in this way that in the discussion of self-evident issues or immediate perceptions conception and assent are true, that their truth is self-evident, and that theoretical sciences obtain their truth from immediate perceptions. However, if we do not regard conception or assent as representing and unveiling the external world, we cannot do so with respect to self-evident issues. Representation is the introduction to truth rather than being the same as it. Conception or assent cannot take the test of truth or falsity before obtaining the permission for representation. Truth is the last step of a ladder ascending which would only be possible through leaving the step of representing and reporting the outside behind. As mentioned before, reporting is not the same as truth but its introduction, in the sense that every true thing represents its outside, yet wherever representation is true, that place is not necessarily home for truth, since representation is nothing more than knowledge revealing what is beyond it. For a representative type of knowledge, there should exist a represented thing; however, this thing does not necessarily correspond to the external world accurately and perfectly. The represented thing is other than the referent. If it perfectly corresponds with the referent of knowledge, this representing and unveiling knowledge is also called true knowledge; other wise, it has represented the external world and is, at the same time, false, Thus representation involves the truth and is also consistent with falsity. At the same time, neither truth nor falsity could be discussed without reference to representation.
Another point is that a distinction is made between mental and pronounced propositions in logic. In the philosophy of logic, which is one of the branches of modern philosophy, there is a similar distinction between a proposition and a sentence. It might be useful here to pay attention to the distinctions between the two. Philosophers of logic  maintain that a sentence represents a grammatical structure which refers to a meaning. A sentence consists of a combination of oral or written words and represents a specific signified thing; the proposition, however, states the informational content of a sentence. Accordingly, there are four distinctions between a sentence and a proposition, as follows:
1) A proposition is one, while sentences are many. For example, if once we say ‘A is bigger than B’, once ‘B is smaller than A’, the two sentences are different in terms of their grammatical structure, while their informational contents are the same. Thus we have only one piece of information, and deal with a single represented issue, and if we believe that the first sentence is true, the second will also be true, and vice versa.
2) A sentence is one, while propositions are many. That is, unlike the previous distinction, all the sentences whose subjects are pronouns, such ‘he came’, have the same grammatical structure, while there will be as many pieces of information as the number of the referents of pronouns. Or if there is a homonym in a sentence such as ‘Hasan saw shir (meaning lion in Persian), we have as many propositions as the number of the meanings of the word shir (lion, water tap, and milk).
3) There are as many versions of a single sentence as there are languages, while there is no more than one proposition.
4) A proposition is subject to truth and falsity, while a sentence could be either meaningful or meaningless. It is the informational load of the sentence that either corresponds to the external world or does not. However, it is nothing more than the sum of the words that have come together according to a specific order, either meaningful or meaningless. Therefore, one of the definitions of proposition is as follows: ‘a proposition is something which is either true or false’.
Finally it is emphasized that since assent is the same as judgment rather than its relation, it comes between the two sides of the proposition and follows conception. The realization of assent is after the realization of conception, which is the initial stage of assent and judgment. Therefore, assent depends on conception. This is one of the well-known issues discussed by logicians; however, in some cases, it seems that the reverse is correct; that is, conception is a result of assent and follows it. A clear example here is a conditional proposition. Such propositions, since they are propositions, have a judgment. A single proposition has a single judgment. In conditional propositions, judgment is the same as the relation established between the condition and the consequent. On the other hand, as we know, condition and consequent each play the role of a proposition. These two propositions can be viewed from two aspects. If we consider them as independent from and unrelated to each other, they will be perfect propositions possessing some pillars including a judgment. These propositions are in fact completely of the type of assent. From another viewpoint, they are the antecedent and consequent in conditional propositions, and should be considered as conceptions. Now, considering the fact that the antecedent or consequent in conditional sentences are assents that are viewed as conceptions, we can say that conception comes secondary to assent, and that assent precedes conception.
. Ibn Sínà, al-Shifà, al-Mantiq, vol. 1, p. 15.
. Ibn Sínà, al-Ishàràt wal-tanbíhàt, vol. 1, p. 12.
. Sharh al-mawàqif, vol. 1, p. 89.
. ‘Abdul Razzàq Làhiji, Kashf al-muràd, p. 172.
. Sabziwàrí, Sharh al-manzumah, p. 7.
. ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í, Nihàyat al-hikmah, p. 250. For more information refer to Fàràbí, al-Mantiqiyyat, p. 266, al-Jawhar al-nafíz, p. 192.
. Mullà Sadrà, al-Taswwur wal-tasdíq, p. 36.
. Imàm Mohammed Ghazzàlí, al-Qistàs, p. 3.
. Suhrawardí, Hikmat al-ishràq, p. 41.
. ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í, Usul-i falsafah wa rawish-i realizm (The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism), vol. 1, p. 130
. Ibid., pp. 94-168.
. Misbàh Yazdí, Àmuzish-i falsafah (Teaching of Philosophy), vol, 1, p. 164.
. Mohammed Bàqir Sadr, Falsafatunà, p. 162.
. Mullà Sadrà, al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq (Risàlah fi) pp. 33-38.
. Sharh al-mawàqif, vol. 1, p. 89.
. Sharh al-matàli‘, p. 8.
. Sharh al-hikmat al-ishràq, p. 42.
. Mullà Sadrà, al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 32.
. Sharh al-mawàqif, vol. 1, p. 89.
. Tabatabà’í, Usul-i falsafah wa rawish-i realizm (The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism), vol. 2, pp. 50-53, Nihàyat al-hikmah, pp. 250-252.
. Mullà Sadrà, al-Asfàr, vol. 3, p. 366.
. Durrat al-tàj, p. 296.
. Mullà Sadrà, al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 39.
. Sharh al-matàli‘, p. 8.
. Nihàyat al-hikmah, p. 251.
. Nazariyyat al-m‘arifat, p. 38, Naqd al-muhassal, p. 6, al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 37.
. Sabziwàrí, Sharh al-manzumah, p. 7.
. Kashf al-muràd, p. 172.
. Sharh al-hikmat al-ishràq, pp. 41-2.
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 53.
. ‘Ayun al-hikmah, p. 42.
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, pp. 96-97.
. Sharh al-mawàqif, vol. 1, p. 88.
. Sharh al- manzumah, Mantiq (logic), p. 8.
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 53.
. ‘Ayun al-hikmah, p. 4, al-Mulakhkhas, p. 1.
. Amuzish-i falsafah (Teaching of Philosophy), vol. 1, p. 165.
. Copulative existence cannot mediate between itself and a thing in the outside, unless in mental or, generally speaking, in the domain of the mind, where there is a difference between quiddity and its existence (according to a philosophical principle, existence is added to quiddity). Regarding this difference, one can establish a relation between the two. It seems that the mind and the object have been confused here, and the judgement of object has been generalized to the mind.
. ‘Allàmah Tabàtabà’í, Nihàyat al-hikmah, p. 251. Usul-i falsafah wa rawish-i realizm ((The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism), vol. 2, pp. 44-48.
. Nihàyat al-hikmah, p. 251, Usul-i falsafah wa rawish-i realizm (The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism), vol. 2, pp. 48-49. al-Asfàr, vol. 1, pp. 385-6 (with Tabàtabà’í’s commentary).
. Usul-i falsafah wa rawish-i realizm (The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism), vol. 2, p. 46, Falsafatuna, p. 58.
. Nihàyat al-hikmah, p. 28.
. Faali Mohammed Taqi, Daràmadí bar ma‘rafat shinàsí muàsir díní (An Introduction to Contemporary Religious Epistemology).
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 98.
. Ibid., pp. 98-101.
. Ibid., p. 44.
. Ibid., p. 39.
. al-Shifà, Mantíq (logic), vol. 1, p. 17.
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, pp. 64-70, Hikmat al-isharàq, p. 41, Kashf al-muràd, p. 172.
. al-Tasawwur wal-tasdíq, p. 60.
. Sharh al-shamsiyyah, p. 7.
. al-Mantiq, p. 16.
. Sharh al-matàli‘, p. 7.
. Faali, Mohammed Taqi, op. cit., pp. 57-63.
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